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ABSTRACT 
The Taliban organization has undergone a major transformation, since its ouster 
from power in Afghanistan and continues to wage an effective defensive insurgency or 
“war of the flea.”    The study uses results of a survey of knowledgeable participants in 
the Afghan-Pakistan arena, conducted by the authors, to analyze the current situation and 
prospects for success. The thesis explains the Taliban's survival and growth in the face of 
significant odds by analyzing the organization’s strengths, weaknesses, and how it adapts 
in response to Coalition Forces' counterinsurgency efforts. The Taliban are deeply rooted 
in the cultural, religious, and ethnic linkages of the Pashtun population. The thesis 
emphasizes that a conventional counterinsurgency strategy using large-scale military 
operations and a fundamentally alien system of governance out of harmony with local 
traditions cannot penetrate the Pashtun tribal, religious, and cultural web in which the 
Taliban operate. The thesis concludes with recommendations for designing and 
implementing a broader Coalition strategy to target identified Taliban critical linkages. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Probably the most widely recognized image of the present day is that of airplanes 
hitting the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. On that fateful day, the terrorist 
organization Al-Qaeda and their hosts, the Taliban1 in Afghanistan, became household 
names around the world. Although the Taliban had featured occasionally in news reports, 
after 9/11 they received massive media attention with stories about their brutality and 
connections to terrorist organizations. 
Although obscure in the west before 9/11, the Taliban were known in their own 
region of the world. Emerging in 1994 from religious madrassahs,2 they rose to 
dominance in Afghanistan and achieved amazing victories over their enemies while 
continuously expanding their influence. Hailed as saviors and feared as oppressors, they 
were almost a mythical phenomenon that represented the very culture of the country in 
which they lived – revenge for transgression, hospitality even for their enemies, and 
readiness to die for a strong sense of honor.3 They know the Afghan people and their 
ways, and embed deeply in the complex web of culture, tribalism, religion, and ethnicity.  
Amidst the lawlessness and warlord rule that followed Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, the Taliban offered security to the war weary populace and thus achieved 
astounding success in a short time.4 Their rise to power, accompanied by a wave of 
intimidation, forced the application of their version of Islamic sharia on the Afghans, in 
contrast to the traditional Afghan tolerance for other sects and religions.5  Later, Al-
                                                 
1 Taliban is a plural form of the Arabic word Talib, which literally means a student of any discipline. 
In the context of this study, the term implies an Afghan fundamentalist movement of the same name and its 
members. 
2 Madrassah (Arabic: سردم ہ ) is the Arabic word for any type of school, secular or religious (of any 
religion). In this research, the madrassahs refers to the Islamic religious seminaries in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. 
3 These values of the Pashtun culture are defined by the tribal code of Pashtunwali, discussed in 
ensuing chapters. 
4 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001), 4.  
5 Ibid., 82. 
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Qaeda elements gained inroads into the Taliban power structure with financial support in 
return for the sanctuaries they needed to plan the 9/11 attacks.6 Cooperation with Al-
Qaeda ultimately resulted in the Taliban’s fall.  
After the initial successes of the U.S. and NATO forces and the Northern Alliance 
in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, the Taliban seemed defeated.  
People in the streets of Kabul and Kandahar were initially jubilant with talk of a liberal, 
democratic, peaceful Afghanistan. However, the population outside the major cities 
feared the Taliban phoenix would arise again. Their fears were not baseless. After six 
years of continuous Coalition military campaigns,7 the Taliban remain a viable opponent. 
They have embraced modern technologies like the internet8 and have developed new 
tactics, techniques, and procedures for their struggle. Despite efforts by Coalition partners 
on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, their numbers and menace are growing 
throughout the Pashtun belt.  
The major policy question is how to stem the Taliban resurgence. For external 
actors like the U.S. and NATO, this is a question of disabling support for terror networks; 
for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the question affects their survival as nation-states. If the 
current Taliban resurgence continues unchecked, very soon their influence may well 
destabilize the whole South-Central Asian region. A comprehensive approach is needed 
to forestall such an eventuality.  
Presently, the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies employed on both sides of the 
border are mainly reactive. Based on a conventional mind-set, they generally fall short of 
fully addressing the problem.  In contrast, the Taliban have transformed themselves while 
exploiting weaknesses in the COIN strategies employed against them. There is thus a 
need for a more proactive approach to assess the way the insurgency is evolving and try 
                                                 
6 Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001), viii. 
7 For the purpose of this study, the terms Coalition and Coalition Forces refer to the governments and 
security forces of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the U.S., NATO and International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) forces operating in Afghanistan. 
8 Hekmat Karzai in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Building a New Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: World 
Peace Foundation; Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 67.  
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to stem the tide before it is too late. This requires a thorough analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Taliban, their methods of operations, and a prediction of their future 
evolution in order to provide guidelines for a modified COIN strategy.  This study 
endeavors to tackle this perplexing problem. 
A. PURPOSE  
This study describes the Taliban phenomenon, elaborates upon their strengths and 
weaknesses, and explains their transformation in response to the Coalition COIN 
strategies. The study endeavors to predict the Taliban's future strategic course of action 
and recommends measures to counter their strengths and exploit their weaknesses in 
order to design a formidable COIN effort. While recognizing the need for massive 
changes at tactical and operational levels, the authors limit the scope of this thesis to the 
strategic level, as the minute details of a modified strategy will certainly require 
additional extensive research. 
B. MAJOR QUESTION AND ARGUMENT 
The Taliban have dominated the Afghan scene, to a greater or lesser extent, since 
their emergence in 1994. It is mistaken to assume that the sole or major cause of their 
success was a brutal intimidation campaign or outside support, as the Taliban are deeply 
rooted in the cultural, religious, and ethnic linkages of the Pashtun population. A 
conventionally oriented COIN strategy, relying on large-scale military operations and an 
alien system of governance out of harmony with local traditions, cannot penetrate the 
local population's tight web of tribal and ethnic identities, and cultural nuances. This 
study identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the Taliban, predicts their likely 
strategies, and prescribes some broad measures to assist the formulation of a better COIN 
policy. It also argues that the current conventionally based COIN strategies cannot ensure 
success in stabilizing the Pashtun belt in the long term. This goal requires a better, 
broader based, and less direct approach based on a through evaluation of the Taliban's 
peculiarities and potential for transformation.  
 4
C. RELEVANCE OF THE TOPIC  
The events of 9/11 generated significant interest in the Taliban, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, spawning a flood of writings about the region. Most of the research discusses 
the problems of insurgency and terrorism in Afghanistan and the Federally Administered 
Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan from a historical perspective only. Relatively little 
research has been directed towards exploring the transformation of the Taliban after 9/11 
and identifying them as the “Insurgés sans Frontiers,” probably because of the obvious 
difficulties with studying a covert organization. For example, Ahmed Rashid’s excellent 
work on the Taliban9 is a milestone but is restricted to a snapshot of the organization as it 
existed prior to 9/11. With few exceptions, including Johnson and Mason's work10  and 
that of Graeme Smith,11 the dominant perspective does not take into account the ethnic 
and tribal basis of the Taliban insurgency's spread across borders. Similarly, material 
about the FATA mostly takes an administrative perspective on the FATA’s integration 
into mainstream Pakistan, without focusing on the phenomenon of "Talibanisation" or  on 
counterinsurgency efforts. For an effective solution to the current instability in the 
Pashtun belt, a thorough analysis of the Taliban insurgency and its ability to evolve over 
time is, therefore, in order. The task is an onerous one, requiring extensive research; this 
thesis will attempt only some small steps in that direction. That said, this study is likely 
to help policy makers in Afghanistan, Pakistan, NATO and the U.S. in dealing with the 
cross border threat posed by the Taliban. The thesis may also interest field operatives, 
helping them to understand their adversary. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.  
10 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in 
Afghanistan," Orbis 51, no. 1 (Winter 2007), 71, http://proquest.umi.com/ (accessed December 11, 2007).   
11 Graeme Smith, "Talking to the Taliban," The Globe and Mail March 22, 2008, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/talkingtothetaliban (accessed April 16, 2008).  
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D. THESIS CONTENTS BY CHAPTER  
Chapter I: Introduction 
This chapter describes the purpose of the thesis and the research question. It 
argues the need for developing a broader understanding of the Taliban in order to develop 
a better approach to counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism efforts in the Pashtun belt. 
Chapter II: Methodology 
The second chapter describes the methodology utilized during the research. It lays 
out the general theory and conceptual models used in the study while providing a 
framework for subsequent analysis of the problem. 
Chapter III: Background of the Problem 
This chapter frames the historical perspective of the problem. It details the genesis 
of the Taliban phenomenon in view of their operational environment, culture, resources, 
and ethnic profile. The chapter also describes the known and implied Taliban aims and 
strategies in order to provide a basis for subsequent analysis.  
Chapter IV: Structure of Taliban 
Chapter IV focuses on the structure of the Taliban. It discusses their formal and 
informal layout and operational mechanisms in conjunction with their leadership and 
decision-making processes. The chapter assesses the motivation and beliefs of Taliban 
operatives to give a better understanding of their recruitment and human resource 
processes. Interviews and results of a survey conducted with Coalition field operatives 
support various assumptions and inferences by the authors.  
Chapter V: Coalition COIN Strategies 
The fifth chapter portrays the COIN strategies adopted by Coalition forces on 
both sides of the border. This description helps identify the positive and negative effects 




Chapter VI: Effects, Adaptation, and Future Options for the Taliban 
Chapter VI describes the visible operational results of current Taliban strategy 
and its effects on the insurgency. The chapter recognizes the Taliban strengths and 
weaknesses along with some visible adaptation trends that appear responsible for their 
survival against COIN strategies as part of the attempt to predict likely future tendencies 
for the Taliban.  
Chapter VII:  Summary and Recommendations 
The final chapter offers conclusions and recommendations for designing a robust 
COIN effort to counter the Taliban strengths and exploit their weaknesses. It presents the 
conclusions of the thesis, stressing the importance of an alternative approach to COIN in 
the Pashtun belt and emphasizing the importance of success for regional and global 
stability and peace. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduced the subject of the study and described its significance to 
the ongoing Global War on Terror (GWOT). It established a need to analyze the Taliban 
phenomenon and its transformation after 9/11 in support of Coalition efforts to bring 
peace and stability to the region. The next chapter describes the methodology used during 
the course of the research and explains the general theory and conceptual models relevant 




II.  RESEARCH DESIGN, THEORETICAL FRAME, AND 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, 
whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for 
strategy and victory. – Sun Tzu12 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the research design, conceptual models, and theory applied 
to the research questions described in Chapter I.   The research design and conceptual 
models provides the architecture in which we examine the Taliban’s re-emergence in 
Afghanistan and their development in Pakistan in order to better understand how the 
Taliban have survived and grown since 9/11 despite Coalition counterinsurgency efforts. 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Figure 1. Research Design Model 
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the mixed-method approach used 
throughout the thesis. The journey commences with the research questions and concludes 
                                                 
12 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (El Paso: El Paso Norte Press, 2005), 138. 
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with an analytical research paper addressing critical quandaries facing the Coalition and 
Pakistani governments and militaries. A variety of data, both qualitative and quantitative, 
is required to assess the Taliban insurgency and the counterinsurgency strategies arrayed 
against them.  A survey of persons who have operated in the region, interviews with 
combat leaders and support and interagency personnel, and the authors' personal 
experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan supply the data for the thesis. 
The qualitative approach assembles information from a myriad of sources.   
Works analyzing the history and ethnography of Afghanistan and the FATA allow the 
reader to understand the culture and composition of the Taliban.13  Thesis research would 
not amount to much if generally accepted theory were not involved; thus COIN Theory as 
it applies to the conditions in the Pashtun belt is presented.  Information gathered through 
interviews with several military and civilian officials involved in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan is discussed, along with media reports, journal articles, and conference papers 
on the current nature of the Taliban insurgency.   
The quantitative approach includes the analysis of various data sources and 
systems models applied to the research question. Two primary and one secondary 
‘systems models’ are used to depict the Taliban and the Coalition approaches to defeating 
them. The Congruence Model (Figure 2 below) analyzes the Taliban as an organization.  
The Components of System Model Inputs (Figure 3 below) further highlights the input 
portion of the Congruence Model; this model identifies all of the internal and external 
factors that influence the Taliban.  The second systems model is the Insurgency as a 
System (Figure 4 below), a variation of the Congruence Model, which identifies critical 
linkages that coalition forces must target. These systems models are discussed in detail in 
subsequent sections.   
                                                 
13 Sample works include Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), Ahmed Rashid’s 
Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Olaf Caroe’s The Pathans, 550 B.C.-
A.D. 1957 (New York: St. Martin's, 1958), Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Maqsudul Hasan Nuri’s Tribal Areas 
of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), Rizwan 
Hussain’s Pakistan & Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Co, 
2005), and Michael Griffin’s, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London: 
Pluto Press, 2001). 
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Survey analysis provides the foundation of the research.  The authors developed a 
survey that questioned military officers, government officials, and academics about the 
following areas: the Taliban as an organization, current Coalition COIN strategies, 
possible Taliban courses of action, and priorities for future Coalition COIN efforts.  The 
survey was limited to personnel from the U.S., NATO, and Pakistan military and 
government agencies with experience in Afghanistan and Pakistan.14  The second source 
of quantitative data is surveys from within Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as the 2007 A 
Survey of the Afghan People from the Asia Foundation and Understanding FATA from 
the Community Appraisal and Motivation Program.  The third source of quantitative 
information involves statistical analysis of figures compiled by trusted agencies.   
C. TALIBAN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The first model utilized to analyze the Taliban as an organization is the 
Congruence Model (Figure 1 above). This model aims at dissecting the Taliban’s inputs, 
strategy, organizational structure, and outputs, thus providing a holistic view.  Assessing 
the enemy through such an approach is significantly different from most conventional 
military analysis.  The conventional approach only takes into consideration the enemy's 
capabilities, disposition, composition, and most likely or most dangerous courses of 
action.  This model, however, provides insight on how and why the Taliban has managed 
to survive, and more importantly, on how they have adapted and grown.   
                                                 




Figure 2. The Congruence Model15 
As suggested by Figure 2 above, the inputs of an organization consist of internal 
and external frameworks that shape their identity and strategy, including their history, 
environment, and resources.  The history of an organization is the foundation for 
understanding why they function as they do.  History can also help to predict the 
organization’s future actions by revealing “the crucial developments that shaped it over 
time—the strategic decisions, behavior of key leaders, responses to crises, and the 
evolution of values and beliefs.”16  Every organization, be it a business, government 
agency, criminal or insurgent group, operates within a larger environment.  Portions of 
the larger environment identified in this study include the physical terrain of the Pashtun 
belt, culture, religion, and other organizations such as NATO, ISAF, and relevant 
governments and militaries.  The larger environment influences the organization through 
demands and constraints imposed as well as opportunities.   The last input for an 
organization is its resources, which includes every asset available including the people, 
allies, training, monetary capital, equipment and information.  Historical, environmental 
and resource inputs affect the strategy employed by an organization.  The strategy to 
configure and utilize resources to best achieve their goals will be determined “in response 
                                                 
15 Adapted from Oliver Wyman, “The Congruence Model: A Roadmap for Understanding 
Organizational Performance,” Oliver Wyman Group, 8, 
http://www.oliverwyman.com/ow/pdf_files/Congruence_Model_INS.pdf. (accessed April 12, 2007). 
16 Ibid., 6. 
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to the demands, threats, opportunities, and constraints of the environment within the 
context of the organization’s history.”17  The inputs to the Taliban are discussed in detail 
in Chapter III.  
The “structure” portion of the model analyzes the transformation of ideals into 
actions. As suggested by Figure 2 above, this analysis is broken down into four sections: 
the tasks or work performed, the people who make up the organization, the formal 
organization, and the informal organization.  The work or tasks performed are activities 
by Taliban members to accomplish or further their strategy. The people are those 
responsible for conducting the work. It is imperative to understand the characteristics and 
culture of the people – their knowledge, needs and preferences, perceptions and 
expectations, as well as their demographics – in order to persuade or dissuade them from 
conducting insurgent activities. The formal organization provides the “structures, 
systems, and processes each organization creates to group people and the work they do 
and to coordinate their activity in ways designed to achieve strategic objectives.”18  The 
informal organization provides unwritten guidelines, such as ideologies or tribal codes, 
which greatly influence individual and collective behaviors, values and beliefs.  The 
structure of the Taliban is depicted in Chapter IV. 
The output segment of the model describes the positive or negative yield of the 
organization in physical and perceptual realms.  For example, the ambush killing NATO 
soldiers emboldened the resistance and increased recruiting, while the suicide bombing 
killed several civilians, turning the populace against the movement.19 The product of 
labor is continually analyzed in the context of achieving strategic goals and a feedback 
loop provides additional input adjust, morph, and flex the organization as necessary.  This 
evaluation and feedback provides the basis for the Taliban’s continued illusiveness and 
flexibility.  The Congruence Model presents a detailed framework within which the  
 
                                                 
17 Wyman, 7. 
18 Ibid., 9. 
19 This example comes from the personal experience of the author who served in Afghanistan during 
OEF rotations in 2003, 2004, and 2005-06 through observations of Taliban operations tempo, use of night 
letters, propaganda, etc. 
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qualitative and quantitative data are applied to reveal the insurgent force’s characteristics, 
strengths, and weaknesses. The output and feedback loop of the Taliban is described in 
Chapter VI. 
An unconventional problem requires an unconventional approach!  The 
Congruence Model provides the necessary mechanism for analyzing and understanding 
an insurgent enemy in a noncontiguous battlefield. 
D. THE CONGRUENCE MODEL INPUTS EXPANDED 
The components of this systems input model are broken down into four 
categories: history, environment, resources and other factors.  The first three categories 
fall directly out of the congruence model lens and focus on both internal and external 
frameworks that make-up the Taliban.  The category of other environmental factors 
includes external factors that either directly or indirectly affect the Taliban.  All of these 
factors provide the foundation for Taliban growth, and they play a large role in its 
character, tendencies, trends and conduct.  These components are discussed in detail in 
Chapter III.20  
                                                 
20 With the exception of Human Terrain, the components of input are self-explanatory.  To prevent 




Figure 3. Components of System Model Inputs21 
E. COALITION APPROACH: CONCEPTUAL MODEL, THEORETICAL 
FRAME AND PROPOSITIONS   
The second conceptual model applied in this study focuses on the supply side of 
the insurgency through an input-output systems model that complements the Congruence 
Model.  The thesis employs Lietes and Wolf’s system approach, outlined in Rebellion 
and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts to identify the critical linkages 
necessary for the Taliban’s continued survival. (See Figure 4 below.) Knowledge of the 
Taliban’s characteristics, strengths and weaknesses using the Congruence Model analysis 
will help the coalition develop a coherent COIN strategy to attack their most vulnerable 
linkages. 
                                                 
21 The authors developed the Components of Systems Model Input in order to detail several factors 
affecting the Taliban as an organization and their ongoing insurgency.  The pie chart is based on survey 
results and interviews and is not quantifiable.  The relative importance of the issues for the Taliban is 
indicated by the area of each slice of the pie; thus, we believe that Physical Terrain and Culture are much 
more important than Regional Players and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). 
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Figure 4. Insurgency as a System22 
The traditional "hearts and minds" approach to counterinsurgency focuses on the 
demands of the insurgents and the populace.  Although there is utility on the demand 
side, the authors find the Lietes and Wolf supply approach highly useful in identifying 
associations between the insurgent force and its support mechanisms.  Insurgencies 
receive their inputs from mainly internal (endogenous) and sometimes external 
(exogenous) sources.  These inputs consist of people, food, equipment, money, and 
cadres.  Coercion, persuasion, or a combination of the two achieves the internal support 
necessary. The conversion mechanism is synonymous with the Congruence Model’s 
structure portion, wherein the inputs transform into outputs; characteristics include such 
things as training, teaching, propaganda, and logistic operations.  The outputs of the 
model afford an understanding of the violent and nonviolent activities that aim to further 
their cause and undermine the ruling government’s legitimacy. This leads to the authority 
section of the system wherein the insurgency seeks to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the 
populace.  The last segment of the system is the pump. The pump allows the insurgency 
to grow.  The insurgents’ newfound authority and success breeds greater internal and 
external support as these resource centers perceive the insurgency as a viable option to 
                                                 
22 Model adapted from concepts found in Nathan Lietes and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and 
Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1970), 
http://rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R0462.pdf (accessed April 12, 2007).  
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the current government; thus, success begets success.  The critical linkages identified 
using this conceptual model provides coalition forces with a priority of effort in 
countering the Taliban’s strengths and exploiting their weaknesses.  Historical examples, 
COIN Theory, data from interviews and surveys will compliment model in developing a 
pragmatic approach to defeating the Taliban. 
The authors ascribe to Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice 
for the primary theoretical frame and the basis for assessing the coalition’s efforts.23  
Four propositions24 are used to test the coalition COIN strategies.    
(1) The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for 
the insurgent. 
(2) Support is gained through an active minority.  
(3) Support from the population is conditional.  
(4) Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.25   
This theory applied to the Coalition’s efforts within the Pashtun belt identifies 
several shortfalls in past and current COIN strategies. More importantly, the theory and 
propositions when applied to the Taliban strategy and methods of operation further 
delineates their weaknesses and options to exploit them.     
F. CONCLUSION 
This research encompasses several systems and methods for gathering 
information.  The hybrid mixed-methods approach permits freedom to choose the 
methods, techniques and procedures that best answer the thesis questions.  With the 
pragmatic knowledge gathered through theory, conceptual models, historical and 
anthropological studies, interviews, surveys and current events, this thesis presents a 
detailed analysis of the Taliban as an organization – inputs, strategy, structure, and 
                                                 
23 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964). 
24 Galula identified these as the four main laws but, for the purpose of this research, they will be 
referred to as propositions. 
25 Galula, 52-55. 
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outputs and the successes and failures of the coalition’s COIN strategy. The next chapter 
provides an understanding of the inputs—the internal and external factors—affecting the 
Taliban composition and conduct and concludes by describing what appears to be their 
current strategy. 
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III.  BACKGROUND: KNOW THY ENEMY 
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of 
a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every 
victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy 
nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.  — Sun Tzu26 
A. INTRODUCTION 
If the Afghan government and Coalition partners hope to succeed in defeating the 
ongoing insurgency across the Pashtun belt, they must know their enemy.  This chapter 
employs an expanded version of the input section of the Congruence Model to describe 
the unconventional enemy that the coalition faces.  Specifically, this chapter examines the 
twelve universal input mechanisms that influence the Taliban organization (see Figure 3 
above).  The input mechanisms include: history, physical terrain, culture, religion, human 
terrain, Al Qaeda and other Jihadist militants, narcotics, regional players, NGOs and 
humanitarian agencies, presence of NATO/ISAF/U.S. forces, presence of Afghan 
security forces, and the presence of Pakistani forces.    These inputs set the stage for 
analysis in later chapters.  This chapter closes with a description of the known and 
implied Taliban strategy. 
B. HISTORY 
The history of the Taliban helps to identify patterns of past actions and to analyze 
their current behavior. Key points include historical events involving strategic and 
operational issues, leadership, crisis, and core organizational values.27  This section 
delves into different aspects of Taliban history, including the influence of ancient warrior 
culture, the Soviet invasion and the resulting development of mujahideen28 fighters, the 
                                                 
26 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (El Paso: El Paso Norte Press, 2005), 138. 
27  Wyman. 
28 Mujahideen (literally "strugglers") is a term for Muslims fighting in any type of struggle. Mujahid, 
and its plural, mujahideen, come from the same Arabic root as jihad ("struggle"). Here, the mujahideen 
refers those who fought the Soviet Union and the communist Afghan government. 
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madrassa29 with their selectively interpreted religious ideology, the civil war and 
warlordism that followed the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the emergence of the Taliban 
as a hope for peace for a war weary people, and the downfall of the Taliban and the 
ongoing insurgency. 
The region inhabited today by the Pashtuns has a long history of invaders who 
tried, mostly in vain, to overpower them. Since Alexander’s appearance in Pashtun areas 
in 326 BC,30 a large number of foreign military forces appeared on the Afghan scene, 
including those of the Persian Empire, Scythians, Kushans, Sakas, Huns, Arabs, Turks, 
Mongols, British, Russians, and most recently the United States. The Pashtuns have 
defended their homeland against all sorts of adventurers while remaining fiercely 
independent. Most conquerors were either defeated outright or absorbed into the tribal 
structure of the Pashtuns through the centuries. Despite the apparent ease in conquering 
the Pashtun areas, no outside power has ever been able to completely subdue it.31  The 
tribes in the region learned and adapted to the military strategies of their invaders and 
utilized the newfound tactics and equipment to fight among themselves until presented 
with an external threat. A military orientation has shaped the culture and outlook of the 
area.  As Johnson writes, “A Pashtun is never at peace, except when he is at war.”32 The 
people of the area have thus been inclined to reject any form of strict authority even at the 
cost of discord and insecurity.33  
                                                 
29 Madrasa refers to any type of school, secular or religious.  While acknowledging that most of the 
madrassas are not bad, this research refers to the religious schools that teach an ultraconservative and 
misperceived version of Islam. 
30 Alison Behnke, The Conquests of Alexander the Great (Breckenridge: Twenty-First Century Books, 
2007), 99. 
31 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 1978), 415. 
32 Thomas H. Johnson, "On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan," 
China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 5, no. 2 (2007), 118, 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/May_2007/Johnson.pdf (accessed November 21, 
2007). 
33 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the 
Taliban  (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002), 134. 
 19
The "Great Game" in the nineteenth century played a dominant role in shaping the 
current political landscape of the region.34 It also gave the Pashtuns their first encounter 
with a modern military power through the three Anglo-Afghan Wars in 1839, 1878, and 
1919. After abortive attempts to gain headway inside Afghanistan, Russia and Britain 
agreed to create a buffer in the shape of Afghanistan between their zones of influence. 
The international boundary known as the Durand Line between British India and 
Afghanistan was demarcated in 1893. The new border, however, did not affect the lives 
of the frontier Pashtun tribes who maintained strong ethnic and family connections with 
their cousins across the border through the provisions of Easement Rights. The British 
also accorded the tribes on their side of the border with a peculiar semi-autonomous 
status that was maintained after the creation of Pakistan in 1947 in the form of the 
FATA.35  
With occasional disturbances,36 the Pashtun areas on both sides of the border 
were dormant during most of the twentieth century. The relative stability of Zahir Shah’s 
four-decade rule ended in 1973.  The instability that ensued after his departure provided 
the catalyst for the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan to overthrow 
the weak and splintered government in 1978. The religious elements of Afghanistan, led 
by the mujahideen, resisted the communists' radical reforms package, which included 
drastic changes in land ownership, new taxes, compulsory education for women, and 
participation of women in non-traditional roles in society.37 The Soviet Union deployed 
troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 to aid their communist ally against the Islamic 
militias and counter the threat of radical Islamist power along its soft underbelly of the 
Muslim majority Central Asian republics.  The Soviet involvement further fueled the rise 
of mujahideen resistance and calls for jihad. The Soviet military waged a brutal 
                                                 
34 For a detailed history of the Great Game see Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game : The Struggle for 
Empire in Central Asia (New York: Kodansha International, 1992). 
35 For details of the administrative arrangements in the FATA, see The Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1986), and Noor ul Haq, Rashid Ahmed Khan 
and Maqsood ul Hasan Nuri, "Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan," Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute Papers 10 (March 2005).   
36 Exceptions include the Pashtun uprisings in the 1920s. 
37 For details of the reforms which upset the countryside see Radek Sikorski, Dust of the Saints : A 
Journey to Herat in Time of War (Khak-i Avaliya) (New York: Paragon House, 1990). 
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counterinsurgency campaign accompanied by thorough destruction of the already meager 
socioeconomic framework of backwards nation.  In nearly ten years of occupation, the 
Soviet forces and their communist Afghan allies allegedly killed 1.3 million Afghans, 
completely destroyed the infrastructure in both urban and rural areas, and caused 
approximately 5.5 million to flee into neighboring Iran and Pakistan, most of whom 
found their way to Pakistan's tribal belt.38  Despite heavy investments in men and 
material, the Soviets were never able to gain unopposed access to the countryside, 
especially in the Pashtun areas.39 Following a long and costly counterinsurgency effort, 
the Soviet Union completely withdrew its forces from Afghanistan in February 1989, 
leaving Najibullah’s communist government to fend for itself.  A civil war followed, 
resulting in Najibullah's overthrow in April 1992.  In the six months before their 
departure, the Soviets handed over huge caches of weapons and ammunition to 
Najibullah’s forces; they continued material support for two years after their departure.  
The defeat of the communist government quickly revealed the differences in the fractured 
alliance of mujahideen parties.  Each faction had its leader or warlord in a geographical 
region of the country with aspirations for power. Fighting broke out among the warlords 
leading to widespread looting and rapine.  This strife between the warlords and a war 
weary population set the stage for the radical ideas of the Taliban to easily take hold in 
Afghanistan.40  “The Taliban mythology cites their creation as a reaction to the injustices 
that were perpetrated during the mujahedin era of Afghan politics.”41 
The cadre of the Taliban emerged from the Pashtun refugee camps.  It was there, 
in some of the madrassas, that a selectively interpreted version of Islam, wahhabism,42 
                                                 
38 The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, eds. 
Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, trans. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2002), 255-256. 
39 David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1998). 
40 Johnson and Mason, Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan.    
41  "The Taliban," (Monterey: NPS Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, 2007), 
http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pubs/The%20Taliban.pdf (accessed November 27, 2007). 
42 Wahhabism is a branch of Islam practiced by those who follow the teachings of Muhammed Ibn 
Abdul Wahhab - the founder and namesake of the movement. For details on Wahhabism, see David 
Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2006).  
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influenced students (talib) to adopt an ultraconservative approach to social issues and 
politics.43 Despite differences with the fundamentalist religion espoused by the Taliban, 
the people gathered behind them because of promises to deliver peace by eliminating the 
menace of the warlords and narcotics.44 Theological students fighting for professed rights 
and freedoms are not a new phenomenon in the region.  Winston Churchill spoke of a 
“host of wandering Talib-ul-ilums, who correspond with the theological students in 
Turkey and live free at the expense of the people. . . .” 45  This tradition and the aura of a 
righteous religious student on the quest for peace gave students immense rapport with the 
Pashtun people. The popularity of the Taliban rapidly spread and they experienced 
continued success in consolidating power.   
The Taliban seized control of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan in November 
1994. Here they gained their de facto religious legitimacy among the rural Pashtuns when 
their leader, Mullah Omar, wore the sacred cloak of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon 
Him) in a public gathering46 and declared himself the Amir-ul-Momineen (Leader of the 
Faithful).47  “This was seen as the divine sanction of Mullah Omar’s rule.”48 The event is 
probably the most important milestone in the Taliban history as it provided the movement 
with a charismatic leader who was thereafter able to draw upon the mysticism inherent in 
the Pashtun culture.49 
                                                 
43 Peter Marsden, The Taliban : War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 73.  
44 Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 6 
(November/December 1999), 22-35.   
45 Johnson and Mason, Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan, 72. 
46 For details of the event see Norimitsu Onishi, "A Tale of the Mullah and Muhammad's Amazing 
Cloak," New York Times, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F04EEDB123EF93AA25751C1A9679C8B63 (accessed 
November 28, 2007). 
47 Johnson and Mason, Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan, 80. 
48 Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.    
49 Joseph A. Raelin, "The Myth of Charismatic Leaders," T + D (March 1, 2003), 46, 
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2007).  
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The Taliban made rapid military progress after 1994. They controlled 95 percent of 
the country by 1997.50 Despite their speedy success and initial euphoria, the Taliban regime, 
led by Mullah Muhammad Omar, gradually lost the support of the international community 
and the Afghan populace due to the very strict enforcement of its version of Islamic law.  The 
Taliban banned television, music and dancing, and prohibited women from attending school 
and working outside of the home. They carried out massive atrocities against the non-Sunni 
population51 of Afghanistan and allegedly supported militant Sunni sectarian outfits in 
Pakistan. Mullah Omar also interacted with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban hosted Al-
Qaeda training camps and leadership in the areas under their control. 
The events of September 11, 2001, and the Taliban’s refusal to extradite bin Laden 
triggered Operation Enduring Freedom and the rapid collapse of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan.  Many Taliban fighters assimilated back into Afghan society, while the 
leadership went underground, only to emerge later as the core of a vibrant insurgency 
campaign. Failed expectations of a war-ravaged Pashtun population and dominance by non-
Pashtuns in the central government provided the impetus to maintain the insurgency. The 
Taliban are currently waging an insurgency against the Afghan government and coalition 
forces.      
On the Pakistani side of the border, their tribal sympathizers have been at odds with 
the Pakistan security forces in the FATA and other areas of North Western Frontier Province 
(NWFP), thereby further complicating the problem. The problem also has roots in the 
Russian invasion of Afghanistan, when FATA was used as a launch pad for mujahideen 
sponsored by Pakistan and the U.S. The tribal areas became a hotbed for extremism as the 
sprouting of madrassahs, abundance of modern weaponry and influx of Afghan refugees 
significantly changed the environment. After the Afghan jihad, many foreign Mujahideen, 
mostly Arabs, settled in FATA and were absorbed in the tribal society through marriage and 
the like. The rise of Taliban from the religious seminaries was viewed favorably in the 
area due to ethnic, religious, and ideological linkages as well as cultural affinities. After 
                                                 
50  Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy - CRS Report for 
Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007).  
51 This includes 19 percent Shi’a and one percent others, including Sikhs, Christians, Hindus, and 
Buddhists. 
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9/11 and the commencement of the Operation Enduring Freedom, the radical elements in 
the FATA mobilized some support for the Taliban and started targeting the Pakistani 
government apparatus because of crucial Pakistani support to OEF. Currently, Pakistan 
has deployed over 100,000 troops in different parts of FATA to counter pro-Taliban 
militants loosely aligned with the main Taliban movement in Afghanistan and with 
similar operational signatures.  Recently, Taliban sympathizers in Pakistan joined forces 
to form an umbrella organization called Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban 
Movement) with Baitullah Mehsud as leader.52 
C. ENVIRONMENT 
The Taliban are influenced by an external environment which places demands and 
constraints on them while simultaneously providing opportunities.53 As suggested by the 
effects illustrated in Figure 3 above, the major components of the environment have 
bearing on the Taliban’s character.  Several of these factors are discussed in detail below. 
1. Physical Environment 
The first environmental dynamic is the physical terrain in which the Taliban and 
their sympathizers operate.  The physical terrain within both Afghanistan and the FATA 
is very harsh. The area is over 250,000 sq. miles54 of which more than 70 percent is 
mountainous.  It is a combination of arid plateaus, thickly forested mountains, and craggy 
valleys. Only 12 percent of the land in Afghanistan is arable.  Southern and Western 
Afghanistan is comprised of mostly desert with the exception of the Helmand River and 
surrounding area. Lines of communication infrastructure are either underdeveloped or 
virtually nonexistent. In the semi-mountainous terrain, the roads are generally aligned 
along the watersheds and valleys, and pass through deep gorges that have been the sites 
of murderous ambushes by local warriors for centuries (See Figure 5 and Figure 6 
                                                 
52  Bill Roggio, "Pakistani Taliban Unites Under Baitullah Mehsud," The Long War Journal 
(December 15, 2007), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/pakistani_taliban_un.php (accessed 
January 15, 2008).  
53  Wyman.  
54 The total area of Afghanistan and the FATA is slightly larger than the state of Texas. 
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below). The houses are generally well-fortified and built on defendable vantage points. It 
is extremely difficult to control the access routes and the population in such a landscape. 
The harsh mountainous terrain is conducive to insurgent activities, providing multiple 
pockets of inaccessible spaces solely governed by tribes that allow militants freedom of 
maneuver55 while making conventional military operations ineffective and expensive in 
terms of troops and resources. Overall, the rugged geography embodies the region’s 
culture, which remains virtually unaffected by time.  Afghanistan is “a place where the 
land fashions the people, rather than the people fashioning the land.”56 
 
 
Figure 5. Physical Terrain57 
                                                 
55  "CIA - the World Factbook 2007," Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed November 21, 2007, 
2007).  
56  Caroe, xii.  
57  Produced using Global Mapper® 9 and databases from Geo Community, GIS Data Depot at 
http://data.geocomm.com/ and NASA’s Shuttle Radar Topography Mission: Jet Propulsion Laboratory at 
http://www2.jpl.nasa.gov/srtm/cbanddataproducts.html  (accessed January 9, 2008). 
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Figure 7. Comparison of Pakistan-Afghan Border with U.S.-Mexico Border59 
                                                 
58 Image created online using Google Earth ® with default imagery and elevation data (accessed April 
11, 2008).  This illustration depicts a route north of Deh Rahwood, Oruzgan Province where multiple 
ambushes have taken place against U.S./NATO/Afghan troops and security forces. 
59 Produced using Global Mapper® 9 and databases from Geo Community, GIS Data Depot at 
http://data.geocomm.com/ and NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Shuttle Radar Topography Mission at 
http://www2.jpl.nasa.gov/srtm/cbanddataproducts.html (accessed January 9, 2008). 
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A comparison of the Pakistan-Afghanistan and U.S.-Mexico borders (Figure 7 
above) illustrates the treacherous terrain that coalition forces face in attempts to interdict 
Taliban and Al Qaeda members as they move between countries.  The Pakistan-
Afghanistan and U.S.-Mexico borders are comparable in total length, but the differences 
in elevation are staggering. Many supposed pundits, news commentators, and politicians 
clamor that success in Afghan’s counterinsurgency fight lies in sealing off the border.  It 
is apparent that those arguing for "sealing the border" do not realize that the U.S. is 
unable to seal its own border with Mexico, and yet it should be easier to seal the U.S.-
Mexico border given the less dramatic topography.  In 2005, border agents apprehended 
1.2 million illegal migrants attempting to slip into the country.  It is estimated that only 
one in every four attempting to enter the U.S. are captured.60  Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
with their limited resources, must deal with the realities of brutal mountainous terrain that 
divides not only their disputed borders but the Pashtun tribes as well. These tribes share 
more than a tribal affiliation. They share a culture defined by the Pashtunwali.  
2. Culture 
Culture61 is probably the most important factor concerning the situation. “Wars 
are not tactical exercises writ large…. They are … conflicts of societies, and they can be 
fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting them.”62 
Taliban presence is most pronounced in the Pashtun areas. “While it would be incorrect 
to refer to the Taliban insurrection or resurrection as merely a Pashtun affair, it would not 
be far from the mark.”63 The culture of the area depends greatly upon the Pashtunwali 
                                                 
60 From U.S.-Mexico Border Fence / Great Wall of Mexico Secure Fence; 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/systems//mexico-wall.htm (accessed January 14, 2008). 
61 Culture - the behaviors and beliefs characteristic of a particular social, ethnic, or age group.  For 
additional information on culture, see Kaplan and Manners’ Culture Theory (Prospect Heights, Illinois: 
Waveland Press), 1986. 
62 Michael Howard as quoted in Johnson, On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in 
Afghanistan, 93  
63  Ibid., 122. 
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code, which is a code of honor that predates Islam and is specific to the Pashtun tribes.64  
The Pashtunwali serves as the traditional norm by which the people of the Pashtun tribes 
are expected to conduct themselves. “A Pashtun must adhere to the code to maintain his 
honor to retain his identity as a Pashtun.”65 If one violates this honor code, they are 
subject to the verdict of the Jirga.66  Some of the more important facets of the code 
include: 
a) Nang (honor).  Under this code a tribesman is obliged to employ 
every means possible to shield and protect his honor and the honor of his family.  The 
honor of a Pashtun rests on a host of apparently small nuances which, if infringed, 
demand a restoration of honor even at the cost of one’s life.   
b) Badal (revenge). This concept most often refers to “revenge 
killings.”67  When a family member is killed or the honor of a woman in one’s family is 
involved, a “revenge killing” is necessary to restore family honor.  This killing can be 
immediate or occur generations later if the family whose honor has been violated is in a 
weak position at the time of infraction.  The Taliban use the concept of badal to recruit 
new fighters into by alienating the population from the Coalition forces because of the 
civilian deaths from Coalition bombings and “hard knock operations.”68  
                                                 
64 The term "tribe," as used in this thesis, refers to “localized groups in which kinship is the dominant 
idiom of organization, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in terms of customs, 
dialect or language, and origins) and have been politically unified at least for much of their history.”  
Antonio Giustozzi and Noor Ullah, ""Tribes" and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005," Crisis 
States Working Papers 2, no. 7 (September 2006), 2, 
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp7.2.pdf, (accessed November 28, 2007). 
65  Johnson, On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan, 121  
66 A jirga is a tribal assembly of elders which takes decisions by consensus, particularly among the 
Pashtun but also in other ethnic groups near them; they are most common in Afghanistan and among the 
Pashtun in Pakistan. For details of jirga tradition see Ali Wardak, Jirga - A Traditional Mechanism of 
Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan (New York: United Nations Public Administration Network, 2004), 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN017434.pdf (accessed August 11, 
2007); and Mumtaz Ali Bangash, "Jirga: Speedy Justice of Elders. What is Not Decided in the Jirga Will 
Never be Decided by Bloodshed," Khyber Gateway, http://www.khyber.org/culture/jirga/jirgas.shtml 
(accessed August 11, 2007). 
67 The term badal can also refer to a type of wedding performed in Pashtun tribal culture. 
68  "Expert: Afghan War Needs New Strategy," United Press International May 21, 2007, 
http://www.upi.com/Security_Terrorism/Briefing/2007/05/21/expert_afghan_war_needs_new_strategy/485
1, (accessed November 28, 2007).  
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c) Melmastia (hospitality). This concept gives new meaning to the 
Motel Six slogan “We’ll leave the light on for you.”  Melmastia means offering 
hospitality to all visitors without hope of remuneration or favor and also enjoins the 
obligation of protection.  Any Pashtun who can gain access to the house of another 
Pashtun, can ideally claim asylum in the house, regardless of the previous relationship 
between the two parties.69 The Taliban use this to their advantage and thus have a built-in 
auxiliary for insurgency efforts with food and shelter wherever they travel within the 
Pashtun belt. 
d) Nanawatay (forgiveness).  This means to go in and seek 
forgiveness from the victim to whom a wrong has been done. It is used when the 
vanquished party is prepared to go to the house of his enemy to beg forgiveness and make 
peace with him. This is the only alternative to Badal.  Overlooking this factor by foreign 
forces has enabled Taliban to exhort aggrieved persons to join the insurgency to restore 
their honor or avenge the death of family members. 
e) Hamsaya (neighbor). This literally means ‘one who shares the 
same shadow.’ This can be compared to early clientele states or later vassal states during 
medieval times.  It is a broad concept of servitude for protection from stronger tribes, 
including military service in exchange for land (mlatar).  This concept explains how 
tribes quickly follow whoever is the strongest and how the Taliban consolidated power so 
quickly in the 1990s.70  The Pashtun tribes have generally remained embroiled in clan and 
tribal rivalries. However, they rally against outsiders if threatened. They are politically very 
savvy and use alliances and counter-alliances to their advantage, using this ability in the 
present war against terror. “The rules of this war are a far cry from the easy slogans of 
                                                 
69  Niloufer Qasim Mahdi, "Pakhtunwali: Ostracism and Honor among the Pathan Hill Tribes," 
Ethology and Sociobiology 7 (1986), 150-154.  
70  Jolanta Sierakowska-Dyndo, Tribalism and Afghan Political Traditions (Warsaw: Institute of 
Oriental Studies, Warsaw University, 2003), 53-59, 
http://www.wgsr.uw.edu.pl/pub/uploads/aps04/5Sierakowska-Dydo_Trybalism.pdf (accessed August 1, 
2007). 
 29
‘you’re either with us or against us.’ Indeed, Pashtun history is filled with heroes who 
played both sides for the benefit of tribe, family, and honor.”71 
3. Religion 
The Taliban utilize culture greatly to their advantage but rely upon religion as the 
other pillar of their movement. Afghanistan is 99 percent Muslim, consisting of 80 
percent Sunni and 19 percent Shi’a.72 The Pashtun tribes are mostly Sunni Muslims 
except for certain Shi’a tribes in Kurram Agency of the FATA.  In the Afghan Islamic 
tradition, Islam has been mixed with pre-Islamic beliefs and tribal customs of 
Pashtunwali.73 The Taliban have further transformed the tradition to include an 
ultraconservative interpretation of Islam.  The core of the religious ideology stems from 
some of the madrassas founded during the Soviet-Afghan war.  With the influx of 
support from Saudi Arabia, many of the madrassas shifted towards a very orthodox brand 
of Islam which looks to “follow a Salafist egalitarian model,”74 with more stringent 
methods of enforcement, while denying any form of dissidence. “The Taliban represented 
nobody but themselves and they recognized no Islam except their own.”75 The majority 
of Afghanistan’s populace did not traditionally follow this interpretation of the religion 
but had to contend with its enforcement during the Taliban reign. 76 
4. Ethnicity 
The ethnic aspect of the environment discussed here is fairly straightforward.  The 
ethnic breakdown within Afghanistan is as follows77 (See Figure 8 below for details):  
 
                                                 
71 Owais Tohid and Scott Baldauf, "Pakistani Army must Go through the Pashtuns," The Christian 
Science Monitor, June 25, 2004,  http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0625/p07s02-wosc.html (accessed 
September 4, 2007).   
72 CIA - the World Factbook 2007. 
73 Marsden, 78.  
74 Johnson and Mason, Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan, 75.  
75 Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 85-93.  
76 Ibid., 85-93. 
77  CIA - the World Factbook 2007.  
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     - Pashtun 42 percent     - Aimak   4 percent 
     - Tajik 27 percent   - Turkmen   3 percent 
     - Hazara   9 percent   - Balochi   2 percent 
     - Uzbek   9 percent   - Other    4 percent 
 
Figure 8. Ethnic Layout of the Area78 
The Pashtun tribe dominates the Taliban with a smattering of opportunists from 
other tribes.  During Taliban rule and subsequently during the insurgency, the other tribes 
have been the target of attacks.  A coalition of northern tribes (Turkman, Tajik, and 
Uzbek) made up the bulk of the northern alliance troops that allied with the U.S. to 
overthrow the Taliban in 2001.       
                                                 
78 Produced using ArcGIS9.2 and databases from Geo Community, GIS Data Depot at 
http://data.geocomm.com/ , Pakistan’s Ethnic Map from Perry Castaneda Map Library, University of Texas 
at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_ethnic_80.jpg  and Afghanistan Ethnic 
Map from University of Texas Libraries at 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_ethno_1982.jpg (accessed January 9, 
2008) 
 31
5. Pashtun Tribal Breakdown 
A plurality of Afghans is ethnic Pashtun.  The Pashtuns are comprised of several 
tribes and subtribes spread throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The Pashtuns in 
Pakistan are larger in number than those in Afghanistan and are mostly concentrated in 
the FATA and NWFP.  Pashtun tribes and subtribes are interwoven in a complex 
interplay of obscure genealogies, mythical folklore, historical alliances, and conflicts 
thereby making it extremely difficult to draw exact dividing lines between the groups. 
Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that five major tribal groups encompass the Pashtun 
tribes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. These groups are the Durrani, Ghilzai, Karlanri, 
Sarbani, and Ghurghusht, with the Durrani and the Ghilzai the two most influential 
players (See Figure 9 below).79   
 
Figure 9. Geographic Layout of Major Pashtun Tribal Groups80 
                                                 
79 For details of Pashtun tribal genealogies and geographical areas of tribes, see Caroe, and Thomas H. 
Johnson, "Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at NPS," Program of Culture and Conflict Studies, 
Naval Postgraduate School, http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/ (accessed January 11, 2008).  
80 Derived from Caroe and Johnson, Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at NPS. 
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The Durrani tribal confederation, mostly concentrated in Southeast Afghanistan, 
has traditionally provided the leadership within the Pashtun areas since Ahmad Shah 
Durrani founded a monarchy in 1747. Ahmad Shah is considered the founder of modern 
Afghanistan because of his ability to unite the factional tribes.  The current president of 
Afghanistan, Harmid Karzai, is also a Durrani.  According to traditional folklore, the 
Durranis, or Abdalis as they were known before Ahmad Shah, are sometimes considered 
a sub-part of the Sarbani or Sarbanri tribal group.81  
The Ghilzai tribal group is concentrated mostly in Eastern Afghanistan and has 
historically been an archrival of the Durranis. Some of the major Taliban leaders today, 
including Mullah Omar, belong to this tribal group.82 The Ghilzais form part of another 
rather obscure tribal confederation known as the Bitanis, which includes other prominent 
subtribes such as the Bhittanis, Niazis, Lodis, and Surs that mostly settled around Bannu 
and Tank areas of NWFP.83 
The Karlanris are the third largest group of the Pashtun tribes and are referred to 
as the hill tribes.84 They straddle the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 
general areas of Waziristan, Kurram, Peshawar, Khost, Paktia, and Paktika.85 
Sarbani or Sarbanri are divided into two major groups which are geographically 
separated. The larger group is located north of Peshawar and includes tribes such as 
Mohmands, Yusufzais, Shinwaris, while the smaller contingent of Sheranis and Tarins 
are scattered in northern Balochistan.86 Because of their linkages with the Durranis, who 
are considered a part of the group, this faction comprises the traditional aristocracy of the 
Pashtun tribes. 
                                                 
81  Caroe, 12. 
82 For a further discussion of the Pashtun tribal dimensions of the Taliban, see Johnson and Mason, 
Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan, 71  
83  Caroe, 15. 
84  Ibid., 22. 
85 Ibid., 21. 
86 Ibid., 12. 
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The last major tribal group is the Ghurghusht. They are mostly concentrated 
throughout northern Balochistan and consist of Kakars, Mandokhels, Panars, and Musa 
Khel among others.  Some subtribes like Gaduns and Safis can also be found in NWFP.87 
D. RESOURCES 
The Taliban resources include consideration of the full range of accessible assets 
ranging from manpower to technology and everything in between.  The key to analyzing 
Taliban resources is to identify the relative quality and to what extent those resources are 
fixed or flexible.88  The primary resources examined here are religious militant outfits, 
human terrain89 and the opium trade.  
The first set of resources surveyed includes the religious militant outfits such as 
Al Qaeda and some sectarian groups.  Al-Qaeda provides the Taliban’s "cause" some 
legitimacy amid a myriad of transcontinental terrorists with global agendas. 
Exemplifying this are the actions of Osama bin Laden when he pledged to follow Mullah 
Omar, the Leader of the Faithful, which supports Omar in the eyes of the Pashtun tribes 
and of Islamic groups worldwide.  Aside from offering assistance to the Taliban in the 
form of information warfare, it provides support that is monetary, personnel (foreign 
fighters), technological (advanced Improvised Explosive Devices and communications) 
and training (tactical) support.  These resources are external and generally flexible as to 
their reliability. Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) is also a strong Taliban 
sympathizer and is mainly active in the FATA and Swat regions of NWFP.  Other groups 
which support or coordinate with the Taliban include the Central Asian insurgent outfits 
like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), Eastern 
Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and a number of small militant bands on both 
sides of the border.  
                                                 
87 Caroe, 19. 
88 Wyman, 5. 
89 For the purpose of this research, Human Terrain will be defined as people and their support and 
intelligence networks. 
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Some of the madrassas in the Pashtun belt that teach a violent version of the 
Islamic ideology are ideal recruiting grounds for the Taliban, thereby mixing ethnic and 
religious sentiments. Mohammed Ali Siddiqi, a madrassa expert, explains the 
phenomenon as "an accident of history": 
The Leadership of the Islamic movement has fallen to the Pashtuns as they 
had resisted the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan successfully.  Then the 
Pashtun Taliban triumphed [in Afghanistan] ... Since the madrassas had 
played a prominent role in the anti-Soviet jihad, they acquired a reputation 
both as recruiting grounds for mujahideen and as centers of learning.90 
All this support filters down to the next level, the people and their support and 
intelligence networks.  This human terrain asset is the most important to the success or 
failure of the Taliban insurgency. Simply put, an uprising cannot be maintained without 
the support of the people.  The Pashtun are the group most vulnerable because of the 
peculiarities of culture and ethnic linkages.  Of late, they have been more amenable to the 
Taliban because there is no Pashtun dominance in the Kabul administration.  Moreover, 
Pashtun suspicions and mistrust of the government were further 
heightened by  the Afghan Transitional Administration’s (ATA) inability 
to protect Pashtuns  from the wave of human rights abuses perpetrated 
by insurgents and warlords since the fall of the Taliban.91  
There are approximately 28 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan.92 This 
large pool contributes recruits, auxiliary support personnel, money, weapons, and an 
intelligence network with which the Taliban wage insurgency.  The people and recruits, 
spread throughout their respective geographical areas, provide outstanding and real time 
intelligence on most troop movements so Taliban fighters can flee when outnumbered, or 
set up ambushes and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) when the odds favor them.  
With more than two generations of war hardened inhabitants to draw from, the Taliban 
recruit experienced fighters who know the terrain and can survive in the harsh 
                                                 
90 Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2007), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=4742 (accessed July 1, 2007). 
91 Johnson, On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan, 97. 
92 CIA - the World Factbook 2007.  
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environment.  The added bonus is the unbelievable amount of ordnance, weapons and 
ammunition that were cached by the mujahideen during the Afghan-Soviet war, the 
subsequent civil war, and the Taliban’s consolidation of power.  Taliban human resources 
are flexible because of the power struggle between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
(IROA) and the Taliban. 
The last asset examined here is the revenue and associated benefits of working 
with drug traffickers and the opium trade in Afghanistan.  With improved irrigation and 
recent year's rains, Afghanistan has virtually become a narco-state.93 The record 2006 
opium harvest was estimated at over $3 billion.94  The 2007 estimates are even higher. 
Afghanistan currently produces 93 percent of the world’s opium95 and it is estimated that 
almost one half of Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Product depends on the opium trade. 
The exact amount that the Taliban receive is unclear.  The Taliban are able to capitalize 
on the drug trade by taxing the farmers, land owners, and drug traffickers.  When they 
ruled the country, the Taliban vowed to eliminate opium, but they look to it now as a 
necessary evil to further their cause in three main venues: 1) most importantly, it provides 
the populace an illegal economy to operate within outside the umbrella and to the 
detriment of Kabul, 2) it provides needed funds for the insurgency, and 3) it helps to 
poison the people of the west, especially in Europe, where 90 percent of the heroin 
supply comes from Afghanistan.  The drug traffickers and the Taliban help each other 
with weapons, personnel, and funding in a concerted effort to destabilize the legitimate 
IROA.  
                                                 
93  House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Afghanistan, Afghanistan: The Rise of the Narco-
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95 Ibid. 
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E. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The other environmental factors that affect the Taliban include regional players 
throughout South Asia, NGOs and humanitarian agencies, and the presence of coalition 
forces including Pakistani, Afghani, U.S. and NATO soldiers. 
1. Regional Players 
Regional players form an important part of the environment in which the Taliban 
operate as they contribute to the overall political scenario affecting the movement. The 
region affected by Taliban, directly or indirectly, stretches across Central Asia to the 
Indian subcontinent. An area of immense strategic importance, its components share 
certain historical roots, affinities, and enmities which have profound impact on their 
interrelationships and even domestic issues. “Many of Afghanistan’s challenges, often 
thought of as domestic, are also regional in character.”96 Afghanistan and the Pashtun 
areas have historically been an arena for competing interests of the regional players. 
While most of the international actors have had time-based objectives in the area, the 
regional players have nearly permanent interests which must be viewed from the 
perspective of the peculiar ethnic and political history of the region. The only good sign 
recently is that since the fall of the Taliban, arguably “Afghanistan's neighbors have 
assessed that support for a stable, independent, and economically strengthening Afghan 
state is preferable to any achievable alternatives.”97 Apart from interest in the future of 
Afghanistan, the other major factor influencing the roles of the regional players is their 
domestic situation. These phenomena create a complex web of relationships in which the 
Taliban operate. 
Undoubtedly, Pakistan is the most critical regional player for the future of 
Afghanistan. It is also among those most affected by the Taliban. The Pakistani 
involvement in the Afghan Jihad against Soviets, supported by the United States and 
                                                 
96 Marvin G. Weinbaum, Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: An Ever Dangerous Neighborhood; United 
States Institute for Peace, Special Report No. 162,  June 2006, 6, 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr162_afghanistan.html  (accessed December 3, 2007). 
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Saudi Arabia, created a complex legacy that haunts Pakistan even today because of 
continuous turmoil and violence linked to the issue. Pakistan has serious interests in 
Afghanistan’s stability and development because of the very close economic and cultural 
links. A stable Afghanistan would provide better economic opportunities for Pakistan and 
ensure its access to the resource rich Central Asian region. The stability in Afghanistan 
will also ensure stability in Pashtun dominated western Pakistan where a Taliban inspired 
radical insurgent situation might destabilize the country. Therefore, Pakistan has the 
potential to become a critical player in the fight against Taliban despite accusations to the 
contrary. 
Despite its cultural affinities with Iran, Afghanistan, with the exception of the 
Herat area, never figured prominently in the Iranian regional perspective prior to the 
Soviet Invasion. Iran focused primarily on the Persian Gulf region.  
The Afghan state stands today more as an opportunity for Iranian 
expansion economically and culturally than as a rival politically and 
militarily. Yet  Afghanistan comes into view strategically mainly out of 
concern that other powers might take advantage of a weak Afghan state to 
menace Iran.98  
Iranian belligerence with Taliban, resulting from their Sunni outlook and the 
persecution of Shi’a minorities, allowed the Iranians to cooperate with U.S. during OEF. 
Iran is interested in expanding its economic role in Afghanistan. A stable Afghanistan is 
beneficial to Iran in the long run, so Iran opposes a Taliban led insurgency. However, 
recent reports of Iranian support to Taliban, if true, signal a different and more complex 
relationship.99 Iranian actions may be viewed in the context of Kabul’s relationship with 
the United States. Because of U.S.-Iranian belligerence, Iranian long term strategic 
interests are ill-served by a sustained U.S. presence in Afghanistan and Iran might, 
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hypothetically and despite ideological differences, decide to manipulate the already 
ongoing Taliban insurgency to its own advantage.100 If this situation materializes, the 
Taliban may be able to overcome some key equipment shortfalls (e.g. advanced anti-air 
weaponry) and gain inroads into Shi’a groups within Afghanistan. 
The former Soviet Central Asian Republics also have a major role in the situation. 
Their ethnic ties with the non-Pashtun northern minorities make them ideal opponents of 
the Taliban due to the latter’s persecution policies. These states have also been concerned 
about the spread of radical Islamist militancy across their borders and their fears have 
been furthered by past Taliban support to entities like the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan. Therefore, these states have strong reasons to assist the Afghan government 
against Taliban. Russia and China share similar concerns because the Taliban recognize 
and support the Chechen and Uighur separatists. However, a neo Cold War with Russia 
over access to Central Asian resources or problems in Sino-U.S. relations could change 
the paradigm to the benefit of the Taliban. 
India has also been a dominant player on the Afghan scene and has used 
Afghanistan as an arena for Indo-Pak hostility. India has always been wary of Pakistani 
influence in Afghanistan and has traditionally opposed any group with perceived links to 
Pakistan.101 This defined India's relationship with the Taliban once India aligned itself 
with the Northern Alliance. India has moved heavily into reconstruction following the 
Taliban government's fall and is supposedly interested in the stability and development of 
Afghanistan as a strategic ally against Pakistan.102 However, with a growing level of 
Taliban-inspired violence inside its borders, Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of 
fostering the militants in FATA and Balochistan in an effort to undermine Pakistan.103 
                                                 
100 Seth G. Jones, Afghan Problem is Regional, Commentary July 4 2007, RAND Corporation, 
http://www.rand.org/commentary/2007/07/04/UPI.html , (accessed December 3, 2007).  
101 Khalid Hasan, "U.S. should Respect Pakistan’s Need for Political Space: CSIS," Daily Times, 
April 5, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C04%5C05%5Cstory_5-4-
2008_pg7_9 (accessed April 27, 2008). 
102 Ibid. 
103 Amin Tarzi, "Afghanistan: Kabul's India Ties Worry Pakistan," Radio Free Europe (April 16, 
2006), http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/B5BFE0BE-ED5D-43DE-A768-99A6AB1E6C5C.html 
(accessed April 27, 2008). 
 39
Pakistan accused India of playing the game of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” by 
covertly funding Taliban inside Pakistan to fight the Pakistan government while 
maintaining its current overt posture in Afghanistan. If true, this scenario dramatically 
alters the situation for the Taliban. 
In view of these factors, it appears that the regional players in relation to the 
Taliban are not static but in a constant state of flux, depending on their interests or the 
actions of their perceived competitors. If the Taliban can use the actions of these players 
to their advantage, the movement's overall situation and resource base can change 
significantly. 
2. Non Governmental Organizations and Humanitarian Aid 
Non Governmental Organizations continue to provide vital assistance to the 
people of Afghanistan, hence directly affecting the Taliban.  In general, NGOs serve as 
advocates for ordinary people by working with the governments where they provide 
assistance, as well as with the United Nations.104 In Afghanistan, NGOs and 
humanitarian aid organizations focus primarily on the rural populace in supporting 
economic development, emergency aid (mainly food and medical assistance), agricultural 
development, education, refugees, human rights, social programs and women’s rights.  
Several NGOs and humanitarian aid organizations work with Afghan ministries to 
rebuild the beleaguered nation. 
Hundreds of NGOs and humanitarian aid outfits work with the Afghan Ministry 
of Rural Rehabilitation and Development to reconstruct Afghanistan.  Five major players 
provide assistance: (1) the International Federation of Red Cross, Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC)105 provides medical assistance to the people, especially to millions of refugees 
who fled the Soviet occupation, (2) the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief 
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Everywhere (CARE)106 fights poverty through economic development and self help 
programs,  (3) Afghanaid107 focuses on development opportunities throughout rural 
areas; (4) the International Rescue Committee (IRC)108 gives emergency medical 
assistance to refugees in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, and (5) United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID)109 provides assistance with Afghan 
development.  The USAID has provided $4.4 billion dollars in development initiatives 
since 2002 to Afghanistan.110  In effect, NGOs and humanitarian aid institutions have 
provided Afghans lifeline for decades, with the bulk of the support coming after the 
Soviet invasion and greater emphasis since 9/11.  Recent assistance has inadvertently 
provided sustenance for the Taliban and their insurgency. Yet the Taliban bites the hand 
that feeds them—and for good reason, when one considers the consequences.111 
The Taliban increased attacks against NGO and humanitarian organizations 
because these organizations' assistance helps to legitimize the IROA.  A genuine 
government that provides services, education and development to the populace spells 
disaster for the Taliban’s insurgency, since without popular support, any insurgency is 
dead. With increased attacks on NGOs in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, 
humanitarian aid efforts have been thwarted.112  Most aid projects have been refocused in 
relatively peaceful areas in the Northern and portions of Western Afghanistan.  The 
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111 This assertion comes from personal experience of the MAJ Samples who seized NGO aid items 
from Taliban strongholds and caches in Zabol, Kandahar, Helmand, and Oruzgan provinces. 
112 “NGO Insecurity in Afghanistan,” Afghnistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) and CARE, May 2005, 
http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/afghanistan/20050505_ansocare.pd (accessed January 14, 
2007). 
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contrast in the aid to the people within the Pashtun belt and those in the North 
exacerbates ethnic friction and fuels the Taliban propaganda machine.  The NGOs feel 
increasingly targeted because they are seen by the Taliban as associated with coalition 
military forces.113 
3. Coalition Forces 
Coalition forces impact the Taliban to varying degrees. To accommodate the 
complexity of the subject, Coalition efforts and their effects on the Taliban are presented 
in Chapter V. 
F. TALIBAN STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES 
As outlined in Chapter II, the Taliban’s strategy is determined “in response to the 
demands, threats, opportunities, and constraints of the environment within the context of 
the organization’s history.”114  Thus, the inputs of the Congruence Model greatly 
influence how the Taliban can best achieve their goals.  This section shifts from historical 
and ethnographic examples to information gathered through interviews and the Taliban 
Survey in order to illustrate the Taliban’s strategy.  It provides an objective view on the 
perspective of the counterinsurgents, a view not often explored. 
The Taliban’s insurgency strategy is one of patience. They are conducting a 
classic "war of the flea," a type of warfare that causes the enemy to suffer the “dog’s 
disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to 
grips with.  If the war continues long enough ... the dog succumbs to exhaustion.”115   
The frequently heard axiom of the Pashtun people in regards to the Taliban is 
“The Americans may have the watches but we have the time.”116 Their plan is time-
                                                 
113 “NGO Insecurity in Afghanistan,”  2. 
114 Wyman, 7. 
115 Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Practice. (New York: Lyle 
Stuart, Inc., 1965), 27-28. The idea of the Taliban utilizing "War of the Flea" tactics is first identified in 
Johnson and Mason, Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan. 
116 Johnson, On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan, 93. Both authors 
of this thesis heard this axiom used throughout Southern Afghanistan and the FATA. 
 42
phased, with continual mobilization of the religious public in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
that invokes the sufferings of Muslims the world over.  The next stage involves rallying 
the Pashtun tribes through the Pashtunwali code and religious ideology by portraying 
their subjugation by the non-Pashtun government in Kabul.  After this, they intend to 
build confidence among the Afghan and tribal populace in the Taliban organization while 
simultaneously decreasing the legitimacy of the IROA, Coalition forces and the 
government of Pakistan.117  Once the Western "crusaders" are expelled by military means 
or NATO’s lack of political will, the Taliban hope to establish firm control of eastern and 
southern Afghanistan and later push for influence in the western Pakistan, establishing 
their version of an Islamic state.118 
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Figure 10. Perceptions about the Taliban Objectives119 
The authors' survey illustrates that the key objectives of the Taliban are perceived 
by respondents as expelling Coalition forces from Afghanistan and resuming Taliban rule 
                                                 
117 Aisbah Allah Abdel Baky, "The Taliban Strategy: Religious & Ethnic Factors," The World in 
Crisis,  http://198.65.147.194/English/Crisis/2001/11/article11.shtml (accessed October 1, 2007).  
118 Interview with Professor Thomas Johnson, Naval Postgraduate School, conducted May 24, 2007. 
119 Shahid Afsar and Chris Samples, "Taliban Survey" (Opinion Survey, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. This survey question, identifying the key objectives of the Taliban, was answered by 942 
people, comprised mostly of CF personnel.  The participants were asked to rank the six possible answers 
from one to six.  The graph depicts the average placement of each answer. For example, Expulsion of CF 
was ranked as the highest priority with an average score of 3.75 out of 6. 
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of the country while ousting Karzai and the IROA from power. Although the Taliban 
appear to have only Afghanistan in their sights, their overall objectives have shifted 
through the years as Al Qaeda gained influence on the Grand Shura.  An anonymous 
contributor's comments underscore this: 
What the Taliban wants is a return to its pre-9/11 status. ... The Taliban are 
driven by two competing interests: the desire to re-conquer Afghanistan 
and the desire to reestablish a caliphate. The first is Pashtun-centric, the 
second more Al Qaeda inspired. The danger of each wing to the Taliban is 
that the Pashtun-centrists may be amenable to cooption in a new 
Afghanistan, and that the jihadists with a more global view may be 
marginalized into criminals and simple terrorists.120  
In an interview, LTG Kearney, former SOCCENT Commander, agreed that the 
focus of the Taliban is becoming more widespread.  
The Taliban are basically Afghanistan-Pashtun specific without any 
outside ambitions. However, lately Al Qaeda has been trying to hijack the 
Taliban into adopting a wider area of support outside of Afghan borders. 
The Taliban would be basically happy to regain their pre 9/11 status, but 
Al Qaeda wants them to operate in a larger context.121 
                                                 
120 The Taliban. 
121 Frank Kearney, Lieutenant General, Deputy Commander U.S. Special Operations Command, 
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Figure 11. Perceptions about the Taliban’s Geographical Aims122 
Nearly 40 percent of operators in our survey believe that the Taliban have greater 
designs than just Afghanistan.  These other intensions include South Central Asia, the 
Islamic Ummah, and global aspirations (Figure 11 above).  It is unrealistic to believe that 
such ends can be met without taking care of business at home.  Admiral Cox, former 
commander, Joint Intelligence Command, Central Command states, 
They have some realistic short-term objectives and some probably 
unrealistic long-term ones. Short term ones include expulsion of the 
Coalition out of their main areas. Their minimalist mid-term aims concern 
Pashtun lands of Afghanistan and Pakistan.123   
 
                                                 
122 A total of 942 people answered this survey question identifying the possible Taliban geographical 
aims.  The participants were asked to choose what they believed the Taliban’s aims were. 
123 Robert J. Cox, Rear Admiral; Commander Joint Intelligence Center, U.S. Central Command, 
Interview by authors; written notes. Tampa, FL, November 14, 2007.  
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Figure 12. Explanation of Terms for Possible Taliban Geographic Aims124 
Thus the saying that "all politics are local" holds true as the Taliban must gain and 
maintain support at home before pursuing longer term support of Al Qaeda global 
operations.  
Regardless of the Taliban’s future intentions, their strategy in Afghanistan is 
ominous and illusive.  They continue to adapt and adjust to the efforts of the Coalition 
and their environment.  Major Ecklund best described the Taliban and their flexibility 
using the analogy of a rock in a stream.  The Taliban “are flexible like flowing water, not 
tied to anything, while ISAF is more inflexible, like rocks in the stream, that the flowing 
stream is able to go around and dominate in the long run.”125 The Taliban’s strategy 
continues to change as they constantly evaluate their environment and output. Their 
strategic adaptation process is further explored in Chapter VI. 
                                                 
124 Modified from Muslim Distribution; Perry Castaneda Library Map Collection; University of 
Texas, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_maps/muslim_distribution.jpg (accessed April 11, 2008). 
125 Marshall Ecklund, Major, U.S. Special Forces. Interview by authors; written notes. Tampa, FL; 
November 13, 2007.  MAJ Ecklund, a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 46
G. CONCLUSION 
The principles of war do not change.  As Sun Tzu stated, “one must know their 
enemy.”  This chapter described twelve factors or inputs that directly or indirectly shape 
the composition and conduct of the Taliban.  Understanding these inputs is paramount for 
coalition governments and militaries fighting against this dynamic and adaptable enemy.  
Research, interviews, the authors' survey and personal experience indicate that the most 
important inputs influencing the Taliban are culture, religion, human terrain, and 
concerted efforts of coalition forces and their governments.  As the thesis develops, these 
inputs are used to build a coherent strategy to counter the Taliban’s strengths and exploit 






IV. STRUCTURE OF THE TALIBAN 
The organizational architecture is really that a centipede walks on hundred 
legs and one or two don’t count. So if I lose one or two legs, the process 
will go on, the organization will go on, the growth will go on.126  
— Mukesh Ambani 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the structure of the Taliban. It provides a snapshot of the 
Taliban's perceived layout and mechanisms, as well as its leadership, human resources 
and decision-making processes. The discussion is based on the four key elements of the 
congruence model: formal organization, informal organization, work, and people (human 
resources). These four elements intermingle to give a characteristic shape to the Taliban 
organization. Due to the limited availability of open-source material, much of the 
emphasis is placed on inferences from known facts and events. Aside from open source 
articles and news reports, a significant amount of information in this section is derived 
from the authors’ personal experiences and observations during field deployments in the 
Pak-Afghan border regions between 2003 and 2006, as well as unclassified interviews 
and surveys with decision makers and operatives in the field. 
B. FORMAL AND INFORMAL ORGANIZATION127 
The Taliban organization has constantly evolved to adjust to its environments and 
operational requirements since its inception in 1994. Its organizational characteristics 
vary by level in the hierarchy. Because of the group's covert nature and intermingling 
with the local culture, religion, social networks, and insurgent activities, it is almost 
                                                 
126 Mukesh Ambani, as quoted in "After Quotes: Famous Mukesh Ambani Quotes," After Quotes, 
http://www.afterquotes.com/great/people/mukesh-ambani/index.htm (accessed April 10, 2008).  
127 Formal organization is defined by an established, clear and permanent set of structures, rules and 
procedures. The informal organization is the cumulative set of intertwined social structure that defines how 
people actually work together and how their loyalties to their colleagues and the organization are 
organized. For more details see John Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal 
Structure as Myth and Ceremony," University of Chicago, 
http://ssr1.uchicago.edu/PRELIMS/Orgs/orgs2.html (accessed February 1, 2008).  
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impossible to draw a dividing line between its formal and informal organization. Prior to 
9/11, the Taliban operated in a very rigid and extremely centralized manner at the top and 
middle level of an organization micro-managed by Mullah Omar.128 Since the 
commencement of OEF, the Taliban organization has apparently become flatter, with 
more and more independence given to local commanders, in order to adapt to the 
demands of a complex insurgent movement and draw benefits from dispersed small 
units.129 Despite this, the core of the Taliban movement maintains a somewhat 
hierarchical structure with centralized decision-making and decentralized execution. 
Broadly speaking, the Taliban is rather similar to the Mao’s model of a rural 
movement,130 based on social networks in the Pashtun countryside. During the course of 
research, the authors developed a broad organizational diagram of key Taliban 
components based on open source media reporting as depicted below.  
 
Figure 13. A Visualized Organizational Diagram of the Taliban131 
                                                 
128 Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 102.  
129 "Taliban," Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, Jane's Information Group, 
http://www8.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed December 1, 2007).  
130 M. Chris Mason, Lecture: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, August 2007. 
131 The tree was developed with information from various open source documents, including Victor 
Korgun, "Afghanistan's Resurgent Taliban," Terrorism Focus 1, no. 4 (October 24, 2003), 
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=23404 (accessed May 12, 2007). and 
Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Omar Names Council to Resist Occupation," The News June 24, 2003.  
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As shown in Figure 13 above, the Taliban are apparently structured into a 
centralized core pool of specialized departments and fighting forces organized and 
controlled by regional commanders. Specialized functional departments exist at other 
tiers of organization as well; the common ones include suicide squads trained and 
directed at the middle tier and above, media outlets that put out coordinated information 
operations like Ummat Studios and Radio Shariat, and specialized training outfits 
imparting technical skills to develop IEDs, suicide bombers, etc. Some of these 
functional departments provide a centralized pool for special skills that are dished out to 
the regional and local commanders as the need arises. There is some informal 
coordination and sharing of resources with other like-minded organizations such as Al 
Qaeda and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami (HiG).132 Some of this coordination 
comes from sharing similar tribal and clan networks that provide access to weapons and 
material besides common social background of various operatives. Some media reports 
suggest that the Taliban may also have a proxy political wing, i.e. political leaders in the 
constitutional bodies within the IROA with known or covert Taliban links that give the 
Taliban a chance to influence the political system.133 
It is interesting to note the status of the Taliban elements in Pakistan within the 
overall Taliban organization. Traditionally the Taliban elements in Pakistan never formed 
an integral part of the Afghan Taliban organization and retained their distinctive identity 
under various groups despite sharing the ideals.134 Some of these groups recently joined 
hands under Baitullah Mehsud to form Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan(TeTP) whose leader 
vowed an oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar.135  However, recently the Taliban  
 
 
                                                 
132 Daan Van Der Schriek, "Weaker but Not Wiser: The Taliban Today," Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 1 
(January 13, 2005), http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369093 (accessed March 
11, 2008).  
133 Syed Saleem Shahzad, "A Political Curtain-Raiser for the Taliban," Asia Times (2007), 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IB03Df01.html (accessed February 1, 2008).  
134 Hasan Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," CTC Sentinel 1, no. 2 (January 2008), 1, 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ (accessed January 17, 2008).  
135 Roggio. 
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leadership in Afghanistan distanced itself from the activities and objectives of Mehsud, 
saying that despite ideological alignment, the Taliban in Afghanistan did not necessarily 
share the objectives of the TeTP.136 
The regional level organization is similar to the top tier's, with a regional 
commander directing a number of local cells and controlling some centralized resources 
and expertise. The exact configuration of these "specialized departments" may vary from 
region to region due to the resources available to a particular regional commander and his 
overall status within the Taliban organization. 
At the local level, the Taliban organization is best described as a network of 
franchises. The franchise structure fits well with the tribal traditions and nuances. Apart 
from ideologically motivated cadres, small militant bands sprout up in the countryside 
based on social networks with objectives that are sometimes in harmony with the 
Taliban's objectives.137 These groups align themselves with Taliban and get permission 
to use the Taliban "trademark" for their local aims, in return for support and cooperation 
while agreeing to abide by the Taliban’s strategic directions. However, these groups “can 
not merely be a criminal gang and have to be sufficiently motivated and ideologically 
‘correct’ to be accepted into the fold of the Taliban.”138 The new cell is expected to 
behave in accordance with the Taliban grand strategy while retaining local freedom of 
action. This modus operandi merges the interests of both parties while preserving 
sensitivities about tribal loyalties and territorial boundaries.  
A typical Taliban village cell (or "franchise") comprises ten to fifty individuals 
who are generally part-time fighters. They are mostly local with a smattering of 
ideologically motivated persons and mercenaries from other areas. The cell runs its own 
intelligence collection, logistics, and population control activities with coordination and 
support from similar cells and local Taliban leaders. The cell configuration varies 
                                                 
136  "Afghan Taliban Distance Themselves from Baitullah," Pajhwok Afghan News, 
http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=49240 (accessed February 1, 2008).  
137 Mark Miller, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Special Forces, Interview by authors. Written notes. Fort 
Bragg , NC, November 16, 2007. 
138 Kevin Stone, Senior Analyst, National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), Interview by authors.  
Written notes. Charlottesville, VA, November 19, 2007.   
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according to its environment and roles. As shown in Figure 14 below, the cell conducts 
most tasks independently but has a reciprocal relationship with other Taliban cells in the 
area for physical and intelligence support; sequential interdependence for processing of 
information (couriers, passage of equipment  and sometimes finances); and pooled 
interdependence on higher levels in the hierarchy for media operations, IED making, 
technical intelligence collection, specialized training and additional financial support. 
 
Figure 14. Forms of Interdependence in the Taliban Organization 
C. LEADERSHIP 
The Taliban acknowledge the central leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar and 
thus far there is no known attempt to question his headship. He holds a charismatic 
leadership position after donning the Prophet Muhammad’s cloak and proclaiming 
himself "leader of the faithful" early in his reign.139  
Mullah Omar is assisted by the Supreme Shura, the highest Taliban ruling body. 
The Taliban’s version of a board of governors, it supposedly consists of twelve members 
and three advisors.140 Different members of the Shura are sometimes assigned specific 
consultation or field command roles in addition to their position in the Shura. For 
example, before his death in 2007, Mullah Dadullah was assigned direct military 
                                                 
139 Johnson and Mason, Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan.    
140 Matt DuPee and Haroon Azizpour, "Blood in the Snow: The Taliban’s ‘Winter Offensive’," 
Afgha: Afghanistan News, December 7, 2006, http://www.afgha.com/?q=node/1589 (accessed April 11, 
2007).  
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responsibilities. The members of the original Shura in 2003 reportedly included 
Jalaluddin Haqqani, Saifur Rahman Mansoor, Mullah Dadullah (replaced by Mullah 
Bakht141), Akhtar Osmani, Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, Mullah Obaidullah, Hafiz 
Abdul Majeed, Mullah Mohammad Rasul, Mullah Berader and Mullah Abdur Razzaq 
Akhundzada.142 Most of these names appear as regional Taliban commanders as well, 
thereby giving the Shura the look of a council of field commanders as well as a board of 
governors. There have been significant and unconfirmed changes in the original list since 
the death and capture of a number of its members. 
At regional and local levels, leadership roles sometimes become ambiguous as 
leaders struggle for personal influence. Of late, the central Taliban leadership has 
supposedly instituted an official leader recognition process in which a leader is 
designated for a region with described geographical and tribal boundaries and an 
elaborate command structure to coordinate and control operations.143 However, most of 
the regional and local leaders emerge in “ a manner typical of Pashtun tribal history—rise 
of charismatic persons within a social network who are able to exercise some clout and 
then get affiliated with the Taliban for further advancement.”144 These regional Taliban 
commanders have elements organized into sub-commands along territorial or tribal 
boundaries, as well as functional divisions similar to the top tier of the organization. An 
approximate representation of some of known regional commanders of the Taliban is 
shown in Figure 15 below.  
Taliban organizational structure, signatures, and tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) vary in different regions due to local environments. For example, in 
Eastern Afghanistan, the Taliban are mainly based on the tribal networks intermingled 
with elements of HiG and Haqqani Network with some Arab influence in Nuristan. In the 
South, and especially in Helmand and Oruzgan, they are more closely tied to the 
                                                 
141 Matt Dupee, "Analysis: Taliban Replace Dadullah, the State of the Insurgency," Afgha: 
Afghanistan News, May 15, 2007,  http://www.afgha.com/?q=node/2947 (accessed May 18, 2007).  
142 Yusufzai, Omar Names Council to Resist Occupation.  
143 Korgun. 
144 Miller. The same phenomenon is described by Johnson and Mason, Understanding the Taliban 
and Insurgency in Afghanistan, 71. 
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narcotics and smuggling gangs that thrive on opium production.145 The Taliban in 
Northern and Western Afghanistan are still not very well organized or effective because 
of ineffective local support, but they are slowly growing in an attempt to expand 
northwards. 146 
 
Figure 15. Perceived Regional Taliban Leadership147 
D. DECISION MAKING 
Decision making within Taliban is a mix of Directive Control (broad, general 
guidance from the top and decentralized execution), Consultative Control (decisions 
based on consensus among leaders), and Autocratic Control (issuing strict orders with 
                                                 
145 Brandon Griffin, Captain, U.S. Special Forces, Interview by authors. Written notes. Fort Bragg , 
NC, November 16, 2007. 
146 Waliullah Rahmani, "Farah Province: The New Focus of the Taliban Insurgency," Terrorism 
Monitor 5, no. 23 (December 10, 2007), 
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373844 (accessed April 10, 2008).  
147 Derived mainly from Korgun. 
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specific details for execution). According to Admiral Cox, former Commander of the 
Joint Intelligence Center at U.S. Central Command, 
In most part, the decision-making is localized. Most of the Taliban 
members are  local with smaller groups moving between different areas. 
Day to day decision  making is normally done at tribal or local level. The 
system looks autocratic from  outside at the top level but further down the 
chain, the locals decide what to do.148  
Mullah Omar was known initially for micromanagement; however, he has 
gradually adopted a more directive style of leadership due to the operational environment 
that requires more decentralized execution. The middle tier leaders are more informal and 
generally rely on consensus in a jirga style meeting. The decision is generally, but not 
always, vetted through the clergy and tribal elders to elicit popular support. However, for 
tactical purposes, most short-term decisions are given at the spur of the moment, without 
consultation.  
In the authors' survey, most respondents considered the decision making process 
to be biased towards a directive control mechanism at the strategic level, consultation 
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Figure 16. Perceptions about Decision Making Process in the Taliban 
                                                 
148 Cox. 
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E. COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION 
The Taliban insurgency is a decentralized and loosely run affair. For the Directive 
Control mechanism, Mullah Omar and the Supreme Shura carry out strategic planning 
and issue overall directives to the regional commanders. These directives are 
disseminated downwards to village cells in the form of a fatwa or decree. The village cell 
acts in a semi-independent manner with minimum control from above. The cell leader 
plans and conducts his activities according to the regional situation, considering 
incentives or dangers for his own group while aiming for alignment with overall policy.  
The regional or local Taliban leader's span of control depends on the nature of the 
task. For routine tasks, the linkages and reporting relationships resemble a traditional 
hierarchical pyramid where information is passed up and down along a vertical line 
(Figure 17 A). However, when a coordinated operation is required, network features of 
the organization come into play and information and support are passed horizontally, 
vertically or diagonally (Figure 17 B). The speed of information sharing is remarkable 
and not restricted by the disruption of a few communication channels, thus enabling the 
Taliban to adopt swarming tactics for their operations.149  The very rare exceptions are 




Figure 17. Linkages, Coordination and Reporting Mechanisms 
                                                 
149 For details of swarming tactics see John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of 
Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2005), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB311.pdf (accessed December 11, 2007).  
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Couriers are used to relay sensitive verbal or written messages.150  The courier 
network relies on tribal linkages and loyalties for speed and security.  The Taliban also 
utilize short-range radios for tactical communications with an extensive code system.  
Lately, Taliban cells are using the internet to communicate within the settled areas and 
for propaganda purposes.151 Another form of communication is the use of Shabnamah 
(night letters) which are "declarations of intent" normally used for population control.152 
These night letters are probably the most widespread form of Taliban messaging along 
with word of mouth (rumors), as highlighted in a recent survey conducted by Altai 
Consulting (Figure 18 below).  This phenomenon illustrates that the Taliban does not 
need to be physically present to reach out and influence the populace. 
 











Figure 18. Forms of Taliban Presence in the Afghan Countryside153 
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F. THE PEOPLE 
The Taliban have an interesting human resource process, deeply rooted and in 
harmony with the local culture and ethnic nuances, that sometimes makes it difficult to 
separate members' tribal and the organizational affinities. This section describes different 
elements of this paradigm. 
1. Recruitment and Training 
The Taliban does not have a formal recruitment mechanism. New recruits are 
generally drawn from two main channels:  1) students of certain pro-Taliban madrassas, 
and 2) local tribal youth recruited based on glamour, desire for revenge, frustration with 
the government, financial incentives, and religious sentiments.  The Altai CEE Survey 
(Figure 19 below) illuminates the reasons for Taliban recruitment, showing that religious 
ideology is a lower priority for recruitment than many suspect. 
 
 
Figure 19. Possible Recruitment Motivators for the Taliban Foot Soldiers154 
                                                 
154 Altai Consulting Survey - CEE: Cognitive Effects Evaluation (Kabul: Altai Consulting [2007]), 
http://www.altaiconsulting.com/work_ns.php (accessed November 23, 2007).  
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The local cell generally acts as the hub for recruitment based on family and clan 
loyalties, tribal lineage, personal friendships and social networks, madrassa alumni 
circles and shared interests. This social movement approach to recruitment enables whole 
personal networks to be used for the organization’s benefits, as  
The best way to organize a social movement is not to recruit individuals 
but to recruit leaders and groups, as undertaken by the Taliban. 
Irrespective of the initial motivations, the perceptions of the new members 
change to become more aligned with the organization once they get in.155  
The feeling of badal or revenge as a response to collateral damage suffered by 
innocent Afghans prompts an influx in recruitment. The frequent use of small numbers of 
Taliban fighters as bait to induce massive strikes in a village from the U.S. and NATO 
forces boosts Taliban recruiting.156  
Recruits generally have basic military skills because of the very nature of the 
Pashtun tribal society where everyone is always armed. Recruits receive significant on-
the-job training and have to prove their military ability within a ‘peer review system’ 
typical of Pashtun tribal structure. Those considered brave, intelligent, pious, and 
politically sound generally gain prominence within a cell and soon either assume 
leadership of the cell or form a new cell of their own.   
2. Motivation 
The Taliban are very successful in achieving goal-congruence among members’ 
personal motivations, group interests, and the objectives of the organization. The 
motivations of the Taliban can be divided into two main groups, as described by Jones. 
The top tier comprises the Taliban leadership structure and key 
commanders. These men are motivated by their interpretation [of] radical 
Islam, and see the insurgency as a fight with Western infidels, and the 
West's "puppet government" in Kabul. The bottom tier includes thousands 
of local fighters and their support network. These are primarily young men 
from rural villages who are paid to set up roadside bombs, launch rockets, 
                                                 
155 Doug Perkins, Pakistan Analyst, National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), Interview by 
authors. Written notes. Charlottesville, VA; November 19, 2007. 
156 Johnson and Mason, Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan, 71  
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and mortars at NATO and Afghan forces, or pick up a gun for a few days. 
Most are not ideologically committed to jihad. Rather, they are motivated  
because they are unemployed, disenchanted with the lack of change since 
2001, or angry because a local villager was killed or wounded by Afghan, 
U.S. or NATO forces.157 
Because they identify their struggle as a defense of Islamic values and Pashtun 
culture, the motivations of the top Taliban leadership can be identified using a mixture of 
the Cosmic War158 and Fundamentalism159 paradigms as they define their struggle to be 
in the defense of their own version of Islamic values and Pashtun culture. The leadership 
seeks to realize a form of Islam that they believe to be pure and, according to them, based 
on the earliest understandings of the faith. The rank and file, on the other hand, are more 
like a social movement that wants to challenge the political status quo and economic 
deprivation; hence, their motivation can be best understood in the context of Social 
Movement Theory.160 However, after carrying out the bulk of recruitment using the 
social movement mechanisms,  
the personal motivation at local level is harnessed by the Taliban 
leadership to  their own advantage. Once you get in, other organizational 
pressures take over and keep the members streamlined to the overall 
ideology. It is like a cult, which changes your outlook after you get inside 
it.161 
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The Taliban persuade their ranks to act in accordance with the organization’s 
wishes by offering monetary rewards for the people driven by money, status for the 
people seeking power, and glamour for the adventurous by glorifying them in tribal 
society.  They also punish people found wanting.  Punishments include withholding 
finances, reduction in status, physical violence aimed at the individual or his kinfolk, and 
alienation from the tribal community. Taliban also have a loosely defined arrangement 
for discipline that the fighters and commanders are expected to follow. In December 
2007, they issued a codex or code of conduct (Layeha) for communicating the 
organization’s rules to its members.162 The central leadership can disown a member or 
commander for any significant violation of the rules as demonstrated recently by the 
sacking of Mullah Mansoor Dadullah.163  
G. THE WORK (OPERATIONS) 
The Taliban work methods are a mixture of Mujahideen (dukhi) tactics inherited 
from the Russo-Afghan War and recent Iraqi insurgent innovations carried across 
borders.164 They exhibit a definite Al Qaeda training signature in their TTPs and overall 
methodology and are becoming more sophisticated with time. For kinetic operations, 
their methods are typical of a rural guerilla insurgency with varying results. Respondents 
to the authors' survey rated the effectiveness of various Taliban TTPs as depicted in 
Figure 20 below. However, the study will not discuss further details of the TTPs as these 
are beyond the scope of this research. 
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Figure 20. Perceived Effectiveness of Different Taliban TTPs 
Despite their obvious effectiveness in kinetic operations, the major routine work 
objective of the Taliban is aimed at population control. For this purpose, two major 
approaches can be identified:  the "Robin Hood" method and the "bullies."165  The Robin 
Hoods generally champion the genuine and perceived concerns of the local populace, 
providing security and speedy justice according to tribal norms and thereby gaining local 
support. The Robin Hoods also stir up local sentiments in their favor by a very effective 
Information Operations (IO) campaign maligning the Coalition forces’ actions, in 
particular the collateral damage. The bullies, on the other hand, use the strength of their 
gangs and massive intimidation to commandeer local loyalties. Because there is no 
permanent Coalition presence in most areas,166 the local population is forced to accept 
the Taliban presence and support their activities to secure safety. In most instances, the 
Taliban groups use a combination of methods as required. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The organization structure of the Taliban is optimized to achieve congruence 
between their environments, strategic objectives, resources, and limitations. The 
understanding of their structure, as described in this chapter, provides a basis for 
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evaluating their strengths and weaknesses in comparison to the Coalition forces' 
strategies. To this end, Chapter V describes the Coalition COIN strategies adopted so far 
on both sides of the border in context of the current problem. 
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V.  COALITION COIN STRATEGIES 
Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without 
strategy is the noise before defeat. — Sun Tzu167 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter IV outlines the perceived organizational structure of the Taliban, as it 
exists today. This chapter describes the counterinsurgency strategies adopted by the 
Coalition Forces on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This description is 
prerequisite to discussion of the positive and negative effects on the Taliban in Chapter 
VI, which allows assessment of the Taliban's strengths, weaknesses and potential for 
transformation. As with in the previous chapter, due to limited materials on the subject, 
much of the information presented is based on open source media reports and 
unclassified interviews with various Coalition decision makers and field operatives. 
B. THE PAKISTANI STRATEGY  
The United States was not the only casualty of 9/11. The attacks hit 
Pakistan differently, but with equally savage force. 
— President of Pakistan, General (Ret) Pervez Musharraf168  
1. Background of the Problem 
The Pakistani security forces have been dealing with the menace of the Taliban 
and their sympathizers mostly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of 
Pakistan since 2001. With an estimated population of 3.18 to 5.7 million, and an area of 
27,220 square kilometers (over 3.4 percent of Pakistan's land area), these territories 
comprise a vast swathe of land along the sensitive and geographically rough Pakistan-
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Afghan border. 169  The area includes seven tribal agencies and six Frontier Regions (FRs) 
(See Figure 21 below). A number of tribes straddle the border, and  almost all maintain 
strong ethnic and cultural links with their Pashtun cousins across it. The tribal areas joined 
Pakistan in 1947 through an agreement between the Pakistani government and the tribal 
elders.170 Pakistan assured a continuation of the accords already in place between the 
tribes and the British Government, including their semi-autonomous status and Easement 
Rights (access across the border to the divided tribes).171 To that end, the constitution of 




Figure 21. Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Frontier Regions173 
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February 27, 2008).  
 65
Historically, elders or maliks had a dominant role in the tribal society.174 
However, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, changing economic situation, rise of 
dissatisfied youth groups, and founding of radical madrassahs have increased the influence 
of politico-religious organizations and challenged the riwaj175 and the authority of maliks 
thereby dividing the tribal society between the power centers of the mullahs, the youth, and 
the maliks.176 Contrary to popular perception, it was not official Pakistani policy at the time 
to reduce effectiveness of maliks for allegedly increasing the mujahideen recruitment. 
Nonetheless, Pakistani and U.S. support to mujahideen groups based in FATA did 
eventually have the same unintended consequence, as the tribal mujahideen gained 
advanced weaponry and mullahs increased in influence with the opening of a large number 
of foreign funded madrassahs.177 
Economically, the FATA are some of the least developed areas of the country. 
Almost 60 percent of FATA households are below the poverty line.178 The region has a 
literacy rate of only 17.4 percent, much lower than the national average of 45 percent, 
and there is only one doctor per 7670 people.179 There are very limited economic 
opportunities in the area with the exception of traditional cattle herding, crude forestry 
and limited mineral exploration.180 
After the Soviet invasion in 1979, an unusual interest attached to the FATA when 
these areas became the launch pad for mujahideen in Afghanistan. 181 The influx of 
Afghan refugees, spread of militant culture, continuing civil war in Afghanistan, and rise 
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of the Taliban did much to aggravate the situation. It led to an altered ethnic balance, 
weapons proliferation, inflow of narcotics, extremism, and increased disorder,182 along 
with undermining of traditional tribal structures. 
Following the U.S. led invasion in Afghanistan, the tribal areas once again came 
into focus, as a number of militants found refuge in these areas with their local 
sympathizers using the Pashtunwali tenet of melmastia (hospitality). The Pakistani 
government thereby decided to launch a cleanup operation in the tribal areas, Operation 
Almizan. The main adversaries of the Pakistani security forces in this effort fall into three 
broad categories: Arabs, Central Asians, and local and Afghan members of the Taliban 
and their sympathizers. The Arabs are mostly a mix of mujahideen veterans of the Russo-
Afghan War and new members of Al Qaeda networks. The Central Asians and Uighur 
Chinese operate under their own umbrella organizations like the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan led by Qari Tohir Yuldashev and Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement under 
Hassan Masoom.183 The FATA locals and Afghan refugees sympathetic to the Taliban 
cause initially organized themselves loosely along tribal lines. However, these outfits 
recently merged under the unified banner of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan184 with an 
ambiguous relationship with the Taliban movement in Afghanistan.185  
The peculiar geography, history, administrative arrangements, and ethno-cultural 
nuances of the tribal areas posed a host of unique problems for the Pakistani government, 
which undertook various strategies to restore order, with varying results. Currently, Pakistan 
has around 112,000 troops deployed to the region186 and has lost the lives of over 1045 
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soldiers in operations there, with another 2471 wounded in action as of January 2008.187 
This is reputedly the largest number of casualties suffered by any one nation in OEF. 
There have also been an even greater number of civilian casualties resulting from terrorist 
acts throughout the country.  The next section discusses these strategies and their 
transformation. 
2. Transformation of the Pakistani Strategy  
The initial aims of the Operation Almizan were twofold: to counter border 
crossings and infiltration by terrorists and militants, and the elimination of any possible 
terrorist hideouts in FATA in order to re-establish the writ of the Pakistani 
government.188 The initial phase of Operation Almizan was synchronous with the 
Coalition Forces’ operations in December 2001. Because of tribal sensitivities and the 
peculiar status of the FATA, the Pakistani security forces moved into FATA only after 
negotiating with tribal elders. The tribal elders assured the Commander of 11th Corps that 
they “would allow access to Pakistan Army and local scouts to the hitherto inaccessible 
tribal areas and seize and handover any suspects.”189 To make the deal lucrative for the 
tribes, the government promised infrastructure and other development programs initially 
worth at least U.S. $20 million.190 The deal generally resulted in a successful outcome 
except in the administrative districts (called agencies) of South Waziristan (SWA) and 
North Waziristan (NWA), where the traditional influence of tribal elders had deteriorated 
for reasons already mentioned. Initially, groups of the Frontier Corps191 and Army 
deployed along the border mountain passes and captured 240 Al Qaeda operatives 
                                                 
187 Khan, FATA and GWOT.  
188 Ibid. 
189 Rahimullah Yousufzai, as quoted in Matthew W. Williams, "The British Colonial Experience in 
Waziristan and its Applicability to Current Operations" School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2005 . 
190 Intikhab Amir as quoted in Williams. 
191 The Frontier Corps is a paramilitary force stationed in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
and Balochistan Province. While operating under the Federal Ministry of Interior, it is responsible for law 
enforcement in tribal areas and border security. For details see "Frontier Corps," Pakistan Military 
Consortium, http://www.pakdef.info/forum/showthread.php?t=5300 , (accessed January 11, 2008). 
 68
representing 26 nationalities in the first month.192 During this stage, due to the army’s 
commitment on the eastern border and lack of adequate intelligence, a number of 
militants were able to sneak across the border and found refuge with sympathetic tribes. 
To counter the problem, a Pakistani infantry brigade entered Tirah Valley in July 2002, 
and followed by another brigade in the North and South Waziristan agencies. In this 
phase, the army mainly concentrated on conducting cordon and search operations for Al 
Qaeda and Taliban operatives, based again on sketchy intelligence. During these 
operations, the security forces suffered significant losses (e.g. in Operation Kazha 
Punga193) but did succeed in capturing some key Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives.  
A major change in Pakistani strategy occurred in mid-March 2004, when a search 
operation at Kalosha in South Waziristan met stiff resistance from the "miscreants."194 
Sixty-four soldiers lost their lives and 58 were severely injured over a period of five days, 
while 68 militants were killed and 163 captured.195 After Kalosha, the security forces 
decided to launch extensive sweep operations to create “Terrorist Free Zones,” to expand 
them further, and then to deploy small outposts throughout the area by inducting around 
80,000 troops. The main facets of the strategy included sealing the border and killing or 
capturing opponents in the area with large-scale operations, creating a suitable political 
environment and increasing development projects. The security forces temporarily 
achieved the upper hand, establishing outposts to counter cross-border infiltration and 
commencing the development works. However, the miscreants soon recovered their 
losses and started attacking government outposts and convoys, which led to occasional 
firefights and violence.  
In June 2006, the Pakistani government announced a shift of strategy from purely 
military dominance to the cooperative integration of local tribal elders, religious leaders, 
and populace; the announcement led to the Miranshah Peace Accord in September 2006. 
According to the government, the objectives of the accord included restoring the 
                                                 
192 Musharraf, 264.   
193 Ibid., 265. 
194 The term "Miscreants" is widely used in Pakistan to describe anti-government forces and terrorists. 
195 Musharraf, 268.  
 69
dilapidated tribal structure and relying on peaceful means to establish better law and 
order. The government declared the policy successful for some time as the level of 
violence in FATA decreased significantly; however, there were some reports of the 
reorganization of local groups sympathetic to Taliban in NWA and SWA.  
According to some observers, the alleged U.S. military operation in Bajaur in 
October 2006 started a fresh wave of violence throughout the area.196 The tribal elders 
declared it a breach of the agreement, the local Taliban sympathizers started asserting 
themselves even outside the tribal regions, and a process of “Talibanisation” commenced 
in the districts outside FATA. The Waziristan Accord came to an end in the aftermath of 
Lal Masjid episode when the army, responding to a wave of suicide attacks, once again 
moved against suspected miscreants’ hideouts in the tribal areas, Swat, and Darra Adam 
Khel.197 Currently, a new wave of negotiations between the government and the tribal 
elders is underway for termination of the hostilities.198       
3. The Current Pakistani Strategy 
Pakistan has a significant interest in the success of the OEF and its own 
operations in the FATA. The desired Pakistani end state includes preservation of 
Pakistani national sovereignty and unity while establishing and retaining control over its 
territory, eradication of extremism and terrorist networks on its soil, long term regional 
stability, development of good relations with Afghanistan, and fostering an enduring 
strategic partnership with U.S. 
The Pakistani strategy in FATA has gradually shifted during the past six years, 
from full scale direct military action to attempted empowerment of tribal institutions 
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through negotiations. The current strategy entails use of tribal institutions to achieve 
control of the area and strengthen the system of governance, use of military force to seal 
the borders and target known miscreant training and logistic nodes in order to reestablish 
the writ of the state from a position of strength, and development and economic 
activities.199 The commander of 11th Pakistani Corps, based in Peshawar, acts as the 
overall military commander of the region in charge of Operation Almizan, while the 
governor of NWFP heads the pillar of the strategy implemented through political agents. 
The next section discusses the ways and means of this strategy in the context of elements 
of national power, focusing on the role of military in employing these elements.   
a. Diplomatic and Political 
“Politics govern tribal behavior in Waziristan.”200 Therefore, the political 
arm of strategy is now heralded as the main feature of the government’s plans to stabilize 
the region. The ultimate aim of political arrangements is to ensure a smooth transition of 
the FATA into mainstream Pakistan. However, this is a slow and painstaking process and 
requires heeding tribal sensitivities. The first step in this long-term strategy is to 
strengthen traditional tribal structures of maliks and jirga in order to increase the use of 
tribal elders against miscreants and achieve local political solutions. The Pakistani 
government has declared its intention to route the new wave of development works and 
dialogues with the populace through the maliks in order to increase their influence and 
importance.201 It expects that the maliks will eventually reassert their traditional role and 
thus help the government implement its strategy. According to the government, some 
events in South Waziristan in March 2007 did show a hopeful trend in this regard, when a 
portion of the Wazir tribe fought against Uzbek Al Qaeda fighters, causing significant  
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losses.202 After the failure of 2006 Accord and ensuing violence, the government signed a 
new agreement with tribal elders from Waziristan in February 2008, which it hopes will 
be significantly more effective and enduring.203 
With the recent success of Awami National Party (ANP) in the general 
elections in NWFP, it is hoped that a more politically oriented strategy will be used to 
deal with the situation. The ANP holds significant influence among Pashtuns and as part 
of its manifesto demands that political processes in the FATA should be brought up to 
par with the rest of Pakistan in order to stem the militancy.204 The success of ANP over 
the religious parties’ coalition (Muttahidda Majlis I Amal, known as the MMA) signifies 
a popular shift among the Pakistani Pashtuns, who opted for a more secular democratic 
solution. A recent survey demonstrates the same trend and claims that the people of 
FATA aspire to a greater political role and do not believe the religious political groups 
can create a better or more just society.205  
On the diplomatic side, the government has been trying t to coordinate its 
operations with the Afghan, U.S. and NATO governments through high-level visits and 
liaisons. However, the efforts on all sides leave much to be desired, as there is an 
apparent lack of coordination among Coalition partners on key issues in the Pashtun belt.  
b. Information and Intelligence Gathering 
Information operations and intelligence gathering form the second tier of 
the Pakistani strategy. The Pakistani government is trying to influence the opinions of the 
tribes against extremism by a national television and newspaper media campaign. It faces 
enormous difficulties in the form of a better and more aggressive information campaign 
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run by the miscreants, and mixed popular reaction to the U.S.206 The two main apparatus 
of the information campaign are the armed forces’ Directorate of Inter Services Public 
Relations (ISPR) and the Ministry of Information. While maintaining its tentacles at field 
headquarters level, the ISPR coordinates media access to military operations, gives out 
accounts of military actions in a daily press briefing as the mouthpiece of the military, 
and runs leaflet campaigns aimed at the local populace. It formulates media policy, 
safeguards against negative influences on the Armed Forces, and monitors the mass 
media for hostile psychological campaigns.207 The main objectives of the information 
campaign as part of the overall strategy are threefold: discrediting militancy, creating 
support for the presence of government security forces in the area, and increasing the 
tribal population’s sense of national identity.  
Intelligence gathering is dependent mostly on the use of sparse HUMINT 
sources, which are extremely difficult to acquire and operate in a well-knit tribal structure 
where outsiders stand out like a sore thumb. Therefore, the security forces depend mainly 
on their own meager human assets, along with some technical intelligence from the OEF 
forces whose main focus is on the other side of the border. This arrangement involves 
bureaucratic hurdles, too, as most sensitive information cannot be shared with non-U.S.-
NATO forces due to classification issues. Currently, the Pakistani forces do not have 
adequate technical equipment, like unmanned aerial vehicles and reconnaissance 
satellites, a lack lamented by President Musharraf.  
Unfortunately, despite our best efforts, we were not given timely access to 
modern technology for intelligence gathering, surveillance, and target 
acquisition. Our army operations remain dependent on technical 
intelligence provided through U.S. resources.208  
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c. Military  
Military actions have been a major feature of the Pakistani strategy in the 
FATA. While the government recognizes that military operations are not the ultimate 
solution, they are used to create a favorable environment for the political process.209 
Apart from monitoring the overall campaign, the primary tasks of the military in the area 
include the eliminating militant hideouts, sealing borders, reestablishing the writ of the 
state, and conducting economic activities like constructing roads, establishing schools 
and providing of health facilities.210 
The security forces initially used massive military direct actions to 
conduct large-scale sweep operations in the tribal territory. As a result, they gained 
outward control of the area and neutralized any large concentrations of Taliban and Al 
Qaeda elements. They achieved this at the cost of significant casualties to security forces, 
while collateral damage caused resentment among the locals due to the Pashtunwali 
concept of badal (revenge). After a gradual shift of government strategy towards the use 
of tribal institutions, the security forces modified their focus to achieve better effects 
from their actions. Recent official figures show that the military has deployed over 
112,000 troops into the area, operating around 1083 posts along the border.211 The 
deployment is aimed at countering border crossing, eliminating militant influence and 
increasing government presence in hitherto inaccessible areas. The Pakistani government 
also proposes to fence the border to counter movement, but faces difficulties because of 
Afghan sensitivities about the Durand Line.212 To augment its capability, new FC wings 
are being raised, along with better personnel training through local and foreign 
                                                 
209 Khan, FATA and GWOT.  
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212 The Durand Line is the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan established during 
the British rule after an agreement between the British Indian government and the Emirate of Afghanistan. 
After the independence of Pakistan, Afghanistan refused to acknowledge the continued status of the Durand 
Line as an international border, claiming rights to the Pashtun majority areas up to Indus River. For details 
of the issue, see Tariq Mahmood, "The Durand Line: South Asia's New Trouble Spot" (M.A. thesis, 
National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School), 105, http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-
image.exe/05Jun%5FMahmood.pdf; http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA435574 (accessed May 30, 2007).  
 74
trainers.213 The Pakistan Army has also created a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) 
as part of its elite Special Services Group to undertake critical direct action tasks while 
training regular troops in counterinsurgency activities. However, it suffers from 
equipment shortages, a very small Special Forces capability, and the presence of a large 
potential threat on Pakistan’s eastern borders that requires an emphasis on conventional 
operations in its training curriculum and equipment acquisitions. 
d. Economic  
The economic element of Pakistani strategy rests on providing incentives 
to influence the behavior of tribes and denying funding for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 
The strategy aims at creating strategic effects. It includes the creation and improvement 
of the communication infrastructure; provision of health care, schools, and clean drinking 
water; help in economic ventures; payment of compensation for collateral damage; and 
payment of cash in return for cooperation. The Pakistan government has recently planned 
a nine-year, $2 billion economic development effort, partially funded by the U.S. 
government, the FATA Sustainable Development Project.214 Currently, the military 
spearheads most development works with funding by the FATA Secretariat and the 
Pakistan government. The military also uses a portion of its budget for development 
works. There is an increasing military effort to couple development works with IO, using 
an incentive scheme in a particular area in return for curbing militancy. However, most 
economic measures still concentrate on economic "assistance," not economic "activities," 
thereby lagging in sustainable development. Pakistan also faces serious problems 
supporting economic measures due to its meager economic resources, and the limited 
infrastructure in FATA does not support major ventures. The FATA Sustainable 
                                                 
213 There are current plans for U.S. trainers to conduct training of the FC units. See David Montero, 
"U.S. Military Prepares to Train Pakistani Forces," The Christian Science Monitor, April 16, 2008,  
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0416/p99s01-duts.html (accessed April 19, 2008).  
214 "$956 Million U.S. Funds for Infrastructure Likely," The Dawn, April 19, 2008, 
http://www.dawn.com/2008/04/19/top10.htm (accessed May 9, 2008).  
 75
Development Plan addresses some major economic and development activities in a 
cohesive manner but its outputs will be slow to materialize.215 
To deny funding to militants, Pakistan relies on financial intelligence to 
track funds channeled to miscreants. This is a difficult task to start with, as a significant 
portion of Pakistani small business and local economy is undocumented.  The militants 
do not operate through formal financial institutions but use hawala type networks while 
re-routing religious charities. The government has launched an effort to monitor the 
religious charities and their utilization with mixed results. 
4. The Tangible Results 
The Pakistani strategy to deal with the problem at hand has mixed results, 
described here briefly as the effects of the strategy on the Taliban and their sympathizers 
is discussed at length in Chapter VI.  
One major tangible output of the Pakistani strategy is a considerable improvement 
of infrastructure in the area. Starting in 2002, the government built a network of roads 
along with new schools and hospitals that, though still insufficient, are a first step in an 
underdeveloped area. These activities allowed security forces to gain some favorable 
ground among the locals. However, lack of effective follow up and an inadequate IO 
campaign prevented them from taking full advantage of the measures. Still, according to 
a recent FATA survey, having witnessed an increasing level of militant violence the 
locals want an end to the conflict in order to acquire the benefits of political 
representation and development.216 Thus, there is hope that with the renewed FATA 
Sustainable Development Plan and the promised U.S. $7 billion aid, development works 
in FATA will gain momentum. 
On the military side, Pakistani forces have been in a constant battle with the 
militants since the start of the Operation Almizan. As noted above, Pakistan paid a huge 
                                                 
215 For details of the FATA Sustainable Development Plan, see FATA Sustainable Development Plan 
(2006-2015). 
216 In a survey conducted in FATA by Community Appraisal and Motivation Program (CAMP), more 
than half of the respondents welcomed the possibility of extension of political system to FATA as a means 
to reduce violence and promote development. For details, see Shinwari, 73.  
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price for its operations in the tribal belt with 1045 soldiers killed and 2471 wounded in 
actions that killed around 2900 terrorists. The Pakistani forces also captured over 1100 Al 
Qaeda operatives, and have arrested and handed over 3800 Taliban to the Afghan 
government.217  
The casualties suffered by opposing sides offer some insight on the nature of 
conflict. The overall balance of casualties over last five years is depicted in the graphs 
below. Figure 22 below shows the casualties resulting from terrorist violence between 
January 2003 and February 2008. There is an upward shift in the casualties throughout, 
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Figure 22. Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Pakistan218 
 
Figure 23 below shows the proportion of casualties among terrorists and 
insurgents killed as a result of security forces action, civilians, and security forces during 
the same period. 
 
                                                 
217 Information obtained from an unnamed source.  
218 Graph generated using data from "Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Pakistan," South Asia 
Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm (accessed May 
30, 2007). There are some anomalies in the data, as casualty figures for some months are inconsistent with 
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Figure 23. Trend of Percent Share of Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Pakistan219 
Although casualty ratios are not a sufficient measure of the success of an 
unconventional campaign, the ratio between militant deaths and security forces and 
civilian casualties is increasingly unfavorable to the miscreants, as the percentage of 
terrorist and insurgent casualties is slowly on the rise. This trend shows that the militants 
are likely to shift to their emphasis from direct attacks on security forces (e.g. ambushes 
and raids) to more indirect attacks in order to reduce their own casualties. This 
phenomenon is seen in the apparent rise of suicide attacks on security forces throughout 
the country. Other effects of these casualty trends on the militant organization and 
procedures are discussed in the next chapter.       
C.  THE COALITION STRATEGY 
The coalition countries are committed to varying degrees to the vision of a secure, 
stable, free, and prosperous Afghanistan established within the Bonn Agreement and 
outlined in the IROA constitution.  The extent to which participating countries will act on 
these altruistic goals remains to be seen.  The lack of unified action under a cohesive 
strategy leads credence to the adage that the road to hell is paved with good intentions.  
This section describes the efforts of the U.S., NATO, and Afghanistan governments to 
                                                 
219 Graph generated using data from “Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Pakistan.” 
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establish strategy, focusing on the background and evolution of strategies, the application 
of the Elements of National Power model (Diplomatic, Information, Military and 
Economic, DIME), and the tangible results.   
1. Background of the Problem 
A major goal after 9/11 included rooting out terror around the world.  Terrorist 
safe havens, like the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, would not be permitted.  On 
September 12, 2001, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 committed to 
taking all necessary steps to respond to 9/11. The U.S. Congress overwhelmingly 
authorized 
All necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 
or persons [the President of the U.S.] determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.220  
Operation Enduring Freedom ensued on October 7, 2001 with astounding success.  
During this swift campaign, a picture perfect matching of Northern Alliance and United 
States Special Forces disposed of the Taliban.221  As battles throughout Afghanistan 
continued, diplomats and scholars from various United Nations’ member countries, 
Afghanistan, and its neighbors met in Bonn to put together a plan to rebuild Afghanistan.   
The Bonn Agreement, signed December 5, 2001, set the stage for political 
transition and reconstruction of Afghanistan.222  The milestones and goals include: 
 
• An interim administration, with Hamid Karzai at the helm and national 
election milestones223 
                                                 
220 Katzman,  italics added. 
221 The fall of the Taliban is generally dated to December 9, 2001, when Mullah Omar and the 
Taliban fled Kandahar.   
222 The Bonn Agreement was sanctioned by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 on December 6, 
2001.  For details see “Afghan Bonn Agreement.” Afghan Government. 
http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm (accessed April 7, 2008).  
223 Presidential elections were held October 9, 2004.  Hamid Karzai was the winner.  Parliamentary 
and provincial council elections were held September 18, 2005 (four months behind schedule). District 
council elections have not taken place to date due to the security situation and difficulty determining 
district boundaries.  
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• International peacekeeping forces, the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) 
• Formalization of emergency and constitutional loya jirgas. 
• Outline the role United Nations including Afghan reconstruction and the 
humanitarian aid. 
• Reorganization of Afghan military forces224  
• Constitution of 1964 applied until permanent constitution drafted225 
The achievements of the Bonn Agreement are lauded by politicians while critics 
point to instability within the country as an indicator of failure and missed 
opportunities.226  Many United Nation countries signed on to implement the agreement in 
a massive nation building campaign.  The strategy developed to implement a significant 
democracy building effort. 
2. Transformation of Coalition Strategy 
This section spotlights three components in the transformation of coalition 
strategy:  the rebirth of U.S. COIN strategy as applied towards OEF, the growth of the  
Afghan National Army (ANA), and the expansion of ISAF. 
a.  U.S. Involvement 
With the cessation of major combat operations after Operation Anaconda 
in March 2002,227 the scramble to assemble a nation-building capability commenced.   
Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180), formed in June 2002, took the lead. 228  
                                                 
224 Five points abridged from Thomas H. Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State 
of State-Building After War," Central Asian Survey 25, no. 1-2 (March-June, 2006), 1-26. 
225 A permanent constitution was ratified by the 502 delegate constitutional loya jirga on January 4, 
2004.  See the full constitution at “The Constitution of Afghanistan.” Afghanistan Online. 
http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html (accessed April 7, 2008).  
226 For additional arguments for the success and failures of the Bonn Agreement, see Johnson, 
Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War. 
227 There are disagreements over the end of major combat operations in Afghanistan.  Some believe 
that they ended in December 2001 with the fall of Kandahar.  For the purpose of this thesis, the end of 
major combat operations is identified as the end of Operation Anaconda in March 2002. 
228 CJTF-180 consisted of a well-resourced three-star-led headquarters (XVIII Airborne Corps) with a 
subordinate division headquarters (TF-82).  See LTG(R) David W. Barno, “Fighting ‘The Other War’: 
Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003-2005,” Military Review, Sep-Oct 2007. 
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With little counterinsurgency experience since the Vietnam War, dominance of an 
enemy-centric "raid mentality," a small ratio of forces to population, and the tenuous 
relationship between the Departments of Defense (DoD) and State (DoS), the U.S. 
military forces and civilian counterparts were not well postured.  The introduction of 
ISAF to secure Kabul in 2002 allowed U.S. forces to concentrate on building ANA229 
and combat operations against remnant Taliban and Al Qaeda throughout the country.  
The enemy-focused strategy with limited forces increased the gap between coalition 
forces and the populace that should be the ‘center of gravity’230 in a counterinsurgency 
operation.231  
For a short time in 2003, all of Afghanistan was the responsibility of the 
10th Mountain Division.  U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), finding the situation both 
overwhelming and deteriorating, created a three-star coalition headquarters in October 
2003, the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A). CFC-A introduced the first 
semblance of a COIN strategy232 to the conventional minded military force in 
Afghanistan.  It takes a significant amount of time to implement a new strategy that 
operatives are neither trained for nor fond of.  Yet this strategy set the stage for expanded 
operations by U.S. and ISAF forces.  
The COIN strategy espoused two overarching principles. The first 
identified the Afghan people, rather than the enemy, as the center of gravity.  The second 
focused on unity of purpose between interagency departments and international partners.  
As seen in Figure 24 below, these principles rest upon five pillars, the tenets of the 
strategy: (1) defeat terrorism and deny sanctuary, (2) enable the Afghan security 
structure, (3) sustain area ownership, (4) enable reconstruction and good governance and 
                                                 
229 The Office of Military Cooperation - Afghanistan (OMC-A) was formed in mid-2002 to build 
ANA and latter the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD).  NATO countries participated in training the ANA 
at the Kabul Military Training Center, and created the Non Commissioned Officer and Officer schools.   
230 “Center of Gravity” can be defined as “physical or moral entities that are the primary components 
of physical or moral strength, power and resistance.” Joe Strange and Richard Iron, "Understanding Centers 
of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities," 7, (Montgomery: United States Air Force Air University, 2004) 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf (accessed December 7, 2007).    
231 Barno, 33. 
232 U.S. Special Forces operating in southern and eastern Afghanistan with Afghan Militia Forces and 
later ANA were conducting COIN operations in accordance with Special Operations Forces doctrine. 
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(5) engage regional states. The bottom of the Figure 24 depicts the increasing importance 
of information operations.  This strategy provided the foundation of the strategy currently 
executed by U.S. and ISAF forces.   
 
 
Figure 24. CFC-A Counter-Insurgency Strategy 2003-2005233 
 
With the expansion of ISAF’s role throughout the country, CFC-A 
disbanded on November 30, 2006, and CJTF-82 now directs the U.S. forces in the 
ongoing OEF.  The OEF commander also commands the ISAF Regional Command-East 
under the NATO ISAF mission.  It is important to note that OEF forces do not fall under 
NATO ISAF command and operate with separate rules of engagement (ROE).234  Only 
19,000 of the 28,000 U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan fall under the ISAF command 
structure.235  A further 3,200 Marines are deploying to Afghanistan for seven months to 
counter the Taliban’s 2008 offensive. Additionally, President Bush announced on April 4, 
2008 that the U.S. would increase the number of forces in 2009 to bolster confidence 
among participating countries.236 
                                                 
233 Barno, 35. 
234 Katzman, 21.   
235 Ibid., summary. 
236 Katzman, 24; a specified number of troops was not given. 
 82
b.  ANA Development 
The creation of the Afghan National Army is an enormous undertaking 
and a great success story for Afghanistan.  The necessity of building an ethnically diverse 
army capable of protecting the interests of Afghanistan became a central theme in the 
COIN strategy.  The ANA, approximately 49,500 strong and comprised of all ethnicities, 
is a symbol of national unity.237  The initial target size of 70,000 by 2009 was upgraded 
to 80,000 by 2010 with a new proposed target of 120,000.238  Presently the ANA is 
comprised of five corps that serve as regional commands: 
• 201st Corps – Kabul (Regional Command Capital) 
• 203rd Corps – Gardez (Regional Command East) 
• 205th Corps – Kandahar (Regional Command South) 
• 207th Corps – Herat (Regional Command West) 
• 209th Corps – Mazar-e-Sharif (Regional Command North) 239 
An ANA kandak (battalion) consists of 600 troops on paper.  All ANA 
Kandaks are infantry with the exception of one mechanized and one tank battalion.  
Operational Kandaks are paired with U.S. and ISAF forces for continued training, 
mentoring, and tactical employment.  A Special Forces unit is being trained and equipped 
by U.S. and French Special Operations Forces, with plans to produce a total of six 
commando Kandaks modeled after U.S. Rangers.240  With time, ANA has become 
increasingly professional and disciplined, conducting independent operations with only 
                                                 
237 Unfortunately, the ANA has been plagued with a high AWOL rate and large proportions of the 
Army on leave to return to their home villages to deliver money to their families because there is no local 
banking system to transmit funds.  The AWOL rate dropped from 33 percent in 2006 to its current rate of 8 
percent. These facts are the experiences of the author and  Antonial Gioustozzi, “Afghanistan’s National 
Army: The Ambiguous Prospects of Afghanistan,” Terrorism Monitor: In-Depth Analysis of the War on 
Terror, Vol VI, Issue 9, May 1, 2008 in 
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374139 (accessed May 12, 2008). 
238 Katzman, 32. The authors of this thesis believe that the 120,000 target cannot be met unless the 
Afghan government’s legitimacy grows substantially.  Strategies are recommended in Chapter VII to gain 
the requisite legitimacy and authority. 
239 “History,” The Official Website of the Afghan National Army. http://www.mod.gov.af/#History 
(accessed April 22, 2008). 
240 History,” The Official Website of the Afghan National Army. http://www.mod.gov.af/#History 
(accessed April 22, 2008). 
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the assistance of U.S. and ISAF trainers.  U.S. Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) and 
ISAF Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) instill confidence in ANA 
Kandaks with logistical assistance and a communication channel for air support and 
medical evacuation for wounded soldiers.241 
c.  ISAF Expansion 
Originally, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created 
to provide a secure environment in Kabul and support reconstruction.  This modest role 
eventually developed into five regional commands covering the entire country.  The 
transition commenced with NATO assuming command of ISAF on August 11, 2003.  
This assuaged the difficulties of changing lead nations and setting up new headquarters 
every six months, and allowed for a semi-unified command of forces under an established 
organization.242  The ISAF initially took on the relatively peaceful north and west. As 
their force package and capabilities grew, they started operating in the south, assuming 
command of the east on October 5, 2006.243  NATO’s Allied Command Operations 
(ACO) has overall responsibility for operations in Afghanistan.  The subordinate 
headquarters, the Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) Headquarters Brunssum, provides 
operational control, planning, and logistics.  The five regional commands under ISAF 
Headquarters, depicted in Figure 25, complement and support the ANA corps 
deployment as follows. 
• Regional Command Capital – Kabul,  lead nation Italy 
• Regional Command East – Bagram, lead nation U.S. 
• Regional Command South – Kandahar, lead nation UK 
• Regional Command West – Heart, lead nation Italy 
• Regional Command North – Mazar-e-Sharif, lead nation Germany244 
                                                 
241 Katzman, 32-33. 
242 “ISAF Command Structure,” International Security Assistance Forces. 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/structure/comstruc/index.html (accessed April 29, 2008). 
243 “Helping to bring security, stability and foster development in Afghanistan,” International Security 
Assistance Force, March 31, 2008. http://www.nato.int/issues/isaf/index.html (accessed April 22, 2008). 
244 “ISAF Regional Command Structure,” International Security Assistance Force, April 28, 2008. 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/structure/regional_command/index.html (accessed April 29, 2008). 
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Aside from military operations, the ISAF efforts are manifested in 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).  A PRT includes civilian and military 
personnel and is a key to success for the three-part strategy of security, governance, and 
development.  There are currently 26 PRTs assisting local authorities with security and 
reconstruction efforts. This is the best effort to reach the grassroots level and affect the 
Afghan populace.245 
 
Figure 25. ISAF Regional Commands and PRTs246 
3. The Current Coalition Strategy 
The strategic and operational situations are messy. Afghanistan is a 
conglomeration of three separate command structures split among the Afghan Ministry of 
Defense, U.S. led Operation Enduring Freedom, and NATO led ISAF.  Thirty-nine 
                                                 
245 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),” International Security Assistance Force, May 5, 2008. 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/recon_dev/prts.html (accessed May 8, 2008). 
246 “Afghanistan ISAF RC and PRT Locations,” International Security Assistance Force. 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afghanistan_prt3.jpg (accessed April 22, 2008). 
 85
countries make up the ISAF while 60 countries and institutions provide continued 
assistance in the rebuilding effort.  Three special civilian representatives, including the 
UN, EU, and NATO, conduct bilateral and multilateral coordination for military and 
civilian security and reconstruction efforts.247 The common theme among those 
interviewed for this thesis is that NATO and ISAF do not have a coherent unified strategy 
in Afghanistan. Former ISAF commander, General David Richards, says, “the current 
lack of unity and coordination between the numerous different organizations and 
agencies often manifests itself in a situation close to anarchy, both military and civil.”248 
This is not surprising given the players involved.  The Afghanistan Study Group Report: 
Revitalizing Our Efforts, Rethinking Our Strategies, released January 30, 2008, describes 
many of these shortcomings.  In an effort to tackle the seemingly insurmountable 
coordination effort and lack of a coherent strategy, the NATO summit in early April  
2008 released the ISAF Strategic Vision. This vision will take time to trickle down to the 
NATO units on the ground, just as the COIN strategy introduced by CFC-A in 2003 took 
time. 
With the ISAF Strategic Vision fresh off the press, this thesis focuses its analysis 
on the U.S. strategic approach.  The ISAF Strategic Vision parallels the U.S. approach 
with few variations.  The most important departure is a massive effort to synchronize 
military and civilian operations among the plethora of organizations.  The diplomatic, 
information, military and economic elements of national power are utilized to describe 
the strategy employed thus far.  Explained in ends, ways and means,249 the strategy seeks 
to provide for a safe, secure, prosperous, and democratic Afghanistan.   
a.  Diplomatic and Political 
The diplomatic ways in which the U.S. plans to achieve its strategy in 
Afghanistan are identified as strengthening the central government and implementing rule 
                                                 
247  “Afghanistan: The Need for International Resolve,” International Crisis Group, February 6, 2008. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5285 (accessed April 22, 2008). 
248 Ibid.,12. 
249 Ends – something toward which one strives, a goal; Ways – a method, plan, or means of attaining a 
goal; Means – an agency, instrument, or method used to attain an end (available resources).  
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of law, with emphasis on the national judiciary and the urban centers first, and promoting 
regional cooperation second. The means in which these ways are pursued include the 
creation of judicial and police training centers, provision of military aid to Pakistan, and a 
string of high level U.S. visits to Afghanistan. The intended benefits of these actions are 
irrefutable. Creating a quality legal and police system in a nation where none existed 
aside from local level councils of elders applying the Islamic sharia law250 is a huge step 
in the right direction to bring crime and corruption under control. Providing military aid 
packaged to Pakistan to make it a more capable ally in the war on terror and gain greater 
control over its territory is imperative to the security of both nations. High level visits 
from U.S. government officials show a continuing high level of commitment to the 
Afghan government and bolsters its credibility within national and international circles.   
b. Information and Intelligence 
The information campaign in which the U.S. plans to achieve its strategy 
in Afghanistan is not addressed in the U.S. strategy outlined in the Report for Congress. It 
is assumed that the standard ways employed by individual agencies in Afghanistan are 
applied through their individual means. The DoS relies on standard press releases, the 
Voice of America broadcast network and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) which provides many small radio broadcast stations to local 
Afghan communities. Department of Defense assets include its Public Affairs branch, 
which issues press releases like DoS and coordinates the embedding of press 
correspondents with deployed DoD units. The Psychological Operations branch uses 
strategic influence capabilities and tactical level means of communicating with target 
audiences, e.g. loudspeakers, print, and radio broadcasts. While each agency has the 
means to conduct information and influence operations, there is a lack of specified 
information goals and strategy for reaching out to Afghan and international audiences to 
improve understanding of the Afghan and U.S. efforts and successes and to counter 
Taliban information operations.    
                                                 
250 Ali Wardak and Davis Spivak, “Afghanistan’s Domestic Legal Framework,” The Senlis Council, 
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/008_publication/domestic_law_exec_summ.  
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c.  Military   
The military ways in which the U.S. plans to achieve its strategy in 
Afghanistan are identified as improving security and curbing the power of regional 
warlords, with an implied task being counter terrorism and Taliban. The means employed 
to improve security include the continuing effort to train and professionalize the ANA 
and the continued security presence of the NATO led ISAF. As of the end of 2007, 
approximately half of the projected 80,000 ANA troops had completed training; however, 
logistical problems plague the fielding of weapons and equipment.251 The overall 
military strategy rests on the ISAF and U.S. OEF operations from firebases and large 
scale troop movements to capture or kill insurgents. These heavy-handed methods 
concern President Karzai252 and alienate the populace. Compounding this are the 
warlords who President Karzai co-opted, some of whom are accused of being abusive in 
controlling their regions.253 The appointment of more moderate technocrats continues at 
a slow pace as ISAF and the ANA work their way to the provinces.   
d.  Economic  
The economic ways in which the U.S. plans to achieve its strategy in 
Afghanistan are identified as combating narcotics trafficking, rebuilding infrastructure, 
and improving the economy. Many means are identified for this task, including 
encouraging alternative crops to replace opium production, using PRTs to coordinate 
infrastructure reconstruction, and macroeconomic investment from foreign companies.  
Poppy eradication is extremely complicated. The sudden loss of opium from the economy 
will have drastic effects, as the estimated $3 billion in narcotics trade accounts for nearly 
half of the Afghan economy.254  The expanded use of PRTs is a good move for the 
reconstruction. Their deployment to firebases to provide security is a safe method of 
deployment, but fails to integrate the teams with the population and isolates them. In 
                                                 
251 Katzman. 
252 Barnett R. Rubin, “Afghanistan: A U.S. Perspective,” Crescent of Crisis: U.S. – European 
Strategy for the Greater Middle East, (Harrisonburg: Brookings Institute Press, 2006), 150. 
253 Rubin, 154.  
254 Ibid.,  155. 
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addition, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have created their own internal 
systems instead of utilizing Afghan resources, which engenders resentment against their 
efforts and fuels Taliban propaganda.255 The same propaganda deters foreign business 
due to concerns over the security of investments.  
4. The Tangible Results 
A nation, according to Adam Smith, must be able to fulfill certain duties to 
achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.  Those perceived duties include protecting 
the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies, protecting 
every member of society from the injustice or oppression of every other member and 
establishing an exact administration of justice, and erecting and maintaining certain 
public works and public institutions.256  The Overseas Development Institute identified 
ten attributes that a sovereign government must strive for, reflecting core functions of a 
legitimate state: 
• legitimate monopoly on the means of violence 
• administrative control  
• management of public finances  
• investment in human capital  
• delineation of citizenship rights and duties  
• provision of infrastructure services  
• formation of the market  
• management of the state’s assets  
• international relations  
• rule of law257 
                                                 
255 Karzai, 74. 
256 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan 
(London: Methuen and Co., Ltd, 1904), 221.  
257 Ghani, et al., “Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State Building,” (London: Overseas 
Development Institute, 2005) 6, www.odi.org.uk/Publications/working_papers/wp253.pdf, (accessed April 
5, 2008). 
 89
The IROA has been unable to achieve the Overseas Development Institute’s 
recommended levels, thus preventing complete legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans.  The 
Taliban efforts plague the reconstruction, stability, and nation building activities of the 
coalition and NGOs.  This section describes some tangible results of the coalition’s 
strategy, a strategy that aims to help develop a trustworthy government. 
The NATO ISAF and U.S. governments continually seek metrics to evaluate 
overall counterinsurgency operations.  A single solution cannot be developed, as every 
insurgency has its own features.  But leaders from the nations contributing to rebuild 
Afghanistan demand evidence of progress to present to their constituents. Evidence 
includes comparisons over time, like improvements reported on the NATO website:  
• In 2001, 8 percent of Afghans had access to basic healthcare. In early 2007, 
the figure is up to 83 percent.  
• In 2001, 1.2 million children attended school daily; today, 7 million do, 
including 2 million girls. Between 43,000 and 45,000 teachers were trained in 
2006. 
• To date, there have been 88,136 anti-personnel mines destroyed, as well as 
11,524 anti-tank mines.258 
Another statistic on the minds of politicians is that of service members' flag 
draped coffins returning home.  This does not measure success or failure, but it is an 
indicator of the increasing lethality of operations in Afghanistan.  With the exception of 
2003, the number of deaths of coalition forces increased every year (see Figure 26 
below).  This is probably a product of two variables: increased numbers of coalition 
forces outside the wire, and the Taliban's adaptive tactics, techniques and procedures, 
discussed in Chapter VI.  
                                                 
258 Information from http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/recon_dev/index.html (accessed April 22, 2008). 
Many of these statistics are contested by other sources but serve as a positive outlook for progress in light 
of diminishing successes in reconstruction and development efforts. 
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Figure 26. Coalition Deaths by Year259 
Public opinion is paramount to the success of this strategy. Thus, it is important to 
begin with the Afghan population's perception of government and security.  The Asia 
Foundation conducted surveys in Afghanistan over the last three years on various issues 
facing the country.260  Concerning the government, the people of Afghanistan feel distant 
from their representative body, with 79 percent feeling that the government does not care 
about their constituents.  Although this seems bleak, there is a positive side, as the 
majority’s views on democracy are optimistic.   
                                                 
259 Data about U.S. and ISAF NATO casualties obtained from “Operation Enduring Freedom.” 
iCasualties.Org, 21 January 2008, http://icasualties.org/oef/ (accessed 21 January 2008) while data about 
Aid and Development casualties is taken from Anthony H. Cordesman, The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status 
Report (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 
http://www.csis.org/burke (accessed April 22, 2008).  Data about casualties of Pakistani forces comes from 
"Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Pakistan," South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm. 
260 The target demographics for the Afghan in 2007 Survey included a population of 6,263.  The 
demographic breakdown of those interviewed is congruent with the Afghan population overall, including 
rural and urban centers.  The survey demographics include Central/Kabul – 18.7%; Eastern – 9.7%; South 
Central – 14.5%; South Western – 9.2%; Western – 11.5%; and Northern – 28.9%.  Participants were split 
evenly between males and  females.  For details, see Afghanistan in 2007 Survey, 111. 
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Figure 27. Perceptions towards the Government261 
With wars spanning three decades, security weighs heavy on the minds of most 
Afghans.  The vast majority, 66 percent, rate security in their area as either very good or 
quite good, while 33 percent describe the situation as either quite bad or very bad.  The 
areas reporting a negative security situation are predominately south and east, the 
traditional homeland of the Taliban.  According to the UN Secretary General Report of 
March 6, 2008, the “conflict has been concentrated in a fairly small area: 70 percent of 
the security incidents occurred in 10 percent (40) of Afghanistan’s districts, home to 6 
percent of the country’s population.”262 
 
Figure 28. Security Situation in Afghanistan263 
One third of the country reporting unfavorable security conditions contributes to 
the increasing number of security incidents.  The number of skirmishes since 2003 has 
                                                 
261 Data obtained from Afghanistan in 2007 Survey, 24. The Afghan population often give the answer 
that they believe people of authority are looking for; thus these survey results should be considered slanted 
considerably in the government's favor.   
262 UN Secretary General Report, The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International 
Peace and Security, March 6, 2008, http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/973861.8.html (accessed April 23, 
2008). 
263 Afghanistan in 2007 Survey, 27. 
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intensified, as shown in Figure 29 below.  The Taliban have flourished over the past five 
years, expanding their sphere of influence towards the west, with some limited 
confrontations in the north.    
 
Figure 29. Security Threat Level264 
The ANSF, consisting mostly of the ANA and ANP, are charged with providing 
security in the COIN fight. The results of the survey in this regard are upbeat, with the 
majority of people trusting both the ANA and ANP.265  Afghans agree that the ANA and 
ANP need additional training and assistance from foreign troops before they can be self-
                                                 
264 Developed using ArcGIS 9.2 with source data derived from United Nations Department of Safety 
and Security Maps as published in “Dangerous Areas Expanding across Southern Afghanistan,” New York 
Times; September 1, 2007; 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2007/09/01/world/middleeast/20070901_AFGHAN_GRAPHIC.html# 
(accessed March 1, 2008). 
265 The interviews and experience of the authors support the ANA findings, but do not agree with the 
ANP results.  The ANP, generally, are untrained, corrupt, and not trusted by the population throughout 
southern Afghanistan.    
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sufficient in fighting against insurgent and criminal elements. Figure 30 below presents a 




Figure 30. Perceptions about the ANA and ANP266 
According to the authors’ survey, most U.S. and NATO field operators who have 
worked in Afghanistan believe that they were successful in battling the Taliban. The 
survey aimed at gauging the perceptions of Coalition Forces. Answers demonstrate 
optimism, as 79.6 percent ranked the Coalition as moderately or very successful in its 
military operations, while around 20 percent see it as in stalemate or failure. One might 
infer that those with a favorable outlook see things from a tactical viewpoint, and the 
Coalition Forces have not been defeated in a direct battle.  On the other hand, those with 
an unfavorable position probably see the strategic picture through an unconventional 
paradigm, taking into consideration the Taliban’s growth and knowing that in an 
insurgency, you can win every battle but lose the war. 
 
                                                 
266 Afghanistan in 2007 Survey, 31-32. 
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Figure 31. Perceptions of Success or Failure in Afghanistan267 
 
D.  CONCLUSION 
A coherent, unified strategy underpins any successful military campaign. This 
chapter provides an overview of the background and transformation of Coalition COIN 
strategies and a snapshot of current policies. These strategies have undergone major 
transformation since commencement of OEF and Operation Almizan. While policy 
makers and field operatives undoubtedly do their best to win the struggle and restore 
peace and harmony, the results have been far from satisfactory for many reasons. Chapter 
VI explores some of those reasons,  along with the effects of the Coalition’s strategies on 
the Taliban’s efforts. The next chapter also evaluates Taliban strengths, weaknesses and 
adaptation trends.   
 
                                                 
267  Shahid Afsar and Chris Samples, "Taliban Survey" (Opinion Survey, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. 
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VI.  EFFECTS, ADAPTATION, AND FUTURE OPTIONS FOR THE 
TALIBAN   
The Afghan resistance is, in my opinion, growing. Such behavior...is 
conditioned by centuries of tradition, geography, climate and religion…. 
Evidently, the [U.S.-led] Coalition forces are also being seen as a threat to 
the nation. — Boris Gromov268 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter illustrates the tangible operational results (outputs) of the current 
Taliban strategy and their effects on the insurgency system model. The chapter includes a 
brief depiction of the Coalition counterinsurgency strategies that appear to indirectly 
enable the Taliban. The chapter also identifies adaptation trends within the Taliban, along 
with the Taliban strengths and weaknesses, and lays out likely options for the Taliban. 
The analysis in this chapter serves as the basis for recommendations to configure an 
effective COIN strategy in Chapter VII. 
B. RESULTS OF THE CURRENT TALIBAN STRATEGY AND ITS 
EFFECTS 
The current Taliban strategy, as described in Chapter III, is to patiently conduct a 
defensive insurgency, a "war of the flea.” The effects of this strategy demonstrate how 
the Taliban influence the environment in order to perpetuate their growth. This process 
forms part of the last feedback loop and growth mechanism of the insurgency system 
model described in Chapter II (reproduced here as Figure 32 below). The influences, 
operational results or outputs of the organization fall into two main categories: physical 
outputs, and perceptual or psychological outputs.  
                                                 
268 Boris Gromov, the general who supervised the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 
1989, as quoted in M. K. Bhadrakumar, "Afghanistan: Why NATO Cannot Win," Asia Times (September 
30, 2006), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI30Df01.html (accessed March 11, 2008).  
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Figure 32. The Conceptual Models for Analysis of the Taliban Insurgency 
1. Physical Outputs 
A major output of the Taliban and their associates in their struggle against 
Coalition Forces has been their physical effect. With the population as the main center of 
gravity of an insurgency, the physical output of the Taliban campaign can be measured in 
terms of the areas or population centers where the Taliban operate freely and exert some 
form of control over the population through their physical presence. This output also 
manifests itself through physical attacks against Coalition Forces and government 
infrastructure. These attacks serve four major purposes: 1) they demonstrate to the local 
populace that the Taliban are still holding out against their enemies, thereby dissuading 
the public from siding with the government,  2) they incite a heavy-handed reaction by 
the Coalition Forces that provides a better recruiting environment for the Taliban 3) they 
attrite the security forces in terms of personnel and resources, thereby imposing caution 
while taking away their freedom of action and 4) they indirectly affect the domestic 
populations of the troop contributing nations. The casualties suffered by the Coalition 
Forces from physical attacks by the Taliban (described in Chapter 5 Figure 26) clearly 
illustrate an increasing level of violence with an obvious payoff. Because of these attacks 
and their effects, the Taliban have enhanced their control across the Pashtun belt and are 
threatening to extend further. According to a recent, and somewhat controversial, report 
by Senlis Council, 
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[Fifty-four] percent of Afghanistan’s landmass hosts a permanent Taliban 
presence….The Taliban are the de facto governing authority in significant 
portions of territory in the south and east, and are starting to control parts 
of the local economy and key infrastructure such as roads and energy 
supply.269  
This phenomenon (Figure 33 below) clearly shows that the physical outputs of the 
Taliban insurgency increasingly affect the environment to the Taliban advantage.  
 
Figure 33. Perceived Taliban Control in Afghanistan According to Senlis Report270 
2. Perceptual (Psychological) Outputs 
The second major product of the Taliban strategy is their ability to influence 
perceptions of the local population and other actors. The perceptual or psychological 
results of the Taliban strategy over time can be measured by opinion polls conducted 
among the local populace. The Taliban have significant success in this regard, as their 
influence on the population has steadily increased. As highlighted in a recent ABC News, 
BBC, ARD Poll (Figure 34 below), the positive rating of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan 
has been on a steady decline, from 68 percent in 2005 to 42 percent in 2007. A significant 
portion of the Afghan population perceives the Taliban as  getting stronger over time, an 
impression that certainly influences the decision whether to support the government or 
                                                 
269 Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink (London, UK: The Senlis Council, 2007) 
(accessed January 10, 2008).  
270 Ibid. 
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the Taliban. Therefore, local perceptions generated by the insurgency are enabling the 
Taliban to garner more willing and unwilling support for their cause, thus delegitimizing 
Coalition efforts.   
 
Figure 34. Afghan Perceptions of the Insurgency271 
3. Effect of the Outputs and Feedback Loop on the Insurgency System 
As described in Figure 32, the outputs of the insurgency system model affect the 
endogenous and exogenous resources and the environment of the insurgency through the 
feedback and growth loop. The physical and perceptual outputs generated by the Taliban 
allow them to extend their footprint among the population. This puts them in a better 
position to control people's behavior, in contrast to the government forces' intermittent 
presence. Popular impressions of Taliban strength and capabilities thus influence 
expectations about the eventual outcome of the struggle.  Figure 34 above shows that 
only 40 percent of the people are hopeful about the success of the government, while a 
significant 40 percent are undecided and thus vulnerable targets for future Taliban 
information operations. These perceptions also affect Taliban fighters' self-image and 
increase their confidence in their ability to regain rule, suggests Graeme Smith in his 
                                                 
271 Developed from Gary Langer, "Afghanistan: Where Things Stand - ABC News, BBC, ARD Poll," 
ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/story?id=3931809 and Cordesman. 
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recent survey of Taliban operatives.272 The ground situation thus turns into a battle for 
control of the population between the central government and the Taliban, as depicted in 
Figure 35 below. According to some current estimates, around half of the population is 
under local control and more favorable to Taliban messages because of the Taliban make 
better use of the Pashtun culture to further their goals.273 The control of the population is 
a zero-sum game and any progress by the Taliban means a reduction in the legitimacy of 
the government. 
 
Figure 35. The Battle for Control of Population in Afghanistan274 
Another apparent effect of the Taliban outputs is the insurgency's ability to grow 
internally. With the increasing demonstration of its effectiveness, the insurgency takes on 
a life of its own and, like a successful business, attracts more resources, recruits, funding, 
intelligence and cooperation from locals. A growing Taliban presence in areas with 
higher ratio of security incidents demonstrates this effect. It also causes the organization 
to adapt effectively to countermeasures by modifying its structure, mechanisms and 
TTPs. As suggested by the insurgency system model (Figure 32 above), the new 
resources go back into the insurgency system and produce more sizable outputs, thereby 
creating a snowball effect.  
                                                 
272 Graeme Smith, Talking to the Taliban.  
273 Ibid. 
274 Derived from Director of National Intelligence’s testimony before Senate Committee on Armed 
Services as quoted in Ibid. 
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C. PROBLEM AREAS IN THE COALITION COIN STRATEGIES 
As highlighted in Chapter V, Coalition COIN strategies have changed, yet are not 
able to solve the problem at hand. The authors acknowledge that policymakers face 
immensely complex problems with no “magic bullet” solutions; this study does not 
involve an exhaustive critique of the policy. Nonetheless, there are some common themes 
in Coalition strategies, which do not contribute to success or cause problems on their 
own. This section describes these problem areas in light of Sepp’s “Best Practices for 
Counterinsurgency”275 shown in Figure 36 below. 
 
Figure 36. Sepp’s Summary of Successful and Unsuccessful COIN Practices 
1. Direction and Control of COIN Effort 
In order for a COIN campaign to succeed, the COIN effort needs a unified 
objective and direction. Unfortunately, this is apparently missing in the COIN effort 
against the Taliban. There is a clear lack of consensus among the Coalition partners about 
how the problem of instability should be tackled and the end state to be achieved. This 
                                                 
275 Sepp analyzes various historical case studies of counterinsurgencies to identify the practices, 
which best provided suitable dividends while highlighting those methods which led to failure. For details 
see Kalev I. Sepp, ""Best Practices" in Counterinsurgency," Military Review (May 2005), 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun05/indexmayjun05.asp (accessed November 21, 
2007).  
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results in diverse, uncoordinated and sometimes conflicting objectives pursued by the 
partners in their respective areas of responsibility. For example, there is a clear difference 
in the strategies implemented by the U.S., British, and the Pakistani governments. This 
inconsistency allows the Taliban to conserve forces in one area while increasing their 
activities in others. 
In current COIN strategies, overemphasis on a military solution poses a 
considerable problem.276 If the ultimate aim is peace and stability, the military 
confrontation approach does not fit well with the Pashtun culture, as local deaths call for 
revenge and thereby initiate a vicious circle of violence. With the current Coalition 
strategy of using various degrees of military might, and the Taliban defensive strategy, 
the conflict will wear on for a long time, with each passing day increasing the probability 
of Taliban success. Hence, there is a need to evolve a new strategy that shifts the 
emphasis to non-military means. 
Another problem with the current COIN effort is its top down approach, where 
the government aims to control the top layer of the social fabric without any real control 
at the grassroots level. Most government efforts concentrate on retaining control of 
provincial and district centers, leaving the countryside wide open for the Taliban. Figure 
37 below depicts how the government presence is manifested mainly at the provincial 
level or higher. As a result, the Taliban have more success, growing from grassroots 
upwards, while the government cannot push down its control to the local level. Thus, 
there should be a major shift in the overall direction of the COIN effort at all political 
tiers to reach out to the lowest level. 
                                                 
276Sepp analyzes various historical case studies of counterinsurgencies to identify the practices, which 
best provided suitable dividends while highlighting those methods which led to failure. For details see 
Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices" in Counterinsurgency," Military Review (May 2005), 




Figure 37. Effects of Top Down Approach of COIN277 
2. Information and Perception Management 
The information and perception management pillars of the COIN strategy could 
be improved. There is no overarching or unified information strategy to serve as a 
common frame of reference for the different agencies operating in the region. The 
inadequate information operations by the Coalition do not employ a deep cultural or 
religious understanding. This deficiency makes the Coalition IO campaign reactive and 
slow, allowing the Taliban to use their excellent information machinery with ease.  
Intelligence gathering is mainly restricted technical intelligence means, with 
insufficient human intelligence (HUMINT) outreach in most parts of the affected area. 
This is in part because it is extremely difficult for outsiders to operate in a tightly 
integrated tribal structure. The absence of security forces and their limited interaction 
with the population at the grassroots level may also be a major cause of the problem. 
3. Military Strategy and Practices 
The military portion of the strategy disproportionately stresses the political, 
informational, and the economic tiers of the strategy, which in itself is a problem.278 Over 
reliance on a military approach ends up winning tactical engagements at the cost of the 
                                                 
277 Adapted from Gordon H. McCormick’s “Depth of Population Control” paradigm. (Gordon 
McCormick, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.) 
278 Sepp. 
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strategic game. A major area of concern is the overemphasis on kill-capture missions 
using large-scale, semi-conventional sweep operation rather than intelligence driven 
operations and engagement of the population.279 This approach causes civilian collateral 
damage, which in the tribal Pashtun society invokes the badal (revenge) tenet of 
Pashtunwali, allowing relatively easy and voluntary recruitment for the Taliban.280 In a 
recent survey conducted by the Globe and Mail, a significant number of Taliban foot 
soldiers reported that they joined the movement for revenge after someone from their 
family had been killed by Coalition air strikes.281 The Taliban are thus  
becoming synonymous with Afghan resistance. The mindless violations of 
the Afghan code of honor by the Coalition forces during their search-and-
destroy missions and the excessive use of force during military operations 
leading to loss of innocent lives have provoked widespread revulsion 
among Afghan people.282  
Interestingly, the same opinion is shared by most Coalition field operatives as evident in 
response to the authors' survey (Figure 38 below). Most respondents consider lack of 
intelligence driving operations as the major cause of failure, followed by inappropriate 
non-kinetic and kinetic strategies.   
                                                 
279 Sepp defines primacy of kill-capture missions as another problem area.  
280 Johnson, On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan, 93. 
281 Graeme Smith, Talking to the Taliban.  
282 Bhadrakumar.  
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Figure 38. Likely Causes of Failure of Coalition Strategy in Pashtun Belt283 
 
The security forces generally remain concentrated at isolated company and larger 
sized forward operating bases for protection284 rather than maintaining a round the clock 
presence in the villages and interacting with the population to gain intelligence and win 
support. This enables the Taliban to intimidate the villages and countryside and thereby 
gain credibility with their threats and promises. Instead of being utilized in an 
unconventional and indirect role, the Special Forces are mainly used for raiding285 or as a 
“super infantry,” which totally offsets their primary capabilities in the unconventional 
realm.  
Another issue with military strategy is the differences in rules of engagement 
(ROEs) for different troop-contributing countries. This allows the Taliban to use the ROE 
limitations and national caveats specific to one nation’s troops against them. For 
example, some nations restrict their troops' operations to daylight hours, while others 
                                                 
283 The scale shows the rating average of respondents; e.g.,  “lack of intelligence” obtained an average 
rating of approximately 3.7 out of 6 and thus ranked as the highest. The equipment shortfalls mentioned 
include equipment shortages for the indigenous forces as well as NATO. For details see: Katzman. 
284 Sepp.  
285 Ibid. 
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forbid activities during snow.286 In short, there is a strong need to design a military 
strategy that is less oriented toward direct action, accommodates local sensitivities, and 
does not create internal bureaucratic dilemmas in execution. 
4. Problems with Local Security Forces  
Pashtun society is highly xenophobic because of its culture and history, and 
usually treats outsiders with suspicion. A strong foreign footprint at different levels of  
the government hierarchy creates additional problems for the COIN effort. Even on the 
Pakistani side, the Pakistani Army, mostly recruited from outside the tribal areas, is at a 
disadvantage when compared to the Frontier Corps or local Khassadar (tribal levies or 
police).  However, these local forces suffer from equipment shortages and training 
inadequacies, although efforts are underway to rectify the situation. Similar problems of 
equipment shortages exist for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. 
This necessitates a rapid build up and strengthening of legitimate local security forces. 287  
There has been some progress in the development of ANA and ANP, yet their 
growth is slower than desired and beset with problems. The ANA trains mainly in the 
image of the U.S. Army as a conventional force,288 but its immediate role is against an 
unconventional enemy. Its units still depend on embedded trainers, especially for 
coordination of air strikes. For example, Giustozzi notes that 
The fighting tactics that ANA officers have been learning from their 
trainers are largely based on American tactics; the infantry’s main task is 






                                                 
286 Katzman, 30. 
287 Hassan Abbas, "Transforming Pakistan's Frontier Corps," Terrorism Monitor 5, no. 6 (March 29, 
2007), http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370292 (accessed September 21, 
2007). . There are some current plans for U.S. trainers to conduct training of the FC units. See David 
Montero, "U.S. Military Prepares to Train Pakistani Forces," The Christian Science Monitor, April 16, 
2008,  http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0416/p99s01-duts.html (accessed April 19, 2008).  
288 Sepp.   
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with air strikes. There is little evidence that ANA units would be able to 
control the battlefield without such air support, or that they are learning 
the necessary skills.289  
Moreover, the ANA and ANP are insufficient, as in most of the districts with an average 
population of over 30,000 people, only 20 to 30 ANP personnel are available.290 The 
Taliban stir up xenophobic sentiments against foreign security forces to their own 
advantage. 
5. Cultural and Political Issues 
The Taliban insurgency has ethnic and tribal underpinnings,291 but the COIN 
strategies to counter it do not fully consider this. Since its creation under Ahmad Shah 
Durrani, Afghanistan has been ruled by Pashtuns except for two brief periods in 1928 
(rule of Bachai-Saqao) and 1993 (presidency of Professor Rabbani).292 In the Pashtun 
areas of Afghanistan, there is still a strong perception that the Pashtuns are sidelined in 
the political and government process, despite the fact that the president is a Pashtun293 
and the expansion of Pashtun cabinet membership.294 The perceived unequal 
representation of Pashtuns in the military officer corps295 and the government hierarchy, 
coupled with the questionable history of some key personalities in the Karzai 
                                                 
289 Antonio Giustozzi, "Afghanistan’s National Army: The Ambiguous Prospects of Afghanization," 
Terrorism Monitor 6, no. 9 (May 1, 2008), 
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374139 (accessed May 3, 2008).  
290 Waliullah Rahmani, "Farah Province: The New Focus of the Taliban Insurgency," Terrorism 
Monitor 5, no. 23 (December 10, 2007), 
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373844 (accessed April 10, 2008).  
291 Johnson and Mason, Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan.    
292 Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Tribes, Traditions and Two Tragedies," Asia Times (2003), 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EI12Ak03.html (accessed October 25, 2007).  
293 Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003), 
http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/asia/afghanistan_southasia/reports/A401078_05082003.pdf (accessed 
May 1, 2007).  
294 Bhadrakumar.  
295 Giustozzi, Afghanistan’s National Army: The Ambiguous Prospects of Afghanistan.  
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government296 further aggravate the problem. The predominately Pashtun Taliban use the 
perceived hegemony of non-Pashtuns to gain popular support among the Pashun 
population. 
Another issue strongly linked to the cultural problem is the imposition of an alien 
form of democracy and strong central government on Pashtun tribal structure. The 
current political strategy tries to “extend the reach of the central government, which simply 
foments insurgency among a proto-insurgent people.”297 The premise of the strategy hinges 
on the mistaken notion that the majority of Pashtun tribal areas are “ungoverned”298 and aims 
to force a system of governance alien to the Pashtunwali culture that itself is “an alternative 
form of social organization with an advanced conflict resolution mechanism.”299 This 
strategy gives the Taliban widespread acceptance, as the Taliban are seen as defenders of the 
traditional Pashtun way of life despite their radical religious agendas. There is, therefore, a 
need to reconstruct traditional Pashtun tribal structures from the inside out on both sides of 
the border rather than force a new form of administration without adequate transition. 
6. Economic Issues 
Economic progress and development should be the cornerstone of any COIN effort. 
Lack of significant economic change in the lives of the people in the Pashtun belt leaves 
much to be desired.300http://newsblaze.com/story/20061010224125rahu.nb/topstory.html 
The pace of reconstruction in Afghanistan and FATA is very slow, which challenges the 
                                                 
296 Some members of Afghan government have a dubious past as warlords, the very people against 
whom Taliban were initially able to rouse the Pashtun population. For details see "Key Afghan Players: 
Who's Who," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3706370.stm (accessed May 12, 2007).  
297 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the 
Pakistan Afghanistan Frontier," International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008), 1.  
298 Ibid., 12-13. 
299 Ibid., 20. 
300  Rahul K. Bhonsle, "Taliban Strategy in Afghanistan," News Blaze, October 10, 2006,  
http://newsblaze.com/story/20061010224125rahu.nb/topstory.html (accessed May 10, 2007).  
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credibility of the Coalition and the international community.301 The Taliban take 
advantage of the situation to further their influence in the underdeveloped countryside. In 
areas where there has been progress, the reconstruction effort is mainly reliant upon 
NGOs who generally hire foreign workers for most of the work,302 creating resentment 
among a population suffering for lack of economic opportunity.  
On the military side of development activities, the PRTs started out as a good 
step. However, their local outreach, especially in the Pashtun belt, is limited by their 
small numbers, weak projection capabilities, and failed attempts to implement 
reconstruction from the provincial level.303 The PRTs cannot fully grasp the needs and 
ground-level realities of the rural population and are unable to link the development 
works to the military or IO pillars of the campaign. 
Narcotics elimination is a major concern, especially for the European NATO 
Coalition partners in Afghanistan, obviously due to associated domestic political issues 
and the fact that a significant portion of narcotics income goes to the Taliban. However,  
uneven opium eradication policies are inconsistent with the fact that currently more than 
35 percent of the Afghan national economy depends on opium.304 Thus, attempts to 
eradicate crops, without providing alternate livelihoods or targeting drug kingpins, will 
only endanger the frail Afghan economy.305 Moreover, the “aggressive pursuit of 
eradication has alienated many peasant farmers and resulted in some of them turning 
                                                 
301 Since 2001, the international community delivered only $15 billion out of $25 billion pledged, and 
from that, over 40 percent can be termed as “phantom aid” as it goes back to the donor countries. See 
"Report: Forty Percent of Afghan Aid Spent on Foreign Workers," CNN, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/03/25/afghanistan.aid.waste.ap/index.html (accessed April 
15, 2008).  
302 Ibid. 
303 Johnson and Mason, No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan Afghanistan 
Frontier, 35.  
304 John A. Glaze, Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counter-Narcotics Strategy (Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute; U.S. Army War College, 2007), 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub804.pdf (accessed April 1, 2008).  
305 Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, "Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and how it Funds Taliban 
Operations," Terrorism Monitor 5, no. 9 (May 10, 2007), 
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373383 (accessed February 11, 2008).  
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against U.S. and NATO forces.”306 This situation allows the Taliban to emerge as the 
“protectors of the farmers” and strengthening their control over the area.     
D. TALIBAN ADAPTATION TO COIN STRATEGIES 
Despite Coalition efforts, the Taliban continue to survive and grow. They conduct 
a resilient defensive insurgency in which they have traded space and time to rebuild their 
combat power and control. This is based on their ability to adapt their methods and 
mechanisms in response to the loss of personnel, equipment, geography and other 
resources. An anonymous Coalition field operative interviewed for this study said that the 
Taliban are “more adaptive than what we thought they would be. The name [Taliban] 
represents a completely different threat then it did in 2002.  Every factor, other than its 
hate for Coalition presence, has changed.” This section analyzes some key adaptive 
trends apparent in the Taliban.  
1. Organization 
The Taliban exhibit an enormous ability to transform their organizational 
structure rapidly to suit the environment.  The Taliban today are different from their pre 
9/11 organization.307 Instead of a rigid, micromanaged, and centrally controlled 
hierarchy, the organization is flatter, decentralized and composed of dispersed networks 
of “Taliban franchises.” Essentially, they have changed from a semi-conventional mobile 
army relying on light cavalry tactics to an unconventional insurgent force using guerilla 
tactics.308 The decentralization of decision-making allows the Taliban commanders to get 
inside the Coalition forces’ Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act (OODA) loop309 by 
                                                 
306 Glaze, 10.  
307 Some observers use the term "neo-Taliban" to describe the Taliban today without consensus on the 
exact definition of the term. See Antonio Giustozzi, "The Resurgence of the Neo-Taliban," Open 
Democracy (December 14, 2007), 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/conflicts/democracy_terror/neo_taliban (accessed April 30, 2008).  
308 Antonio Giustozzi quoted in Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: Taliban Evolves into Network of 
Groups," Radio Free Europe, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/04/eae848e5-e3af-49b8-9d6d-
d27ba748f251.html (accessed April 29, 2008).  
309 The OODA loop, conceptualized by U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd, consists of four 
overlapping and interacting processes. For details see Chet Richards, "John Boyd's OODA Loop," Defense 
and National Interest, http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/boyds_ooda_loop.ppt (accessed April 11, 2008).  
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shortening their own. The situation is typified in a comment by one of the interviewees 
for this study: “They [Taliban] act, we react, they counteract; the cycle continues.” The 
network organization bases itself on a “scale-free network” model where some 
commanders (nodes) have many connections to other nodes while most nodes only have 
a handful.310 Another major adaptation in the Taliban organization involves recruitment. 
Traditionally, the Taliban were a Ghilzai Pashtun-led radical movement with most 
members being former madrassa students. Lately the Taliban have shifted to a wider 
intake, encompassing people from all Pashtun tribal groups and even some other ethnic 
minorities.311 The organization appears to "incorporate new constituencies and, therefore, 
represent different tribes and communities. So as their constituencies change, they also 
adapt to those constituencies."312 Instead of ideological indoctrination, the recruitment 
process now hinges on the disaffection of locals, badal, and financial benefits.  The trend 
shows that the Taliban can gradually become a bigger phenomenon outside ethnic 
boundaries while maintaining their Pashtun credentials. Overall, the Taliban organization 
seems able to change its shape to suit the environment unless its key survival channel, the 
support of population, is challenged. 
2. Kinetic Methods 
Taliban kinetic methods have undergone a major transformation since 9/11. In 
addition to being better equipped, their tactics, techniques, and procedures have clearly 
changed in response to Coalition military strategies and TTPs. The Taliban have shifted 
from semi-conventional light cavalry tactics to insurgent guerilla tactics based on a 
suitable combination of direct and indirect means. Their TTPs appear to be significantly 
influenced by Iraqi insurgents313 which can probably be linked to their Al Qaeda liaison 
                                                 
310 The main reason for this is that potential members of the insurgency favor joining already 
established and "famous" groups. For a detailed concept of scale free networks see Albert-László Barabási 
and Eric Bonabeau, "Scale-Free Networks," Scientific American (May 2003), 52, 
http://www.nd.edu/~networks/Publication%20Categories/01%20Review%20Articles/ScaleFree_Scientific
%20Ameri%20288,%2060-69%20(2003).pdf (accessed April 11, 2008).  
311 Giustozzi, The Resurgence of the Neo-Taliban.  
312 Synovitz.  
313 Omid Marzban, "Taliban Shift Tactics in Afghanistan," Terrorism Focus 3, no. 15 (April 18, 
2006), http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369961 (accessed April 1, 2008).  
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and training. A respondent to the survey done by the authors says that the Taliban “use 
OEF and OIF like we use JRTC and NTC.”  The TTP adaptation comes in part from slow 
changes in Coalition TTPs.  Slow changes give the Taliban ample opportunity to devise 
countermeasures without being seriously hampered in their performance. The results of 
the adapted TTPs are clearly seen in the shift of their preferred types of targets and 
methods of attack over time, as shown in Figure 39 below. The Taliban have greatly 
increased their attacks on the security forces and government apparatus while civilian 
attacks almost remain unchanged. The methods of attack have also shifted considerably 
towards suicide bombing. This clearly illustrates the Taliban’s preference a typical 
insurgent approach, targeting government structures using minimum resources to 
maintain control of the population while producing maximum psychological effect. They 
have opted for IEDs and suicide bombings as force-multipliers because of the 
disproportionate casualties suffered during direct attacks.314 
 
 
Figure 39. Shift in Taliban Targets and Methods of Attack315 
Another major adaptation in Taliban kinetic operations is better tactical patience, 
operational security, and improved planning mechanisms compared with earlier displays 
of reckless personal bravery. This demonstrates a high learning curve at all tiers of 
                                                 
314 Giustozzi, The Resurgence of the Neo-Taliban.  
315 Derived from Cordesman.  
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Taliban leadership. As noted above, their planning and TTPs aim to exploit the Coalition 
TTPs. They observe the modus operandi of the Coalition forces keenly, deduce the limits 
on the different nations' rules of engagement and sensitivities, and use these limitations 
effectively.  The Taliban also take into account the rotation schedules of Coalition units 
for planning their operations. According to a survey participant, the Taliban  
know that the first two to three months after deployment are situational 
building phase, time to exploit their [Coalition] stupidity; followed by a 
fighting stage; followed by a heavy CA and development phase and a few 
collateral damages; followed by a cautious phase by the upper [Coalition] 
commands because of bad press; followed by a final push, then a cautious 
time as the year tour finishes.  
Therefore, it is clear that the Taliban show great potential for transformation vis-à-vis 
Coalition military strategies and TTPs and will continue to outwit the security forces 
unless some major change is made in the overall strategy. 
3. Non-kinetic Methods 
Probably the biggest adaptation the Taliban demonstrate is in the realm of indirect 
or non-kinetic methods. From a media shy, almost stubborn outfit that shunned all forms 
of technology, they have become a politically savvy organization exhibiting great media 
skills. Instead of taking the support of the populace for granted, they have adapted to 
influence it with a very efficient information campaign. General David Richard 
acknowledged their effectiveness when he remarked, “In all my 36 years [of service] I've 
never seen a more sophisticated propaganda machine as the Taliban.”316  The Taliban IO 
campaign uses a wide spectrum of radio, internet,317 music, audio and video CDs, 
posters, night letters, and word of mouth, all skillfully integrating religious references, 
Pashtun history, and cultural sensitivities. This is in stark contrast with the pre 9/11 
Taliban who used as their mouthpiece only the unattractive broadcasts of Radio Sharia. 
                                                 
316 Bill Graveland, "Canadians Battling Taliban Propaganda," Canadian Television CTV, 
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20061204/afghanistan_media_061204?s_name=&
no_ads= (accessed April 13, 2007).  
317 Foxley, 6-7. 
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The Taliban media arm is now proactive and often plans media statements before 
operations,318 thereby beating the Coalition IO in the “battle of the story.”319  
The Taliban also show considerable survival potential in establishing an 
underground parallel governing apparatus. They counter government political outreach 
by denying the government machinery presence through physical and intimidation 
attacks. Their system of governance thus gains more legitimacy as it can deliver speedier 
justice and security in accordance with cultural norms while promising some social 
services, like schools.320 Also on the political side, they have tried to gain legitimacy 
internationally as a power-in-being by conducting hostage release negotiations with Italy, 
Germany and Korea. This, coupled with their efforts to project a softer image as evident 
in the 2006 directive to Taliban field commanders, aims to erase their legacy of brutality. 
Similarly, they have tried, at least publicly, to distance themselves from Al Qaeda, 
probably to gain acceptance outside their traditional realm. 
The Taliban stance on some key issues also shows signs of adaptation. For 
example, before 9/11, the Taliban strictly banned music, CD shops, television, and 
internet, but now use those same media to propagate their messages. It is unclear if this is 
due to a change in basic ideals of the organization or temporary necessity. Similarly, they 
have almost reversed their stand on poppy cultivation, which they earlier declared to be 
un-Islamic.321 Another example is acceptance of suicide attacks as a major tool, in 
contrast to the Islamic and Pashtun cultural values.322 Likewise, the Taliban media 
outlets now occasionally attempt to project the movement at extra-regional aims, which 
                                                 
318 Stone.   
319 For example, the Taliban made an international press release of the shooting down of a NATO CH 
47 Chinook helicopter near Kajaki in May 2006, several hours before any NATO press statement. See 
"NATO Chinook Shot Down," The Australian, May 31, 2007, 
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21824791-601,00.html (accessed January 10, 2008).  
320 Noor Khan, "Taliban to Open Schools in Afghanistan," Washington Post, January 22, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/21/AR2007012100165.html (accessed 
May 2, 2008).  
321 Mili and Townsend.  
322 Pascale Combelles Siegel, "Taliban Graduation Ceremony Demonstrates Change of Tactics," 
Terrorism Focus 4, no. 21 (July 3, 2007), 
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373516 (accessed February 11, 2008).  
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contrasts with the earlier confinement within Afghanistan.323 These examples show that 
the Taliban are gradually adapting and compromising some of their fundamental values 
in order to gain influence. 
E. TALIBAN STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
To assess strengths and weaknesses of the Taliban organization, the authors use 
their survey in conjunction with key themes from their interviews and field experience.  
This discussion of the Taliban's strengths and weaknesses is the basis for the 
recommendations in Chapter VII.  
1. Strengths 
When asked for their perception of Taliban strengths, most survey participants 
from the Coalition forces rated the Taliban’s ability to use human terrain as their 
foremost strength (See Figure 40 below). The Taliban’s center of gravity lies in their 
appeal and legitimacy to the rural Pashtun population based on religious sentiments, 
ethnic connections, dislike of foreigners and the government’s failure to provide security, 
speedy justice and economic opportunities. In the words of a veteran Mujhaideen leader, 
“If the Taliban has any chance, it is because they are a very attractive alternative for the 
Afghan people. They are several times more appealing to the Afghan people than the 
Afghan government.”324 Their deep knowledge of human terrain also facilitates excellent 
HUMINT through a grassroots network of auxiliaries. 
                                                 
323 Rahimullah Yousufzai maintains that this trend is a cosmetic effort to obtain sponsorship from 
mainly Arab militant financiers whose attention is currently fixated on Iraq. See: Daan Van Der Schriek, 
"Weaker but Not Wiser: The Taliban Today," Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 1 (January 13, 2005), 
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369093 (accessed March 11, 2008).  
324 Qazi Mohammad Amin Waqad quoted in Waliullah Rahmani,"Afghanistan's Veteran Jihadi 
Leader: An Interview with Qazi Mohammad Amin Waqad," Spotlight on Terror 4, no. 1 (May 3, 2007), 
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373371 (accessed May 11, 2007).  
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Figure 40. Perceptions of Taliban Strengths 
Closely related to their understanding of human terrain is their excellent IO 
capability, which is a sustaining pillar of the Taliban. Lately, Taliban wield this 
instrument of power to great effect.  
Another major Taliban strength is their ability to draw upon a vast recruiting pool 
to fill the gaps in their ranks. Recruits include large numbers of students from pro-
Taliban Madrassahs as well as disaffected youth and tribesmen wanting revenge after 
being estranged by collateral damage or security forces' cultural insensitivity. No amount 
of direct kill-capture missions will seriously hurt the movement; such missions  create 
more Taliban recruits. 
Availability of an ideal physical geography for guerilla operations is another plus. 
Remote countryside with meager communications infrastructure automatically lends 
itself to creation of small isolated pockets that preserve the Taliban organization against 
the top-down COIN approach.  
The Taliban rely on abundant material resources to sustain their insurgency. 
Besides donations, diverted charities and extortion money, revenue from poppy 
cultivation and smuggling contributes to the movement’s ability to continue the fight. 
The large number of weapon caches and abundance of weapons in the Pashtun society 
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also are a source of strength for the insurgent organization. Their loose alliance with 
jihadi networks provides money, training and equipment.  
The Taliban organizational structure is a strength. Their decentralized, grassroots, 
network-styled organization provides great irregular warfare capability because of easy 
passage of information and coordination. The “scale-free” network, as highlighted above, 
allows the organization to accommodate accidental failure or countermeasures.325  
Probably one of their biggest strengths is the ability to sustain the insurgency by 
using time and patience as force multipliers. This ability comes partly from the Pashtun 
culture, where feuds and enmities span generations, and partly from the lack of a pressing 
timeline from the government. By demonstrating their persistence, they intimidate locals 
from cooperating with foreign forces by implying a long-term enmity once the Coalition 
forces depart. The Taliban can continue fighting a defensive insurgency, needing to 
remain on the battlefield only until Coalition forces leave and they can stage a full-scale 
return. 
2. Weaknesses 
Probably the biggest weakness of the Taliban organization is the use of violence 
and intimidation to keep the population in line. The Taliban aim to overcome this 
weakness by creating popular appeal through their IO campaign. The use of intimidation 
tactics creates vulnerability for the Taliban if the Coalition forces capable of providing a 
modicum of long-term security in return for local cooperation. Most survey respondents 
considered this the greatest Taliban vulnerability (Figure 41 below).  
                                                 
325 Barabási and Bonabeau, 57.  
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Figure 41. Perceptions of Taliban Weaknesses 
 
The Taliban have an unenviable legacy of repressive rule, although their IO 
campaign tries to glorify their time in power. Their legacy can make people unfavorable 
to a reenactment of Taliban rule, a vulnerability for the organization. 
Despite their deep understanding of the human terrain, the Taliban challenge the 
traditional tribal structures of the Pashtun by shifting power from the elders to the clergy 
and the youth. This creates innate resentment from the tribal elders and maliks, some of 
whom consider the Taliban a long-term threat to the tribal institutions. 326  
The Taliban interpretation of Islam is not in harmony with the Afghan Islamic 
tradition, nor does it coincide with most of the regional ethnic groups' more tolerant 
views. This gives the Afghanistan and Pakistan security forces, who can legitimately 
discuss the issues as fellow Muslims, opportunities for turning the population against the 
Taliban. 
                                                 
326 Reportedly, more than 200 tribal elders who resisted Taliban domination were killed by the 
militants in 2005 and 2006. See Johnson and Mason, No Sign Until the Burst of Fire, 15.  
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Coupled with their religious interpretation is the Taliban’s dominantly sectarian 
outlook and alliance with extremist sectarian outfits like Sipah-e-Sahaba,327 which 
seriously hampers their ability to expand into other ethnic and sectarian communities. 
A similar organizational weakness is over-reliance on ethnic and tribal connections 
that provides strength at the local level but hampers expansion beyond tribal and ethnic 
groups. This phenomenon is visible in the distribution of security incidents among various 
ethnic groups (Figure 42 below) and Pashtun tribal groups (Figure 43 below).  It is clear from 
these figures that the Taliban are most active in the Pashtun dominated areas and within the 
Ghilzai and Karlanri tribal groups in particular. The mainly Pashtun nature of Taliban, and a 
high concentration of Ghilzais in its top leadership circles, inhibits lateral expansion into 
tribal and ethnic communities who opt for government presence. On the other hand, the 
reliance on tribal connections raises the possibility of clan and factional infighting within the 
organization, especially in cases that require allegiance to commanders from rival clans. 
 
Figure 42. Ethnic Distribution of Security Incidents 2007-08 328 
                                                 
327 Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan is a Sunni militant sectarian organization that primarily targets Shia 
Muslims. It operates mainly in Pakistan and Afghanistan and was banned by the Pakistani government in 
January 2002 as a terrorist outfit. For details see "Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan," South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Ssp.htm (accessed April 11, 2008). 
328 Shahid Afsar, Distribution of Security Incidents in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2007-08 (Monterey, 
California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). Incident data derived from “Senlis Maps,” The Senlis 
Council-Security and Development Policy Group; http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/maps (accessed 
March 1, 2008). 
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Figure 43. Distribution of Security Incidents within Pashtun Tribal Groups329 
 
The Taliban insurgency's tribal nature contradicts its purportedly religious focus 
and its claim to transcend tribal and ethnic boundaries, thereby raising questions about its 
basic stance.330 Rahimullah Yousufzai highlights the issue. 
The Taliban and other jihad advocates often claim that they believe in the 
concept of a common Muslim ummah (community) and reject the division 
of their religion into groups based on ethnicity, language, geographical 
borders and tribes. In practice, this is easier said than done. In tribal 
societies such as that of the Pashtuns inhabiting Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
even ideologically-driven radical Taliban and jihadist fighters gravitate 
toward their own tribe and local commander whether fighting U.S.-led 
Coalition forces or the armed forces of Pakistan.331 
                                                 
329 Shahid Afsar, Distribution of Security Incidents in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2007-08 (Monterey, 
California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). Incident data derived from “Senlis Maps,” The Senlis 
Council-Security and Development Policy Group; http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/maps (accessed 
March 1, 2008). 
330 Smith, Talking to the Taliban.  
331 Rahimullah Yusufzai, "The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban," 
Terrorism Monitor 6, no. 3 (February 7, 2008), 
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373954 (accessed February 11, 2008).  
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The lack of international support and recognition of the Taliban due to their 
assumed association with terror networks is a disadvantage for the organization in the 
international arena. Their association with terrorism raises serious questions about the 
Taliban's chances for acceptance should they wish to acquire official power at some 
stage, and creates problems for any negotiated settlement, as most nations will probably 
not negotiate openly with a group labeled as terrorist sponsors.  
F. THE WAY FORWARD FOR THE TALIBAN: STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
This section considers some of the strategic measures that the Taliban might use 
to their benefit. This description of possible strategic options is based almost wholly on 
an "enemy courses of action" analysis by the authors and is neither definite nor 
conclusive. Some of these measures have already started to emerge, while others may 
never become manifest. 
Probably the best course of action for the Taliban is to strike at the fabric of 
Coalition and force it to break apart.332 They have been attempting to do so by 
specifically targeting members of some Coalition nations in an effort to influence their 
domestic public sentiment and force them to withdraw their troops. This in turn creates a 
diplomatic and political rift within the Coalition. 
Another critical step by the Taliban might be targeting the Coalition lines of 
communication running through Pakistan.333 This could entail physical attacks on the 
logistic routes like those already emerging,334 or creating serious rifts between Pakistan 
on the one hand, and the U.S. and Afghanistan on the other. The Taliban could easily 
incite NATO and U.S. forces into military operations inside Pakistan, with or without 
Pakistani approval. This would de-legitimize the Pakistani government in the eyes of its 
people, making the Taliban appeal to religious and nationalist sentiments even more 
                                                 
332 Siegel. 
333 Andrew McGregor, "Targeting the Khyber Pass: The Taliban’s Spring Offensive," Terrorism 
Monitor 6, no. 7 (April 3, 2008), http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374076 
(accessed April 17, 2008).  
334 Some analysts maintain that one of the main target of 2008 Taliban offensive will be the Khyber 
Pass, linking Pakistan and Afghanistan. For details, see McGregor. 
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attractive. Recent media statements by top ranking U.S. officials and politicians 
threatening attacks inside Pakistani territory, along with past instances of alleged U.S. 
strikes inside Pakistan, have already created an environment conducive to Taliban IO 
success.335 Widespread instability in Pakistan resulting from such a misadventure would 
prove disastrous, as new recruits spanning a much larger and technologically developed 
support base would join the Taliban and Al Qaeda and deny access to the main logistic 
route for  NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan.336 The same instability might also lead 
to a much wider regional conflict, sucking in more countries to the detriment of world 
peace. The Taliban could probably also use a similar strategy to instigate active hostilities 
between Iran and the U.S.  
The current flow of resources to the insurgency and the perception of their likely 
success increase the chances of a regional expansion of the Taliban despite ethnic 
barriers. The perceived Taliban success against Coalition forces might encourage like-
minded militant groups outside the Pashtun belt to associate themselves temporarily with 
the Taliban, even if they do not share their ultimate aims. Such groups might therefore 
allow expansion of sympathetic intelligence and logistics networks extending outside 
areas of active insurgency. An analysis of recent Taliban night letters points to the 
possibility that “the Afghan insurgency might very well be morphing into a campaign 
with more transnational concerns.”337 
An alternative possibility is transformation of the Taliban into a nationalist 
movement seeking power on both sides of the border by invoking images of past Pashtun 
grandeur and portraying the current conflict in a Pashtun vs non-Pashtun paradigm. The 
mainly Pashtun composition of the Taliban will certainly help in this regard. This 
scenario would create a host of problems for regional stability for obvious reasons. 
                                                 
335 Eric Schmitt, "Pakistan Warns U.S. on Attacking Al Qaeda on its Own," The New York Times, 
January 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/12/washington/12pakistan.html?ref=world (accessed 
February 12, 2008).  
336 Ibid. 
337 Johnson, The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters), 331.  
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The 2009 national elections in Afghanistan will be a milestone, as the conduct and 
outcome of the elections will determine the Taliban's chance of success. To show their 
hold on the Afghan countryside, the movement will likely try to directly or indirectly 
disrupt the elections.338 Another possible strategy for the Taliban in this regard might be 
to covertly insert and support their own candidates to take on the system from within 
while continuing to wage the insurgency. 
Another potential scenario for the Taliban organization projects in-fighting among 
factions as the insurgency grows and local leaders gain strength and clout. In the absence 
of a rigid conventional organizational structure, and given the nature of Pashtun tribal 
relations, this is very much a possibility. Some signs of this have already appeared, as 
factions claiming to be loosely aligned with the Taliban but more or less pursuing their 
own methods have begun to surface. If this trend continues, it could lead to Taliban 
disintegration into smaller factions, as happened with their predecessors, the Mujahideen 
of the Russo Afghan War.     
G. CONCLUSION 
The Taliban appear to be a self-sustaining organization that is becoming stronger 
by generating effects that feed back into its resource base. This dynamic organization has 
adapted well to various COIN strategies.  Though it faces several hurdles, the 
organization will likely survive and eventually control much of its support base if 
Coalition strategies do not change. A new strategic approach is needed that takes into 
account the Taliban's strengths and weaknesses. To this end, the next chapter presents 
broad recommendations for evolving a strategy to counter the Taliban’s strengths and 
exploit their weaknesses while attacking critical enabling linkages.  
                                                 
338 David Lamm, Colonel (Retired), former Chief of Staff to Lieutenant General (Retired) David 
Barno at the Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan; Interview by authors. Written notes; Washington, 
D.C.; November 19, 2007.   
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VII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Over the last few decades, regular armed forces – including some of the 
largest and best – have repeatedly failed in numerous low-intensity 
conflicts where they seemed to hold all the cards.  This should have 
caused politicians, the military, and their academic advisors to take a 
profound new look at the nature of war in our time; however, by and large 
no such attempt at reevaluation was made.   — Martin Van Creveld339 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents recommendations to help the Coalition Force defeat the 
Taliban insurgency. The recommended strategies have two preconditions or overarching 
principles necessary for the success of any counterinsurgency effort: make the population 
the center of gravity, and adopt an oil spot counterinsurgency strategy.340  The chapter 
provides four strategies that focus on attacking and severing the Taliban’s critical 
linkages, given their identified strengths and weaknesses. These strategies are (1) Input 
Denial, (2) Counter Production, (3) Counter Output/Force, and (4) Counter Authority. 
The authors provide recommendations for implementing these strategies based on 
personal experience, introspection, a survey of field operatives, COIN theory and history. 
The goal is to discern what might transform current disjointed strategies into a cohesive 
approach that is based upon the enemy, rather than on matters like the available forces, 
national caveats and confusing command structures.  A unified effort to counter the  
 
                                                 
339 Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), 222. 
340 The oil spot strategy (sometimes called the ink spot strategy) is a method for countering an 
insurgency in a large hostile region with a relatively small force. First, the red (insurgent controlled), pink 
(contested), and white (government controlled) areas must be identified across the region. The COIN force 
starts by establishing a number of small safe areas dispersed over the region in the pink or red areas 
identified as most crucial. It then pushes out from each area, extending its control and expanding the areas 
until they eventually merge, leaving only pockets of resistance. The name of the strategy refers how oil or 
ink spots spread on a piece of blotting paper or tissue. This approach to COIN is described in detail in a 
later section of this chapter. 
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enemy’s production mechanism341 is the way forward for Coalition forces operating in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The chapter also explains the thesis's limitations and explores 
opportunities to expand on this research.      
B. SETTING THE STAGE FOR SUCCESS 
There are two preconditions for Coalition forces to implement the recommended 
strategies.  The first condition is to “truly”342 make the population the center of gravity of 
the COIN effort.  The second, given the limits on resources, personnel and equipment, is 
to implement a so-called "oil spot" approach.   
The first theoretical principle of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is that the 
support of the population is the most sought after commodity.  The population must be 
considered the center of gravity.  Without popular support, neither the insurgent nor 
counterinsurgent can further their legitimacy.343  The Taliban surely know this and the 
majority of Coalition field operators surveyed are well aware of the principle (Figure 45 
below). While the IROA, Pakistan, NATO/ISAF and the U.S. do state that the population 
is the center of gravity, their actions are evidence to the contrary.  Until Coalition forces 
internalize the principle at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, the fight will 
remain an uphill battle. 
The second precondition for implementing the recommended strategies involves 
providing “genuine” security for the population.  Galula’s assertion that “[t]he minority 
[of the population] hostile to the insurgent will not and cannot emerge as long as the 
threat has not been lifted to a reasonable extent” must be a guiding principle of 
counterinsurgency strategy and tactics.  Pakistan or the IROA can own the “hearts and 
minds” of portions of the public, yet not gain their support due to real or perceived 
Taliban threats.  Given the limited number of trained security forces, it is difficult to 
                                                 
341 In the context of the Lietes and Wolf model, discussed in Chapters II and VI, the authors refer to 
the Taliban’s production mechanism as the "pump." 
342 Although some nations within the Coalition have identified the population as the center of gravity 
for COIN operations, it is not commonly accepted by the soldiers on the ground, and research suggests that 
the COIN strategies are not being executed as such. 
343 Galula, 52. 
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protect all of Afghanistan and Pakistan from the Taliban.  Hence, the relevance of the “oil 
blot” approach.  If Coalition forces cannot hold the terrain, then the large-scale 
conventional operations discussed in previous chapters only alienate the population.  
Admitting that the Coalition forces cannot control the entire region round the clock is a 
bold departure from what is currently practiced, but essential to assure victory. Galula 
described victory in COIN this way: 
A victory is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces 
and his political organization . . . . [It is that] plus the permanent isolation 
of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the 
population but maintained by and with the population.344 
C. COUNTERING THE “SUPPLY PUMP” 
As described in Chapter II, the Insurgency as a System model focuses on the 
supply side of insurgency and transforms inputs into outputs, thus promoting the actual or 
perceived authority of the rebels.  This sustained authority provides the impetus of 
support from both internal and external sources and allows the insurgency to grow.  
Analysis of the Taliban using the Congruence model identifies their strengths and 
weaknesses.  Considering these strengths and weaknesses, four overarching strategies 
(Figure 44 below) will counter or defeat the Taliban’s “supply pump”: (1) input denial; 
(2) counter production; (3) counter output/force; and (4) counter authority.345 
                                                 
344 Galula, 54. 
345 The strategies recommended in this thesis were conceived and adapted from three primary 
sources: (1) COIN Seminar at the United States Military Academy in March 2007, (2) the seminar on 
guerrilla warfare taught by Professor Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School, and (3) the 




Figure 44. Pump Destroying Strategies346 
Critical linkages are key aspects of the organization that, if successfully 
countered, would render the organization ineffective.  Figure 45 below highlights the 
most important ones as identified by the authors' survey of over 1,000 field operators 
with experience in Pakistan or Afghanistan, as well as the analysis of the Taliban’s 
strengths and weaknesses.  Access to the population, money and the command structure 
are of paramount importance, while weapons caches, ideology, refugee camps and 
outside TTPs are judged less important by survey respondents. Many of the Taliban’s 
strengths correlate directly with these critical linkages. The four strategies described 
below aim to sever these critical linkages. Many of the recommendations to implement 
the proposed strategies are cross-cutting but are described only in the section on the most 
critical strategy.   
                                                 
346 The priorities depicted in this Figure are not based on a mathematical calculation; they represent 
the authors’ sense of relative importance. 
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Figure 45. Critical Linkages, Strengths, Weaknesses of the Taliban 
The survey participants were asked to prioritize COIN strategy methods.  Figure 
46 below identifies the recommended strategy for each method discussed in the survey.  
Popular support was considered the highest priority, with reconstruction, intelligence 
collection, and information operations following close behind.  The top four methods are 
all viable methods of COIN strategy.  Finishing out the list, in order, are targeting High 
Value Targets (HVTs), targeting sanctuary areas, isolating the population, killing or 
capturing insurgents, and reforming madrassahs. The authors conclude that isolating the 
population gets less emphasis than targeting HVTs and sanctuary areas because Coalition 
forces do not understand or do not value the oil spot approach. 
Discussion of the four strategies includes, in each case, the target, the Taliban's 
critical linkages, strengths, weaknesses, and the recommended approach.   
 
 
Figure 46. Suggested Emphasis for COIN 
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1. Input Denial Strategy 
a) Target: The input denial strategy targets access to the population and 
available resources for the Taliban insurgency: people, weapons, equipment and money. 
b) Taliban Critical Linkages, Strengths and Weaknesses:  
The Taliban’s access to the population and their ability to gain support using their 
understanding of human terrain, IO, religious sentiments, pashtunwali, intimidation, and 
by providing security and governance are the most important linkage. Not surprisingly, a 
large majority of survey participants share this view (Figure 45 above). The Taliban’s 
access to refugee camps and other displaced populations is also important as a source of 
recruits. Refugee camps provide established links across tribal groups, appealing to the 
disaffected population adrift and without traditional support mechanisms. 
Taliban access to money and resources is another critical link in the insurgency. 
Because they can pay foot soldiers and acquire material resources, the organization can 
maintain and enhance its influence. The sources of Taliban funds, including narcotics, 
smuggling and diversion of charities must be taken into account.   By severing these two 
critical linkages, the Coalition will significantly counter two of the Taliban’s most 
important strengths: its recruiting pool and resources. 
c) Recommended Approach: 
The Taliban’s access to the population can only be minimized by radically 
changing the current unsuccessful Coalition policy of trying to control the entire region.  
Galula’s eight steps describe the mechanisms to implement the oil spot approach.347  
1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of 
armed insurgents. (Surge) 
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose the insurgent’s comeback in 
strength, install these troops in the villages and towns where the population lives. 
(Quarantine) 
                                                 
347 Galula, 55-56; variables added from a presentation by David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency in Iraq: 
Theory and Practice, 2007 (power point presentation). 
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3.  Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off 
its links with the guerrillas. (Control or isolate) 
4.  Destroy the local insurgent political organizations. (Purge) 
5.  Set up, by means of elections and consensus, new local authorities. (Build) 
6.  Test these authorities through various concrete tasks replacing those who are 
incompetent.  Organize self-defense units. (Test) 
7.  Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. (Nationalize) 
8.  Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. (Mop up) 
The level of control and legitimacy within an area determines to what extent each 
of the eight steps must be employed.  First, red (insurgent controlled), pink (contested), 
and white (government controlled) areas must be identified across the region by the 
Afghan and Pakistan governments.348  Then the process of cordoning and slowly 
exterminating the Taliban’s military and political arms must be executed by, with, and 
through the population and HN security forces. 
The oil spot approach can be applied to the spiritual home of the Taliban’s 
movement, Kandahar, as an example to briefly explain the methodology.  Kandahar, a 
linchpin to the Taliban, is the best launching point for this strategy.349  Refugee camps 
and other major population centers within Afghanistan, like Herat, Gereshk, Qalat, 
Ghazni, Jalalabad and Kunduz might also serve as commencement zones for the strategy. 
Figure 47 below depicts the three zones350 necessary to fully secure and influence the 
area:  the reconstruction zone (RZ), security and influence zone (SZ), and disruption zone 
(DZ).  The RZ represents the focus for reconstruction activities.  This zone should be 
selected for its popular support for the Afghan government and Coalition forces; it 
                                                 
348 Identification of red, pink, and white zones is beyond the scope of this thesis; it requires extensive 
research and critical decision making by the Afghan and Pakistani governments. 
349 This strategy would require that the Coalition forces recall the men, weapons and equipment 
spread throughout the country to the pink and red areas, which their governments have identified as most 
important. 
350 The concept of the urban oil spot approach is derived from Kilcullen. The Kandahar example is for 
illustrative purposes only; it does not represent the detailed planning required to implement this strategy. 
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becomes the main effort of PRT and reconstruction efforts.  The area must be 
permanently garrisoned by security forces (e.g., ANP) that provide constant population 
protection and no kinetic operations without Afghan reconstruction office and PRT 
approval.  The reconstruction zone should not be expanded until the area is fully secure.   
 
Figure 47. Kandahar Urban Oil Spot Example351 
The second ring is the security and influence zone surrounding the RZ.  This zone 
is the main effort of ANA and their Coalition partners; their mission is to protect the RZ 
from enemy infiltration.  The population within this zone are kept under strict control and 
denied the benefits of the RZ.  HN Joint Influence Teams352 (JIT) operate in the SZ to 
influence the populace using the progress of the RZ as “object lessons” to persuade 
outlying village leaders to cooperate and sign up for RZ benefits.  The outlying villages 
within the SZ must meet designated criteria353 before they are eligible for reconstruction 
and development efforts.  Once this criterion is met, the RZ expands into this zone.   
                                                 
351 Google Earth map of Kandahar, Afghanistan with RZ, SZ, and DZ zones depicted. 
352 HN Joint Influence Teams are Afghan led, Coalition resourced groups that influence the 
population with concentrated information operations. 
353 Criteria should include enemy activity reported, village elder and shura exercised control over the 
youth (especially fighting-age males), and no antigovernment or anti-Coalition activity. 
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The disruptive zone includes the remainder of the AOR.  The DZ focuses on 
disrupting the enemy through intelligence-driven operations executed by ANA and 
Coalition forces SOF, thus keeping the Taliban off balance. With intelligence gathering 
the main effort within this zone, the Afghan government and Coalition forces could 
identify the next oil spot locations. The primary focus must be on HUMINT, with 
technical intelligence gathering tools used to add depth and redundancy.  As security and 
stability prevail, the zones will continue to grow until oil spot regions are formed and 
most security can become the responsibility of the population and local civil defense or 
police forces. 
Population control within the three zones depends upon cooperation and the 
security threat.  The survey offered six possible methods of controlling the populace 
(Figure 48 below). Access control, checkpoints and a large concentration of security 
forces proved most important to operators. Mandatory national identification cards,354 an 
accurate census of tribal areas and night curfews were rated fairly evenly. Banning 
weapons rated the lowest, due to Pashtun culture and existing laws and administrative 
arrangements. 
Suggested Means for Population Control
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Figure 48. Suggested Means for Population Control 
 
Severing the Taliban’s access to resources, in part, lies in the control of the 
population. The resources traditionally offered through the Pashtunwali code of 
                                                 
354 Identification cards must include photographs and thumb prints to prevent fraud. 
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melmastia (food and shelter) and internal charities can be denied. Also, as the population 
feels more secure, the flow of intelligence will increase, leading Coalition forces to the 
thousands of weapons, munitions, and explosives caches throughout the region. These 
resources should be consolidated and used by local security forces or destroyed.   
Monetary resources pose a much greater problem. Porous borders and 
mountainous terrain between Afghanistan and the FATA make it impossible to 
completely stem the smuggling of men, armaments and sakat (religious donations akin to 
tithing).  The Afghan government and Coalition forces must focus on the major source of 
Taliban money, which poisons the population and some IROA officials:  opium.  As the 
oil spot zones approach poppy producing areas like Helmand province, the government 
must implement a finely balanced combination of crop eradication, interdiction and 
alternative development and crop opportunities.355 Eradication and alternative 
development efforts should take place in reconstruction and security zones, with 
interdiction activities targeting drug labs and the prosecution of drug traffickers, drug 
lords and corrupt officials executed in the disruption zones.  The benefits of living within 
the RZ can be conveyed through a focused JIT information operations campaign and will 
likely cause farmers and village elders to vie to participate in the legitimate system.356 
2. Counter Production Strategy 
a) Target: The counter production strategy targets the Taliban propaganda 
machine that influences the sympathies of the populace: teaching, training, recruiting, and 
propaganda. 
b) Taliban Critical Linkages, Strengths and Weaknesses: 
The Taliban ideology is another critical linkage for many hard-core members of 
the organization, although it may be less relevant for others.  Access to madrassahs for a 
steady stream of ideologically motivated recruits for high-risk missions like suicide 
                                                 
355 James L. Jones (ret), Thomas R. Pickering, et al, Afghanistan Study Group: Revitalizing our 
Efforts, Rethinking our Strategies (Washington DC: Center for the Study of the Presidency), January 30, 
2008, www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan_Study_Group_final.pdf (accessed April 8, 2008).  
356 See Afghanistan Study Group, 31-33, for further discussion on counter narcotics tools and 
strategy.  This hypothetical situation is based on the successful implementation of the oil spot approach in 
Malaysia and the Philippines.   
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attacks is critical. It is assumed that the ideology itself is vulnerable if approached 
carefully through mainstream Muslim scholars. The Taliban’s propaganda machine 
provides the critical linkage between hard-core ideologues and the sympathetic or 
intimidated populace, leading to further recruiting, teaching and training.  This strategy 
must exploit the Taliban’s weaknesses, including their history of oppressive rule, atypical 
interpretation of Islam, limited cross-ethnic legitimacy, use of coercive measures to force 
support, sectarianism and opposition from tribal elders. 
c) Recommended Approach: 
The first step in combating the Taliban’s propaganda machine is to analyze their 
message and disseminate this information down to the lowest level.  The Afghan and 
Pakistani government and security forces, as well as NATO, ISAF and U.S. forces, must 
understand matters such as the Taliban’s draft constitution, night letters, and strategic 
aims. With this understanding, Afghan and Pakistani357 information operations can 
challenge the Taliban’s aims, exploiting every blunder, suicide attack and crime against 
the population to reveal the dark side of the Taliban. Countering the Taliban’s 
propaganda can also be conducted by reporting government successes, especially in 
development. The government must manage popular expectations for reconstruction to 
prevent disillusionment.358  The population in the contested red and pink areas must 
understand that the Taliban operations prevent reconstruction and development in those 
areas.  Also, fissures in the Taliban organization must be exploited to highlight the 
infighting among regional Taliban organizations.  These fractures can be magnified by 
promoting and reporting on repatriated Taliban. 
                                                 
357 Afghan and Pakistani personnel must lead information operations.  Due to Pashtun xenophobia 
and the predominately Christian Coalition personnel, the Coalition forces have limited legitimacy.  Samples 
witnessed differences in popular acceptance of information operation messages delivered by U.S. PSYOP 
teams, ANA soldiers or local officials.  
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Figure 49. Suggested Priority of Information Operations Means 
The survey identifies the perceived best methods of implementing an information 
operation campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Figure 49 above).  Word of mouth 
scores the highest of all forms of communication, while radio is a close second. Most 
respondents rated these two forms at the top because of their known effectiveness and the 
low literacy rates in the Pashtun tribal areas.359  All written forms of communication 
scored very low.  Written forms do have some utility, because HN JIT, controlled oil spot 
region religious leaders, or IO specialists can read aloud in schools, trade schools, shuras, 
local bazaars and mosques.  Radio can reach the distant population, as can word of mouth 
conveyed by travelers between reconstruction zones and contested areas. Training and 
equipping Afghan and local tribesmen in Pakistan to deliver a concentrated information 
campaign is paramount. The focus of the operations should be to challenge the Taliban 
and reveal weaknesses while promoting the successes of the Afghan and Pakistani 
governments through media that reach most of the population. This may seem an 
oversimplified solution, but it is not being implemented across the Pashtun belt.360 
                                                 
359 This observation comes from Afsar’s experience in the FATA and Samples’ experience 
throughout southern Afghanistan, as well as from data in the Afghanistan in 2007 Survey, 97-108. 
360 Some units conduct information operations consistent with the recommendations in this thesis, but 
they represent a small minority. 
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3. Counter Output / Force Strategy 
a) Target: The counter output / force strategy targets the Taliban command 
structure, combative and technological cells, and recruiters: leaders, advisors, soldiers, 
technicians, supporters, and recruiters. 
b) Taliban Critical Linkages, Strengths and Weaknesses: The Taliban 
senior leadership and command structure is designed for success. The layout of Taliban 
organization as a scale-free network, and its directive control style decision-making 
mechanism at the top make it extremely vulnerable to targeted attacks on hubs.361 
Leadership targeting based on strong HUMINT will create serious problems for the 
organization. As mentioned in Strategy 2, attempts to create divisions or infighting along 
tribal lines will yield major dividends. The advisors, soldiers, technicians, supporters and 
recruiters are all targets of opportunity and do not serve as critical linkages but as the end 
products of the Taliban’s production mechanisms.  This strategy focuses on countering 
the Taliban’s strengths of integration into human terrain, use of physical terrain and new 
TTPs.  
c) Recommended Approach: The most effective way to implement this 
strategy is to increase the capacity of the ANA, ANP and Pakistan’s FC and Khassadars. 
The Afghan and Pakistani governments must continue to invest in developing, training 
and sustaining security forces. The NATO and U.S. governments must “focus more efforts 
and resources on training and standing up the ANA and recruiting, training, and providing 
adequate pay and equipment to the ANP to maintain security in an area once coalition forces 
depart.”362  Without a properly trained security force that shares cultural, ethnic and 
religious linkages with the local population, the oil spot approach will not succeed. Coalition 
forces must continue to fight by, with, and through indigenous forces.  Security forces with 
unproven capabilities should continue to operate alongside Coalition forces while more 
advanced ANA, ANP and FC can fight independently with the limited assistance of 
                                                 
361 Barabási explains that all scale-free networks are secure against taking out of individual nodes 
(middle or low level leadership) but are very vulnerable to targeted attacks on hubs (top leaders and 
facilitators.) For details, see Barabási. 
362 Afghan Study Group, 13. 
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embedded military and police trainers as combat multipliers with air support, access to QRF 
and medical evacuation.363  Coalition forces should remember T. E. Lawrence’s article 15, 
applied here to Afghanistan:  
Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better that [Afghans] do 
it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help 
them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions 
of [Afghanistan], your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you 
think it is.364 
 
Figure 50. Taliban Organization Output365 
 
As the ANA, ANP, and FC operate alongside Coalition forces and embedded trainers, 
they must remember that tactical success guarantees nothing in a COIN fight. All operations 
must be intelligence driven to avoid  harassment of those from whom they hope to gain 
support. With the inflow of intelligence from population that sees growing government 
legitimacy, targeting leader hubs, fighters, facilitators, and supporters will become more 
successful.  In operations against these cells, security forces must not overreact.  
Overreaction, such as use of air power in populated areas, kills innocent civilians and 
provokes the desire for revenge.  As the oil spot grows, many large population centers will be 
out of the Taliban’s reach, and they will be relegated to isolated areas where security forces 
                                                 
363 Afghan Study Group, 13-14. 
364 Adapted from T. E. Lawrence, The Arab Bulletin, August 20, 1917, from 
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_27_Articles_of_T.E._Lawrence, (accessed April 10, 2008). 
365 Adopted from model found in Donald C. Bolduc and Mike Erwin, “The Anatomy of an 
Insurgency: An Enemy Organizational Analysis,” Special Warfare, July-August 2007, Vol. 20, Issue 4, 15. 
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can find, fix and finish them with little fear of collateral damage. This is where Coalition 
forces take away the human and physical terrain strengths from the Taliban. Information 
operations must be integrated into missions, exploiting successes and mitigating setbacks. 
The IO cell should write the narrative before the operation to win the race to get the story out. 
With security and stability established and the Taliban cells disrupted, Afghan and Pakistani 
government legitimacy will grow. 
4. Counter Authority Strategy 
a) Target: The counter authority strategy targets the Taliban’s authority and 
legitimacy: political footprint, control and influence of populace. 
b) Taliban Critical Linkages, Strengths and Weaknesses: Popular support is 
the critical linkage to the legitimacy that the Taliban needs to further their insurgency. 
This strategy views authority and legitimacy as a zero sum game between the Taliban and 
the Afghan and Pakistan governments. Promoting government legitimacy makes 
government better able to counter Taliban popular support and the passivity of fence 
sitters.   
c) Recommended Approach: First, both Afghanistan and Pakistan should 
promote the legitimacy of their governments through rule of law, development and an 
expanded sense of nationalism.  Where possible, tribal structures should be used against 
extremism, bringing a gradual political change. In Pakistan, mainstream political 
parties366 can also assist at the grass roots level by influencing the political situation in 
tribal areas. In regards to development, the authors ascribe to Natsios’ nine principles of 
reconstruction and development implemented through the oil spot approach and adapted 
to the unique circumstances in Afghanistan and Pakistan.367 
1. Ownership – build upon the leadership, participation, and commitment 
of Afghans and Pakistanis, thus providing the buy-in necessary to 
succeed. 
                                                 
366 The recent victory of the Pakistan’s ANP political party over the MMA provides a vehicle that 
could facilitate this recommendation. 
367 Andrew S. Natsios, “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,” Parameters, 
Autumn 2005; 35, 3; 7-19. 
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2. Capacity Building – Coalition, Afghan, and Pakistani forces must 
strengthen local institutions, teach technical skills, and promote policies 
agreeable to the populace. 
3. Sustainability – Programs must be designed taking into consideration 
cultural variables so that the impact can endure. 
4. Selectivity – Resources must be allocated based upon the needs of the 
people that support the government. 
5. Assessment – Diligent research must be conducted in order to assure 
design of development for the local conditions.  One size does not fit all 
in different regions and population centers. 
6. Results – Objectives must be identified upfront in order to allow the 
proper allocation of resources necessary to succeed. 
7. Partnership – Coordination between donor governments, organizations, 
and private sector is paramount ensure strategic effects. 
8. Flexibility – Coalition forces and the Afghan and Pakistani 
governments must be prepared for fluid conditions and take advantage 
of opportunities. 
Two overarching ideals are required to provide for the growing legitimacy of the 
governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan: (1) “reconstruction aid and development 
assistance must flow into a region immediately after it is cleared of Taliban presence by 
the Coalition”368 and (2) Coalition forces and donor communities must not take credit 
for development.   
The survey posed the question of where to begin in development and reconstruction 
projects (Figure 51).  The participants identified employment opportunities as the number 
one priority. Building trade schools in population centers and beginning massive construction 
efforts to build infrastructure, the second highest priority, would provide opportunities to pick 
up a shovel or a trowel as opposed to an AK-47.  Clean and potable water sources rated third, 
while building schools, medical facilities and irrigation schemes rated close in importance.  
                                                 
368 Afghan Study Group, 15. 
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With few natural resources, the U.N. should promote a Central Asian free trade block and 
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Figure 51. Suggested Priority for Development 
D. COORDINATED EFFORT 
A major problem plaguing the COIN effort is inadequate coordination and 
consensus among Coalition partners manifested as conflicting methodologies, ROEs, 
national caveats and intelligence sharing practices. There is a need to harmonize the 
strategies as far as possible.  
The coordination issues gain significance due to the cross border nature of Taliban 
and instability in the FATA and border regions of Afghanistan. Because of the region's 
history and administrative nature and local sensitivities, stability efforts have to be routed 
through local mechanisms.369 For effective COIN measures on both sides of the border, 
operations and intelligence must be coordinated. The Durand Line issue between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan should be resolved to facilitate clear demarcation of border and 
responsibilities. In addition, the existing tripartite mechanism between Afghanistan, 
                                                 
369 Afghan Study Group, 37-38. 
 140
Pakistan and the U.S. forces should be augmented and given more authority to decide key 
issues of strategy. For better coordination of operations at tactical and operational levels, 
cross-border communication links between tactical and operational commanders need to 
be improved. In addition to the current practice of flag meetings and satellite phone 
communications, Afghan, U.S. and Pakistani forces should consider exchanging liaison 
officers down to brigade level to coordinate operational details and allay misperceptions 
about the intentions and operations of the other side. The same liaison channel might 
allow rapid passage of intelligence in both directions, especially from technical 
intelligence means often blocked by classification concerns about handling by non-
NATO and non-U.S. personnel.  
A similar coordination issue is an inadequate ISAF command structure that 
complicates mission coordination, approval and support mechanisms. Presently, the U.S., 
NATO ISAF, and ANSF work within the same national boundaries but with different 
operational mechanisms, strategic visions and caveats. The command structure should be 
redesigned to streamline procedures and complement the efforts of the various 
components while taking into account national considerations.370 A strategic dialogue 
between Coalition partners to seek consensus on the approach to the insurgency will 
assist in this regard.  
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
The thesis takes a broad approach to evaluating the Taliban organization as a first 
step in understanding specific aspects of the Taliban and the insurgency in the Pashtun 
belt. The study has two major limitations: it presents the Taliban as a single organization, 
and the survey research has limited scope. 
The description of the Taliban used in this study is general; the research does not 
identify the differences among regional groups using the Taliban title. The authors 
believe that examination of the nature of the groups that make up the Taliban movement 
is necessary for a more thorough understanding of the organization. 
                                                 
370 Afghan Study Group, 17-19. 
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The survey sample tilts heavily towards military operatives, which biases the 
responses. In addition, the survey asked participants to rank various options according to 
their perceptions, but might not have presented an adequate set of response options. 
This study inspires topics for further research. For example, deeper analysis of the 
religious and ideological components of the insurgency might aid visualization of a host 
nation led, Coalition forces supported information campaign. Similarly, exploration of 
the potential rifts between Taliban groups based on tribal or ethnic lines could prove 
beneficial to Coalition forces. In the realm of reconstruction and nation building, there is 
a need for more research on use of PRT style teams to conduct grassroots level economic 
growth in the Pashtun cultural environment. All such this research will facilitate better 
understating of the insurgency and the best approach to stability and peace in the region.     
F. CONCLUSION 
One must understand the enemy, the environment and nature of the insurgency to 
develop an effective counterinsurgency strategy. The study advocates sweeping change in 
current strategies and employment techniques in light of the Taliban's strengths and 
weaknesses. The Taliban have become a networked style organization that uses local 
environments and gains power under the influence of other modern transnational 
networks. Their center of gravity is the rural, war-weary Pashtun population. They 
compete by capitalizing on popular concerns, and effectively adapt to changing COIN 
strategies.  
The Coalition forces have also transformed, with some success, but Coalition 
strategies suffer numerous problems. To defeat the Taliban in the battle to control the 
masses, the Coalition forces need to revamp their strategies, making them comprehensive 
and balanced. The authors recommend a shift to a supply-side strategy of severing the 
Taliban's critical linkages by countering the insurgent field force and command structure, 
stopping organizational inputs and resources, de-legitimizing its ideology and messages, 
and targeting its operational mechanisms while emphasizing economic development 
activities. Regional stability and the success of the global war on terror depend on  
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Coalition strategy. It is about time that we change the game on our terms; otherwise, the 
opponents will change it on theirs.  As General David Richards says, "We need to realize 
we could actually fail here." 371 
                                                 
371 David Richards, the former commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, as quoted in 
Bhadrakumar. 
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APPENDIX – TALIBAN SURVEY 
A. PURPOSE   
The purpose of the Taliban Survey is to acquire qualitative and quantitative 
information to support thesis research at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.   
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTICIPANTS 
The survey elicits operational, practical, and academic knowledge from Coalition 
military and civilian personnel with experience in Afghanistan or Pakistan.     
C. SCOPE   
The survey focuses on the perceptions of the participants about several aspects of 
the Taliban organization and its interaction with its environment. It looks at the strategic 
and operational COIN methods employed by the Coalition and asks participants about 
their opinions about the COIN measures and nation building efforts.  The survey also 
elicits insights of the participants about the Taliban’s strengths, weaknesses, critical 
linkages, and adaptation trends. 
D. KEY FINDINGS 
The majority of those surveyed believe that the Coalition has been moderately 
successful in its counterinsurgency efforts, with only 20 percent believing that the 
Coalition is unsuccessful or in a stalemate.  Participants ascribe the current success to two 
primary factors:  the trust and confidence of the people, and cultural understanding.  They 
believe that large-scale military sweep operations have had little or no success.  The most 
common failures are attributed to a lack of intelligence and employment of inappropriate 
kinetic and non-kinetic strategies.  Given limited resources, those surveyed would focus 
on popular support and intelligence gathering activities that go hand-in-hand. They 
believe kill/capture missions have limited utility in the fight for popular support. 
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The respondents maintain that the Taliban's principal strength and advantage over 
the Coalition is its superior knowledge of the human and physical terrain.  Their success 
through the years is due to their ideology and access to what one participant called “a 
never ending pool of recruits.”  According to the survey, the critical linkages for 
Taliban’s survival include popular support, followed by money and areas of limited 
government control where they regroup, train, and prepare to fight.  The Taliban’s 
weaknesses, which can be exploited by a resolute information operation campaign, are 
their indiscriminant use of violence and intimidation of the population, as well as their 
history of repression.  
E. SURVEY METHODOLOGY  
1. General 
The survey was administered to aid the formulation of a thesis about the evolution 
of the Taliban after 9/11. It was conducted in November 2007 and describes the opinions 
of military and civilian members of various government agencies and academics with 
experience relevant to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Taliban. The sample includes a 
fairly good mix of military officers, civilians from government agencies, and academics 
from the U.S., Pakistan, Afghanistan and NATO countries. Military officers with 
experience in the region comprise the majority of the survey population. The survey was 
hosted online on the website of the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. To avoid unsolicited responses, participants were sent a link to the 
survey with a password. A total of 1526 persons responded to the survey. Of these, 942 
replied to all the quantitative questions and 871 went on to complete the detailed opinion-
oriented questions. The details of the sample are described in the succeeding paragraphs. 
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Figure 52. Country of Origin of Survey Respondents 
The bulk of the respondents are from the U.S. (1461, 95 percent), with a small 
response from NATO, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
3. Organizational Affiliations and Status 
The majority of respondents belong to the military, with a small response from 
civilian government agencies and academia. Within the military, there is a major tilt 
toward conventional forces (77.7 percent). The rank structure of the respondents offers a 
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Figure 54. Military Rank of Respondents 
 
4. Regional Experience of Respondents 
The sample represents a wide mix of experience in different regions of the area. 
Geographical boundaries used in the questionnaire are described in Figure 56 below. 
Those with prior experience in RC East in Afghanistan are in the majority, followed by 
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those with experience in RC South. These are the areas where the Taliban have been most 








RC South RC East RC North RC West FATA Balochistan Other 
 
Figure 55. Regional Experience of the Respondents 
 
 
Figure 56. Geographical Boundaries of Areas of Responsibility 
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F. SURVEY QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES 
1. How would you rate the success of military operations against the Taliban 
during the last five years? 
This question gauges the overall perceptions of the success of Coalition forces 
operations against the Taliban. A total of 1080 persons replied to the question. Overall, 
the answers show optimism, as 63.6 percent rank the Coalition as moderately successful 
in its military operations, while only about 20 percent describe the situation as some 
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Figure 57. Perceptions about Success of Military Operations Against Taliban 
 
2. Please prioritize the importance of factors relative to your organization's 
success in the Pashtun belt.  
One objective of the survey is to get feedback on methodologies that had 
previously been helpful in the counter insurgency effort against the Taliban. This 
question, therefore, asks respondents to rank the value of various factors in gaining any 
degree of success. 
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Factors Important for Success




Use of kill / capture missions.
Development activities.
Trust and confidence 
 
Figure 58. Relative Importance of Factors for Coalition Success 
A total of 1,080 persons responded to the question. Trust and confidence from the 
people, cultural understanding, and development activities feature prominently as the top 
three priorities, while large-scale sweep operations and kill/capture missions are 
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3. Please prioritize the importance of factors relative to your organization's 
failures in the Pashtun belt. 
This question is the counterpart to the previous one. It is aimed at identifying 
likely causes of failure in the campaign against the Taliban.  
Likely Causes of Failure
0 1 2 3 4
Equipment shortfalls.
Lack of intelligence.
Inappropriate kinetic ground strategy.
Inappropriate kinetic air strategy.
Inappropriate non-kinetic strategy 
Inadequate training.
 
Figure 60. Relative Importance of Likely Causes of Coalition Failure 
This question was answered by 1080 persons. Inadequate intelligence emerges as 
the top reason for failure, followed by inappropriate non-kinetic strategies (e.g., faulty IO 











1 2 3 4 5 6 N/A
Prioritized Likely Causes of Failure
Equipment shortfalls.
Lack of intelligence.
Inappropriate kinetic ground strategy.
Inappropriate kinetic air strategy.
Inappropriate non-kinetic strategy (IO campaign, reconstruction, civil affairs, etc.).
Inadequate training.
 
Figure 61. Likely Causes of Coalition Failure  
 151
4. Please prioritize the most effective measures employed by the Taliban against 
Coalition forces during their operations (kinetic/non-kinetic).  
The question is designed to analyze the effectiveness of different kinetic means 
employed by the Taliban.  
Effectiveness of Taliban TTPs
0 1 2 3 4 5
Use of IEDs.
Use of suicide bombings.
Use of hostage taking.
Sniping.
Attacks on f ixed sites 
Ambushes.
 
Figure 62. Relative Effectiveness of Taliban TTPs 
A total of 1080 people responded to this question.  Use of IEDs is considered the 
most effective means used by the Taliban; ambushes and suicide bombings rank second 













1 2 3 4 5 6 N/ A
Prioritize d Effe c tive ne ss of Ta liba n TTPs
Use of IEDs. Use of suicide bombings. Use of hostage taking. Sniping. Attacks on fixed sites (military, security forces, police, etc). Ambushes.
 
Figure 63. Prioritized Effectiveness of Taliban TTPs 
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5. Please rank the order of priority that you think our COIN strategy should 
be.  
This question assesses the suggestions for changes in COIN strategy in 
Afghanistan.  
Suggested Emphasis for COIN Strategy





Killing / capturing 
Training  / sanctuary areas.
Reforming madrassahs.
Deny access to population 
Intelligence collection.
 
Figure 64. Suggested COIN Strategy 
A total of 1,080 people responded.  Most recommend added emphasis on gaining 
popular support, effective intelligence collection, and economic development, while 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A
HVT targeting.
Gaining popular support.
Reconstruction / economic development.
IO campaign.
Killing / capturing Taliban f ighters.
Targeting training centers / sanctuary areas.
Reforming madrassahs.
Deny access to population (ink spot theory: controlling small segments of population first and then expanding the controlled areas).
Effective intelligence collection.
 
Figure 65. Suggested Priority of COIN Strategy 
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6. Please prioritize the most important reconstruction/economic development 
activities that should be conducted. 
The aim of this question is to assess the relative importance of development 
activities support of COIN efforts.  
Suggested Thrust of Development Effort








Figure 66. Suggested Development Effort 
A total of 1,080 people responded to this question.  The majority of the 
respondents consider the creation of employment opportunities, road construction, and 
infrastructure development (LOCs) to be most important, while irrigation schemes and 










1 2 3 4 5 6 N/A
Priority for Development
Road construction and communication infrastructure. Schools.
Medical facilities. Clean / potable w ater.
Irrigation schemes (agricultural improvement). Employment opportunities.
 
Figure 67. Suggested Priority of Development Activities 
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7. Please prioritize the most effective means for implementation of an IO 
campaign against the Taliban.  
This question seeks to assess the viability of IO platforms in support of the COIN 
strategy.  
 
Suggested Means for IO Campaign







Word of mouth 
Billboards
Audio / video recordings.
 
Figure 68. Suggested IO Means 
A total of 1080 people responded.  Most consider the use of whisper campaigns as 
most effective, with radio following closely behind. Internet is thought to be the least 









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A




Word of mouth (w hisper campaigns) Billboards
Free distribution of audio / video recordings.
 




8. Please prioritize the means by which you can effectively control a village, 
area, or population in the Pashtun belt.  
This question elicits suggestions about the best means to exercise population 
control in a Pashtun village in a COIN setting.  
Suggested Means for Population Control
0 1 2 3 4
Mandatory ID cards
Access/Check points





Figure 70. Suggested Means for Population Control 
A total of 1,080 people responded.  The majority list establishment of checkpoints 
as the first measure, followed by continued presence of security forces. It is interesting to 
note that a suggested ban on carrying or possessing weapons received the lowest rating, 












1 2 3 4 5 6 N/A
Mandatory ID cards Access/Check points Large security forces 
Population census Night curfews Ban on weapons
 
Figure 71. Priority of Population Control Means 
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9. Please prioritize the long-term political means by which we can overcome the 
problem of FATA in Pakistan. 
This question seeks suggestions about the long-term future of FATA.  
Suggested Measures for the FATA










Figure 72. Suggested Measures for FATA 
A total of 1,080 people responded to this question.  The majority of respondents 
did not prioritize the options and instead opted for N/A, probably because of insufficient 
understanding of the administrative structure of the area. Of those who did respond, most 
suggest is that it should be a separate province, followed by reforming FATA. Only a 











1 2 3 4 5 N/A
Making FATA a separate province.
Merge FATA w ith NWFP.
Make FATA independent.








10. What are the possible objectives of the Taliban? 
Respondents' perceptions of Taliban objectives are measured with this question, 
which was answered by 942 people.   
Taliban Objectives
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Expulsion of CF 
Taliban Afghan regime 
Domination Pashtun areas
Ruling Afghanistan / friendly Pakistan
Taliban Islamic Caliphate
Ousting of the Karzai regime
 
Figure 74. Perceptions about Taliban Objectives 
Most respondents consider the expulsion of Coalition Forces from Afghanistan as 
the primary Taliban objective, followed by establishment of a Taliban regime. 
Interestingly, a possible Taliban aim to dominate both Pakistan and Afghanistan gained 












1 2 3 4 5 6 N/A
Expulsion of Coalition forces from Afghanistan.
Re-establishing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Domination of all Pashtun areas.
Ruling Afghanistan and establishing a friendly regime in Pakistan.
Setting up their version of an Islamic Caliphate.
Ousting of the Karzai regime.
 
Figure 75. Prioritized Likelihood of Taliban Objectives 
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11. What is your perception about the Taliban's primary geographic 
orientation? 
This question is a sequel to the previous question and seeks to assess the likely 
geographical limits of the Taliban as a movement. A total of 942 people responded to this 
question.  Most of the respondents (61.5 percent) consider the Taliban limited to 







Islamic Ummah (i.e. the Islamic community w orldw ide).
Global (i.e. the complete w orld encompassing both Muslims and non-Muslims).
 
Figure 76. Perceptions about Likely Strategic Orientation of Taliban 
 




12. What are the factors considered important for the success of the Taliban 
according to their relative importance? 
This question is designed to elicit responses about the possible factors important 
for success of the Taliban.  
 
Factors Important for Taliban 
Success







representation in Afghan govt
 
Figure 78. Factors Considered Important for Taliban Success 
A total of 942 people responded to this question.  The majority of the respondents 
consider the use of religious ideology by the Taliban to be most important to their 













1 2 3 4 5 6 N/A
Collateral damage during coalition military operations.
Pashtun culture.
Religious ideology.
Availability of madrassah recruits.
Lack of development activities.
A perceived lack of Pashtun representation in Afghan government.
 
Figure 79. Priority of Factors Considered Important for Success of Taliban 
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13. Please rank the order of the perceived critical linkages necessary for the 
Taliban to succeed.  
This question is designed to identify the Taliban's critical linkages in order to 
recommend a COIN strategy.  
 
Critical Linkages for Taliban










Figure 80. Perceived Critical Linkages for Taliban 
A total of 942 people responded to this question.  Access to population is 
considered the most important linkage for the Taliban, closely followed by access to 
money and command structures. Access to outside TTPs is considered the least important 











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A
Population Access Weapons Money Madrassahs and Ideology
Refugee camps Outside TTPs Command structure  
Figure 81. Priority of Perceived Critical Linkages for Taliban 
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14. How would you prioritize the strengths of the Taliban as an organization or 
entity? 




0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Knowledge of the
human terrain







Use of physical terrain 
Rating Average  
Figure 82. Perceptions about Taliban Strengths 
A total of 942 people responded to this question.  Most respondents consider the 
Taliban's knowledge of human terrain to be their major strength, followed by their 
knowledge of physical terrain and availability of a large recruitment pool. Interestingly, 
popular support ranked much lower, probably as respondents consider that because of the 
Taliban’s knowledge of culture and ability to use it to their advantage does not require a 













1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A
Knowledge of the human terrain (culture, Pashtunwali, etc).
Recruiting pool (refugee camps, madrassahs, disaffected youth, etc).
Alliance with Al Qaeda.
Availability of resources (caches, narco-funds, charities, etc).
Information campaign.
Popular support.
Knowledge of physical terrain (geography, infrastructure, etc).  
Figure 83. Prioritization of Perceived Taliban Strengths 
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15. What is the decision-making mechanism within the Taliban at various levels?  
This question measures the perceptions of the Taliban decision making process at 
various levels of the organization. A total of 942 people responded to this question.   For 
the purpose of this survey, directive control means broad, general guidance and 
decentralized execution, consultative control means making decisions based on consensus 
among the leaders, and autocratic control means giving out strict orders with exact details 
for execution. Most respondents believe the Taliban have a directive control mechanism 
at the strategic level, are consultation oriented at the operational level, and are autocratic 























Strategic Level Operational Level Tactical Level
Decision Making Process
Autocratic Consultation Directive control
 
Figure 84. Perceptions about Decision-making Mechanisms within Taliban 
 
16. How would you prioritize the weaknesses of the Taliban as an organization 
or entity? 
This question seeks to identify Taliban weaknesses.  
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Taliban Weaknesses
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
Intolerant interpretation of Islam
Local legitimacy based on ethnicity
Indiscriminate violence and intimidation
Past history of repression
Lack of international acceptance
Opposition from tribal leaders
A dominantly sectarian outlook
Rating Average
 
Figure 85. Perceptions about Taliban Weaknesses 
Most of the 942 respondents consider the use of indiscriminate violence and 
intimidation as the biggest weakness of the Taliban, followed by their past history of 
repression and opposition from tribal elders. The Taliban's sectarian outlook ranked last, 
probably because most respondents consider Taliban to be focused only in the Pashtun 











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/ A
Insistence on strict orthodox interpretation of Islam.
Local legitimacy.
Use of indiscriminate violence and intimidation (suicide bombings, IEDs, etc).
Past history of repression.
Lack of international legitimacy and recognition.
Opposition from tribal maliks and khans.
A dominantly sectarian outlook.
 
Figure 86. Prioritization of Perceived Weaknesses of the Taliban 
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